This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

A

SYSTEM OF ORATORY,

Delivered in a

COURSE OF LECTURES

Publicly read at

GRESHAM COLLEGE, LONDON:

To which is prefixed

An INAUGURAL ORATION, Spoken in Latin, before the Commencement of the LECTURES, according to the uſual Cuſtom.

By *JOHN WARD*, D.LL. P.R.G.C. F.R. and A.SS. and T.B.M.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
Printed for JOHN WARD, in *Cornhill*, oppoſite to the *Royal Exchange*.
M.DCCLIX.

THE NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY
813460 A
ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS
R 1936 L

THE CONTENTS.

XXVIII. *Of a Synecdoche and Irony.* Pag. 1.
XXIX. *Of the ſecondary Tropes.* p. 17.
XXX. *Of Figures.* p. 33.
XXXI. *Of verbal Figures.* p. 49.
XXXII. *Of Figures of Sentences, particularly thoſe ſuited for Proof.* p. 65.
XXXIII. *Of Figures of Sentences, ſuited to move the Paſſions.* p. 79.
XXXIV. *Of more Figures of Sentences, ſuited to expreſs the Paſſions.* p. 94.
XXXV. *Of Stile, and its different Characters.* p. 110.
XXXVI. *Of the Low Stile.* p. 129.
XXXVII. *Of the Middle Stile.* p. 146.
XXXVIII. *Of the Sublime Stile, as it relates to the Thoughts.* p. 163.
XXXIX. *Of the Sublime Stile, with regard to the Language.* p. 178.
XL. *Of Wit and Humour.* p. 195.
XLI. *Of Epiſtles and Dialogues, and their Stile.* p. 213.
XLII. *Of Hiſtory and its Stile.* p. 230.
XLIII. *Of the Subject, and different Kinds of Hiſtory.* p. 246.

CONTENTS.

XLIV. *Of the ſeveral Parts of the Subject of Hiſtory.* p. 261.
XLV. *Of the Order and Stile of Hiſtory.* p. 281.
XLVI. *Of the Stile of an Orator.* p. 298.
XLVII. *Of Pronunciation in general.* p. 313.
XLVIII. *Of the Voice.* p. 329.
XLIX. *Of Geſture.* p. 344.
L. *Some particular Rules for the Voice, and Geſture.* p. 360.
LI. *Of Memory.* p. 378.
LII. *Of other helps to Oratory, particularly Hearing, Reading, and Writing.* p. 393.
LIII. *Of Imitation, and who are to be imitated.* p. 408.
LIV. *Of the Subject, and Manner of Imitation.* p. 424.

A

SYSTEM of ORATORY

READ AT

GRESHAM COLLEGE.

LECTURE XXVIII.

Of a Synecdoche and Irony.

HAVING already treated upon two of the four principal tropes, namely, a *Metaphor* and *Metonymy*, I now propoſe to conſider the other two that remain, which are a *Synecdoche* and *Irony*. For as theſe do not require ſo large an explication as the former, what is neceſſary to be ſaid of both may be brought within the compaſs of one diſcourſe. LECT. XXVIII.

I SHALL begin with a *Synecdoche*, which is the more extenſive and frequent of the two. And in diſcourſing on this trope, I ſhall firſt endeavour to explain the nature of it in general, with the ſeveral ſpecies into which it is commonly divided; and then

LECT. XXVIII.

then treat upon each of thoſe ſpecies ſeparately, and illuſtrate them with proper examples.

A SYNECDOCHE then is, *A trope by which either the whole of a thing is put for a part of it, or a part for the whole.* So that the two things, whoſe ideas are preſented to the mind in this trope, are internally related to each other, by which, as has been ſhewn already, it is diſtinguiſhed from all the other tropes. In a *Synecdoche* the word retains its proper ſenſe, and the expreſſion is elliptical, as will appear by the ſeveral ſpecies of it, wherein the ellipſis in moſt of the examples is very obvious, and may with no great difficulty be ſupplied. Now a thing may be conſidered as an whole in three different reſpects, which logicians call an univerſal, eſſential, and integral whole. An univerſal whole is any genus with regard to its ſeveral ſpecies, as: an *animal* with reſpect to *mankind* and *brutes*; or *philoſophy* with reſpect to the ſeveral *arts* and *ſciences* compriſed under it. An eſſential whole conſiſts of matter and form, as: a *man* of *body* and *ſoul*. And an integral whole is any body or quantity, with reſpect to the ſeveral parts of which

the matter of it is compoſed, and into which it may be divided; as: an *human body* with reſpect to its *ſeveral members*; or a *year*, as diviſible into *months*, *weeks*, and *days*. And thus rhetoric is an integral whole in reſpect to the four parts that compoſe it, namely, invention, diſpoſition, elocution, and pronunciation. So likewiſe any aggregate body, as a civil community, which is diviſible into thoſe who govern and are governed; or an army conſiſting of the general, and his ſoldiers. As an whole therefore in each of theſe acceptations of the word is frequently put for a part, and a part for the whole; hence ariſe ſix ſpecies or ſorts of *Synecdoche*, each of which I ſhall now procede to illuſtrate by proper examples, in the order already mentioned.

LECT. XXVIII.

THE firſt of theſe puts the genus for the ſpecies. Thus virtue in general is ſometimes uſed to denote ſome particular ſort of virtue. As when Cicero mentions virtue as one of the four qualifications neceſſary in a general, he means greatneſs of mind[1]. And ſo perſons are often commended for inſtances of virtue ſhewn in their conduct, which reſpect only ſome ſingle virtue, as juſtice, temperance, or

[1] *Pro Leg. Man. c.* 11.

LECT. XXVIII.

the like. And in this ſenſe Cicero calls Clodius, *a deadly animal*[1]. So when our Saviour commiſſions his apoſtles, *to preach the goſpel to every creature*[2], the meaning is, *every rational creature*. And thus likewiſe, *to talk to a perſon*, ſometimes denotes the ſame thing as to blame him, which is one way of talking.

[1] *In Piſon.* c. 9.

[2] *Mark* xvi. 15.

THE ſecond kind of *Synecdoche* puts the ſpecies for the genus. Thus bread denotes any ſort of food. As when a perſon is ſaid, *to get his bread by his labor*. In the ſame way of ſpeaking money is put for any kind of wealth in general. And it is a uſual expreſſion to ſay, that *wine deſtroys more than the ſword*, that is, than any *hoſtile arms*. And the legal form of baniſhment among the Romans, was to prohibit perſons, *the uſe of fire and water*[3], that is, *the moſt common and ordinary neceſſaries of life*, in which all others were included.

[3] *Philip* 1 c. 9.

THE third ſpecies of this trope is, when the eſſential whole is put for one of its parts, that is either for the matter or form. Thus in the evangeliſt Mary Magdalen ſais: *They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him*[4], meaning his *body*. So it is uſual to ſay of

[4] *John* xx. 13.

a

a deceaſed perſon, *He was buried at ſuch a time.* And in the inſcriptions of ſepulcral monuments we frequently meet with this expreſſion: *Here lies ſuch an one*, that is, *his corps.* Nor are inſtances uncommon, in which the whole being is put for the form. Thus when Cicero ſais: *Thoſe perſons live, who have fled from the confinement of the body, as from a priſon* [1]; by perſons muſt neceſſarily be underſtood their ſouls, which are here diſtinguiſhed from and ſet in oppoſition to their bodies. And ſo Virgil repreſents Aeneas as meeting with Dido and ſome of his Trojan freinds in the infernal regions [2], by which are meant their ghoſts. LECT. XXVIII.

[1] *Somn. Scip. c. 3.*

[2] *Aen. Lib. vi. v. 455, &c.*

THE fourth kind of *Synecdoche* is, when either the matter or form is put for the whole being. Thus ſilver and gold are uſed to ſignify money made of thoſe metals. As when we ſay: *I have ſo much ſilver*, or *ſo much gold.* And the word *ſoul* both in our own and other languages is put for the *whole perſon.* So with us, *a merry ſoul*, and *a dull ſoul*; in Cicero, *dear ſouls* [3]; and in Horace, *candid ſouls* [4]; are all uſed in this tropical ſenſe. But this way of ſpeaking occurs no where more frequently than in the ſacred wri-

[3] *Ad Fam. Lib. xiv. Ep. 14.*

[4] *Lib. i. Sat. 5. v. 41.*

LECT. XXVIII.

tings. Thus for inſtance it is ſaid: *All the ſouls, which came with Jacob into Egypt*[1], meaning the *perſons*. And again: *The ſoul that ſinneth it ſhall die*[2]: from which expreſſion, and others of the like import, ſome perſons by not attending to the nature of this trope, have been erroneouſly led to infer that the ſoul is naturally mortal. But ſometimes only part of the matter ſtands to expreſs the whole eſſence or being. So we imitate the Latins in uſing the word *caput* or head to denote either a perſon or thing. For as with them, *lepidum caput*, ſo with us, *a witty head* ſignifies the ſame, as *a man of wit*. And in the ſame ſenſe, *ſo many head of cattle*, means *ſo many entire cattle*.

[1] *Gen.* xlvi. 26.
[2] *Ezek.* xviii. 20.

By the fifth ſort of *Synedoche*, the whole of any material thing or quantity, whether continued or diſcrete, is put for a part of it. So when Cicero ſais: *A war is kindled through the whole world*[3]: in compliment to his country he calls the Roman empire *the world*. And this expreſſion is uſed alſo by hiſtorians. Thus Cornelius Nepos ſpeaking of the quarrel between Mark Anthony and Auguſtus tells us, that, *Each of them deſired to be lord of the world*[4]. And in like manner St.

[3] *Ad Fam. Lib.* iv. *Ep.* 1.
[4] *In Vit. Attic. c.* 20.

St. Luke ſais: *There went out a decree from Caeſar Auguſtus, that all the world ſhould be taxed*[1]. So in St. Paul's ſhipwreck it is ſaid: *They ran the ſhip aground*, that is, *the head of her*; for it is plain by what follows, that the ſtern was looſe. And as to diſcrete quantity, our Saviour uſing this trope ſaid he ſhould be *three days and three nights in the heart of the earth*[2]. Though he did not continue three whole days and nights in the grave, but only part of the firſt and third day and the whole ſecond day, with the two whole nights between the firſt and third day, according to our way of reckoning. For he was buried on Friday in the afternoon, and reſted in the grave that night with the following day, which was the Jewiſh Sabbath, and was riſen on the morning of the next day. So that we muſt neceſſarily have recourſe to this *Synecdoche*, which puts the whole for the part, to clear up that event. And his own words elſewhere plainly direct us to this, where he ſais, he ſhould *be killed, and be raiſed again the third day*[3]. From whence it is evident, that he could not mean by the former expreſſion, that he ſhould lie in the grave three whole days and three whole nights.

SECT. XXVIII.

[1] *Chap.* ii. *v.* 1.

[2] *Matth.* xii. 40.

[3] *Matth.* xvi. 21.

SECT. XXVIII.

But ſome have thought there is notwithſtanding a difficulty in the words, becauſe it is ſaid, *three days and three nights*, whereas he continued in the grave only two nights, and no part of the third night. So that altho this trope will account for the three days, yet it does not ſeem to make out the three nights. Therefore to remove this ſeeming difficulty, we muſt conſider, that the writers of the New Teſtament often uſe the Hebrew idiom, and the Jews expreſs a natural, or as others call it, a civil day, conſiſting of twenty-four hours, by two words, *day and night*, which Moſes calls the evening and morning, when he ſais, *the evening and the morning were the firſt day*[1], becauſe the Jews began their computation of the natural day from the evening preceding. Hence whatever was done between evening and evening was ſaid to be done that day, which the Greeks, agreably to the genius of their language, expreſs by one compound word νυχθήμερον. Our Saviour therefore, when he ſaid he ſhould be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth, means the ſame, as if he had ſaid, *he ſhould be there three natural days, or part of three natural days*, which proved

[1] *Gen.* i. 5.

ved true in the event. For being laid in the grave on Friday in the afternoon, from that time to the evening must be accounted the first of the three days, of which the preceding night was the first part; then began the Jewish Sabbath and continued to the evening following, which was the second day; and from the beginning of that evening till his resurrection the next morning was the third day. And that this way of expression was agreable to the custom of the Jews, appears farther from a passage in Esther, where she sais: *Fast for me, and neither eat nor drink three days, night or day, I and my maidens will fast also, and then will I go in unto the king*[1]. And yet it is said afterwards that she went to the king on the third day[2]. So that by the words, *three days, night and day*, must be meant here three natural days, wherein no difference is made between night and day, but one continued space designed of twenty-four hours. Nor was this manner of computing their days so, as to include the nights, peculiar to the Jews. For thus a day is described in the Roman law, which sais: *The day begins at midnight, and ends at midnight following; therefore whatever*

LECT. XXVIII.

[1] *Chap.* iv. *v.* 16.

[2] *Chap.* v. *v.* 1.

is

LECT. XXVIII.

is done in these twenty four hours, that is, in the two half nights, and the light between them, is reckoned as done the same day[z]. And this is agreable both to our custom, and manner of speaking. But to procede, by this kind of *Synecdoche*, the plural number is sometimes put for the singular. Thus St. Matthew sais: *The thieves, who were crucified with our Saviour, reviled him*[a]: tho it is plain from St. Luke, that only one of them did so[b]. It may also be refered to this trope, when a certain number is put for an uncertain one. So it is an usual way of expression to say: *I have seen or done such a thing an hundred, or a thousand times*: when perhaps so many are not really intended, but only in general some considerable number.

[z] *L. 8. H. de feriis.*

[a] *Chap.* xxvii. 44.

[b] *Chap.* xxiii. 39.

The sixth and last kind of *Synecdoche* puts a part of any material thing or quantity for the whole it. So we say of a man: *He shelters himself under such a one's roof*, that is, *in his house*. And of a fleet, that it *consists of so many sail*, meaning, *so many ships*. And by this trope, that is ascribed to a single person, which was done by the assistance of others, and in conjunction with them. As when it is said that, *Hannibal killed forty thousand Romans at the battle*

battle of Cannae[1]. For an army is an aggregate body, of which the general is the head, and consequently the cheif part of it. And to this kind of *Synecdoche* may also be refered such expressions, in which the singular number is put for the plural. As if one should say: *A man is liable to be misled by the influence of irregular passions:* meaning *all men* or *mankind in general.* Or when less than the real number is put for the sake of any round number. Thus some antient writers, when they speak of the Grecian armada, that came against Troy, call it a fleet of *a thousand ships*[2], tho according to Homer's list it contained eleven hundred and eighty-six. And so likewise the Greek interpreters of the Old Testament are usually called the Seventy, whereas in reality they were seventy-two.

LECT. XXVIII.

[1] *Florus, Lib.* ii. *c.* 6. But see *Liv.* xxii. 49.

[2] *Juven. Sat.* xii. *v.* 122.

I NOW procede to an *Irony*, which was the other trope I proposed to treat on in this discourse. And here I shall first consider the nature of an *Irony*, then shew what are the proper subjects of it, and lastly take notice of the different ways, in which it is applied.

AN *Irony* then is: *A trope, in which one contrary is signified by another.* As if any

LECT. XXVIII.

any one ſhould ſay, *Well done,* when at the ſame time his deſign is to intimate, that the thing was *ill done.* So that by this manner of expreſſion the ſpeaker appears to mean ſomething contrary to the ſenſe of the word he makes uſe of. Not that the word is changed from its uſual ſignification, but by the circumſtances attending the expreſſion we perceive the contrary to what is ſpoken, is intended. Quintilian obſerves that an *Irony* may be known one of theſe three ways: *by the manner of pronunciation, or from the nature of the perſon, or the thing.* For, as he adds, *where any of theſe do not ſuit with the words, it is plain the ſpeaker intends the contrary* [1]. The *Irony* is very plain from the manner of pronunciation in that paſſage of Terence, where Simo ſpeaking to his ſervant by way of reproof ſais: *You have taken great care indeed* [2]. From the circumſtances of the perſon, when Cicero addreſſing to Cataline ſais: *He went to your companion, that excellent man, Marcus Marcellus* [3]. When he calls him, *an excellent Man,* it is evident he means the contrary; becauſe no good man would be a companion of Catiline. And when he begins his oration for Ligarius with ſaying,

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 6.

[2] *And. Act.* v. *Sc.* 2. *v.* 6.

[3] *In Cat.* i. *c.* 8.

LECT. XXVIII.

ſaying, *Caeſar, this is a new crime, and never heard of till now*, the thing he is ſpeaking of ſhews it to be an *Irony*; for it was not new, as all who were preſent very well underſtood.

THE ſubjects of *Irony* are vices and follies of all kinds. And this way of expoſing them is often more effectual, than ſerious reaſoning. For many perſons, who either from temper, or want of reflection, cannot be moved by the force of an argument, are not proof againſt the poinancy of wit and raillery. And therefore we find the moſt grave and ſerious perſons have not declined the uſe of this trope upon proper occaſions. Socrates, whom the oracle pronounced the wiſeſt man of his age, gave ſo much into it, that he got the name of εἴρων, that is, the *droll*. In the ſacred writings we have a remarkable inſtance of it in the prophet Elijah, where he challenges the prieſts of Baal to prove the truth of his deity. For it is ſaid expreſſly: *He mocked them, and ſaid: Cry aloud for he is a god; either he is talking, or he is purſuing, or he is on a journey, or peradventure he ſleepeth, and muſt be waked*[1]. And Solomon takes the like method to expoſe the follies of youth by this ironical

[1] 1 *Kings* xviii. 27.

LECT. XXVIII.

apoſtrophe: *Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth*[1], with what follows, which is all ironical. Nay our Saviour himſelf thought fit thus to reprove the Jewiſh doctors, when he ſais: *Full well ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition*[2]. Where by the words, *full well*, or as it is in the original, καλῶς, it is very evident, that a ſevere reprimand was intended.

[1] *Eccleſ.* xi. 9.

[2] *Mark* vii. 9.

AN *Irony* is uſed on a variety of occaſions, as I ſhall ſhew from ſome inſtances in Cicero. Sometimes he applies it in a way of jeſt and banter. As when he ſais: *We have much reaſon to believe the modeſt man would not aſk him for his debt, when he purſues his life*[3]. At other times by way of inſult and deriſion. Thus when he would repreſent the forces of Cataline as mean and contemptible: *O terrible war*, ſais he, *in which this band of rakes are to march under Cataline. Draw out all your garriſons againſt this formidable body*[4]. Again at other times to give the greater force to his argument, he would ſeem as it were by this trope to recall and correct what he had ſaid before. As in his oration for Milo: *But it is fooliſh in us to compare Druſus, Africanus, Pompey, and ourſelves*

[3] *Pro Quint.* c. 11.

[4] In Catil. ii. c. 11.

ſelves with Clodius; all our calamities were tolerable, but no one can patiently bear the death of Clodius[4]. Now the character of Clodius was ſo well known, that all who were preſent muſt be ſenſible he meant the contrary. And to name no more, an *Irony* is never uſed to greater advantage; than when is it followed immediately by ſomething very ſtinging. Thus ſpeaking of Piſo he ſais: *You have heard this philoſopher: he denies that he was ever deſirous of a triumph.* And then addreſſing to him he immediately adds: *O wretch! When you deſtroyed the ſenate, ſold its authority, ſubjected your conſulate to the tribune, overturned the ſtate, betrayed my life and ſafety for the reward of a province: if you did not deſire a triumph, what can you pretend you did deſire*[1]. This muſt effectually confound the falſe gravity at that time aſſumed by Piſo.

LECT. XXVIII.

[4] Cap. 8.

[1] Cap. 24.

I HAVE now gone thro' the four principal tropes, and endeavoured both to explain the nature and properties of each of them, and likewiſe to illuſtrate them with a variety of examples from different languages and writers. Which I the rather choſe to do, that the general uſe of them might be the more conſpicuous.

Tho,

LECT. XXVIII.

Tho, I think, there are but few which I have produced, but may be allowed a place in oratory. And from ſome of the inſtances here given the advantages, that ariſe from gaining a juſt notion of theſe tropes, muſt appear very evident; ſince the not attending to the true nature of them, has occaſioned ſuch groſs miſtakes and errors in matters of the higheſt conſequence to mankind.

LEC-

LECTURE XXIX.

Of the ſecondary Tropes.

IN treating upon the diviſion of tropes I diſtinguiſhed them into two ſorts, *primary* and *ſecondary*. Of the firſt ſort are theſe four; *Metaphor*, *Metonymy*, *Synecdoche*, and *Irony*; which I have endeavoured to explain in ſome preceding diſcourſes. The latter ſort I choſe to call *ſecondary* tropes, becauſe they are all of the ſame nature with the former, and may be refered to ſome or other of them, tho they have received different names. Some writers ſeem to have increaſed the number of theſe beyond neceſſity. I ſhall therefore take notice of ſuch only, as are of conſequence to be known, and will help us to diſcern the true force and beauty of many expreſſions, both in our own and other languages. LECT. XXIX.

THESE are eight in number, *Antonomaſia*, *Communication*, *Litotes*, *Euphemiſm*, *Catachreſis*, *Hyperbole*, *Metalepſis*, and *Allegory*. The three firſt of theſe are ſimple tropes, and may all be refered to a *Synecdoche*. But the five laſt are of a mixed or complex

LECT. XXIX. nature, and not confined to any one of the primary tropes, as will appear in treating upon them in order, which I propoſe to do in this diſcourſe, but ſhall begin with the former ſort.

A COMMON or general word is ſometimes uſed for the proper name of ſome particular thing or perſon, which upon any account is eminent and remarkable. So we ſay: *He is gone to the city*, or *he came from the city*; that is, *London*. And by the Scriptures we mean the Bible. So likewiſe in ſpeaking of perſons the orator is uſed for Cicero, the poet for Homer or Virgil, and the philoſopher for Ariſtotle. And it is not unuſual to ſay the apoſtle, when we mean St. Paul. On the contrary, the proper names of things or perſons are ſometimes applied to any other of the ſame character. Thus we uſe the word Goſpel for any certain and undoubted truth. And Carthaginian faith proverbially ſtood for the greateſt deceit or falſhood among the Romans. With the Greeks Hercules ſignified a ſtrong man, Neſtor a wiſe man, and Irus a beggar; and the names of Samſon, Solomon, and Job now anſwer the like characters. Both theſe ways of expreſſion are often very emphatical,

tical, and highten the idea more, than where things are expreſſed by their own name. To call a good orator Cicero, or an excellent poet a ſecond Virgil, includes not only an encomium from the arts themſelves, but leads the mind to what is moſt perfect in them, and was peculiar to thoſe perſons. Theſe forms of ſpeech are called *Antonomaſia*, and come properly under a *Synecdoche*; for in the former the whole is put for a part, and in the latter a part for the whole. LECT. XXIX.

NOTHING is more common with orators, than a change of perſons. Sometimes to avoid envy, and prevent the imputation of pride, in aſſuming to themſelves the praiſe of any laudable action, they aſcribe it to their hearers, and do not ſay, *we*, but *ye did ſo and ſo*. At other times, when it is neceſſary to remind them of ſomething, which they have done amiſs; or to caution them againſt ſome wrong ſtep for the future, to prevent giving offenſe, they take it upon themſelves, or, at leaſt join themſelves with them, and do not ſay, *you have done this*, or *do not you do this*: but *we have done it*, or *let us not do it*. And again at other times in compliment to their hearers they

LECT. XXIX.

join them as partners in the commendable actions or virtues of other perſons. As when the whole body of the people is brought in, to ſhare the praiſe ariſing from the ſucceſs of wiſe counſels, or victorious arms. Such ways of ſpeaking often occur both in Demoſthenes and Cicero. They are called *Communication*, and come properly under a *Synecdoche* of the whole.

ON the contrary there is a mode of ſpeech, in which by denying the contrary more is intended, than the words expreſs. This way of ſpeaking is called *Litotes*, and is often uſed for modeſty ſake, where a perſon is led to ſay any thing in his own praiſe; or to ſoften an expreſſion, which in direct terms might ſound harſh, or give offenſe. As if one ſhould ſay, *I do not commend you for that*, meaning *I greatly diſcommend*, or *blame you for it*. Where more being underſtood, than the words expreſſly denote, it is properly a *Synecdoche* of the part. Not that this manner of ſpeaking is always to be ſo interpreted; but where it is not, there is no trope, which muſt be judged of by the circumſtances of the diſcourſe. But that it frequently is ſo uſed, might be eaſily ſhewn from many inſtances, tho it will

be

be ſufficient to mention two or three. Cicero ſpeaking of Cotta, calls him, *no mean orator*, whom he had juſt called, *a very great orator*[1]. And he ſais of Varro, that, *he purſued his ſtudies not without induſtry*; and afterwards gives him the character, *of a man of the greateſt application*[2]. Which paſſages compared together plainly ſhew the import of thoſe negative expreſſions. And a freind of Cicero writing to him, begins his letter thus: *Altho I am ſenſible the news I ſend you will not be very pleaſant*[3]. This news was concerning the death of another freind of Cicero's; and therefore by the words, *not very pleaſant*, muſt to be ſure be meant, *very unpleaſant and melancholy*; but he choſe that expreſſion in the beginning of his letter, as the ſofteſt and leaſt ſhocking, the better to prepare him for the following account of what that news was. And this way interpreters explain that paſſage in St. Matthew: *And thou Bethlehem in the land of Juda art not the leaſt among the princes of Juda*[4]. Where by, *not the leaſt*, they underſtand the *greateſt*, or *very great*, upon account of the honor it received by the birth of our Saviour, as the words immediately following plainly intimate.

LECT. XXIX.

[1] *De Clar. Orat. c.* 56.

[2] *Epiſt ad Brut. apud Voſſ. Inſt. orat. Lib.* iv. *c.* 10. §. 8.

[3] *Ad Fam. Lib.* iv. *c.* 12.

[4] *Chap.* ii. 6.

LECT. XXIX.

I NOW proceede to the conſideration of the mixed or complex tropes.

AND firſt, when any diſpleaſing or ungrateful thing is expreſſed by a more ſoft and agreable word, it is called *Euphemiſm*. And as the word made uſe of is either contrary to the proper word, or only different from it, it may be refered to different tropes. The Latins have a ſoft way of expreſſing their diſregard to a perſon, by ſaying *valeat*; which we have borrowed from them, and ſay, *fare him well*. When the contrary being intended, to what is expreſſed, it comes properly under an *Irony*. And as the word *death* carries in it an idea that is diſagreable to human nature, inſtead of ſaying a perſon is dead, we often ſay, *he is deceaſed* or *departed*, which we have alſo taken from the Latins, who uſe the words *deceſſit* and *abiit* in the ſame ſenſe. So that in both languages it comes under a *Synecdoche* of the whole, to depart out of life being one ſort of departure. But when the evangeliſt ſpeaking of Stephen, who was ſtoned to death, expreſſes it by ſaying that, *he fell aſleep*[t], this is a beautiful *Metaphor*, taken from the ſimilitude between the death of a good man and ſleep.

[t] Act. vii. 60.

LECT. XXIX.

THE next trope above mentioned was *Catachreſis*, which ſignifies in general any harſh trope, tho it is moſt commonly found in *Metaphors*. It is principally uſed by poets, who make choice of it for novelty, or to inforce an expreſſion, where the proper word does not ſeem ſtrong enough. As when Milton in deſcribing the angel Raphael's deſcent from heaven ſais, he

Sails between worlds and worlds[1]; [1] *Par. Loſt Lib.* iv. *v.* 268.

where the novelty of the word enlivens the image more, than if he had ſaid *flies*. But it is ſometimes found in the graveſt authors, and even in the ſacred writings. So we read of the *blood of the grape*. And Solomon ſais, *the horſe leech hath two daughters*[2]. In all theſe inſtances the trope is a *Metaphor*. But when St. John ſais in the revelations: *I turned to ſee the voice that ſpake to me*[3], it is here a *Metonymy* of the adjunct, the word voice being put for the perſon who uttered it. In St. Matthew we read of *Simon the leper*[4]. not that he was then a leper, but had been ſo, and was cured; which is a *Synecdoche* of the part. And when a criminal is ſaid *to have had his reward*, that is, his puniſhment, it is an *Irony*.

[2] *Prov.* xxx. 15.

[3] *Chap.* i. 12.

[4] *Chap.* xxvi. 6.

LECT. XXIX.

HYPERBOLE is the boldeſt of all tropes, for it excedes the ſtrict bounds of truth, and repreſents things either greater or leſs, better or worſe, than they really are. But the repreſentation is made in ſuch a manner, as not to impoſe on the hearers. For an *Hyperbole* is not uſed to define or deſcribe any thing accurately, but only to magnify or depreſs it in a conſiderable degree, when we either cannot, or do not chooſe to repreſent it exactly. The exceſs in this trope is called *Auxeſis*. As when we ſay of any thing that is very high, *it reaches to the ſkies*. The defect or contrary extreme is termed *Meioſis*. So we ſay of a very lean perſon, *he is nothing but ſkin and bones*, or *a mere ſkeleton*. It is principally *metaphorical*, but ſometimes taken from other tropes. When Saul and Jonathan are ſaid to have been *ſwifter than eagles, and ſtronger than lions*[1], the expreſſion is founded in ſimilitude, and is therefore a *Metaphor*. When inſtead of ſaying Cato was a very virtuous man, the hiſtorian calls him, *the image of virtue*; it is an hyperbolical *Metonymy* of the adjunct for the ſubject[2]. And when we read in the Moſaic hiſtory *of cities fenced up to heaven*[3], there is a *Synecdoche*. But if a man of weak

[1] 2 Sam. i. 23.

[2] Vell. Paterc. Lib. ii. c. 35.

[3] Deut. ix. 1.

weak ſight be ſaid *to be eagle eyed*, it is an *Irony*. Thoſe *Hyperboles* which are expreſſed comparatively, are commonly moſt emphatical, becauſe they ſhew a peculiarity in the exceſs. To ſay a thing is *as light as a feather*, carries the idea very far; but to ſay, *it is lighter*, not only carries it ſtill farther, but alſo hightens it by leaving the mind at an uncertainty, where to fix the limits. LECT. XXIX.

SOMETIMES two or more tropes, and thoſe of a different kind, are contained under one word; ſo that ſeveral gradations, or intervening ſenſes come between the word that is expreſſed, and the thing deſigned by it. And this is called a *Metalepſis*. The conteſts between Sylla and Marius proved very fatal to the Roman ſtate. Julius Caeſar was then a young man. But Sylla obſerving his aſpiring genius, ſaid of him: *In one Caeſar there are many Marius's*[1]. Now in this expreſſion there is a *Metalepſis*. For the word Marius by a *Synecdoche* or *Antonomaſia* is put for any ambitious and turbulent perſon, and this again by a *Metonymy* of the cauſe for the ill effects of ſuch a temper to the public. So that Sylla's meaning diveſted of theſe tropes was, that Caeſar would

[1] *Suet. in Vit. c.* 1.

LECT. XXIX.

would prove the moſt dangerous perſon to the Roman ſtate, that ever was bred in it. Which afterwards proved true in the event. So when Virgil deſcribing that part of the African coaſt, where Aeneas arrived with his ſhips, ſais, *A dark wood hung over it* [1], the word *dark* by a *Metonymy* of the effect is put for ſhady, and that again by the ſame trope for thick; for his meaning is, a *thick wood*. But the words of Dido in the ſame poet contain a larger gradation, when ſhe ſais:

[1] *Aen. Lib.* i. *v.* 165.

Happy, ah truly happy had I been,
If the Trojan ſhips our coaſts had never
ſeen [2].

[2] *Aen. Lib.* iv. *v.* 664.

In which expreſſion firſt by a *Metonymy* of the adjunct the ſhips are put for the Trojans in the ſhips; and theſe by a *Synecdoche* of the whole for Aeneas, who was one of them; and again his arriving on the coaſt by a *Metonymy* of the cauſe, for her ſeeing him; and laſtly her ſeeing him, by the ſame trope for the paſſion ſhe had for him. So that her meaning is, ſhe had been happy, if ſhe had never entertained a paſſion for Aeneas. This trope is more frequently to be met with in poets than orators, as they take greater liberty in uſing diſtant alluſions, than is ſuited to that perſpicuity of

of expreſſion, which is required in oratory. But as Quintilian has well obſerved, all the intermediate links of the chain in this trope are of no further uſe, than to lead the mind gradually from the firſt to the laſt, the better to perceive their connection.[1] As in the example laſt mentioned relating to Dido, if we drop all the intervening ſteps, and connect the words expreſſed with what is directly intended, they will be found to contain a very remote cauſe put for the effect, which comes under a *Metonymy*. On the contrary in the ſecond example, where *dark* ſtands for *thick*, the effect is put for a remote cauſe. And the firſt, which is founded in a ſimilitude of temper between Caeſar and Marius, belongs to a *Metaphor*. As to thoſe expreſſions, in which the antecedent and conſequent are put for each other, and are by ſome called a *Metalepſis*, I have already conſidered them under a *Metonymy*.

LECT. XXIX.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. c. 6.

THE laſt trope, on which I propoſed to treat, was an *Allegory*. And as a *Metalepſis* compriſes ſeveral tropes in one word, ſo this is a continuation of ſeveral tropes in one or more ſentences. Thus Cicero ſais: *Fortune provided you no feild, in which your virtue*

LECT. XXIX.

virtue could run and diſplay itſelf[1]. Where the words *feild* and *run* are *Metaphors* taken from corporeal things, and applied to the mind. And in another paſſage ſpeaking of himſelf he ſais: *Nor was I ſo timorous, that after I had ſteered the ſhip of the ſtate thro the greateſt ſtorms and waves, and brought her ſafe into port, I ſhould fear the cloud of your forehead, or your collegue's peſtilent breath. I ſaw other winds, I perceived other ſtorms, I did not withdraw from other impending tempeſts; but expoſed myſelf ſingly to them for the common ſafety*[2]. Here the ſtate is compared to a ſhip, and all the things ſaid of it under that image are expreſſed in *Metaphors* made uſe of to ſignify the dangers, with which it had been threatened. And indeed *Allegories* generally conſiſt of *Metaphors*, which being the moſt beautiful trope, a number of them well choſen and put together is one of the fineſt and brighteſt ornaments in language, and excedes a ſingle *Metaphor* in luſtre, as a conſtellation does a ſeparate ſtar. It is true that *Allegories* are ſometimes found in other tropes, but this is very rare. In that known expreſſion of Terence the tropes are all *Metonymies*: *Without Ceres and Bac-*

[1] *Pro Muraen. c.* 8.

[2] *In Piſon. c.* 9.

LECT. XXIX.

Bacchus Venus grows cold[1], that is diveſted of the tropes: *Without meat and drink love dies.* And Samſon's riddle is made up of *Synecdoches: Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the ſtrong came forth ſweetneſs*[2]. But there is no ſmall ſkill required in the right management of *Allegories.* For care ſhould be taken, that the ſame kind of trope be carried thro the whole, ſo as to compoſe one uniform and conſiſtent ſet of ideas: otherwiſe they dreſs up a chimera, a thing that has no exiſtence, and of which the mind can form no perception. And, as Quintilian ſais very juſtly, *to begin with a tempeſt and end with a fire would be very ridiculous and unnatural*[3]. It is likewiſe very neceſſary that the alluſions be all plain and evident, eſpecially where the name of the thing alluded to is not expreſſed. Theſe are called *pure Allegories.* As that of Cicero: *So it happens, that I, whoſe buſineſs it is, to repell the darts, and heal the wounds, am obliged to appear, before the adverſaries have thrown any dart; and they are allowed a time to attack us, when it will not be in our power to avoid the aſſault; and if they throw a poiſonous dart, which they ſeem prepared to do, we ſhall have no opportunity to*

[1] *Eun. Act.* iv. *Sc.* 5.

[2] *Judges* xiv. 14.

[3] *Inſt. or at. Lib.* viii. *c.* 6.

LECT. XXIX.

apply a remedy[1]. The tropes here are all taken from military affairs, without any intimation what they are applied to. But that is plain from the context of the diſcourſe. For he is ſpeaking of the diſadvantages he laboured under in defending his client againſt thoſe of the oppoſite ſide; and ſo applies to the bar thoſe terms, which were proper to the feild. But where the reference is not evident, it becomes a riddle, which is nothing elſe but an *obſcure Allegory*. To avoid this therefore the beſt writers generally uſe what they call *mixed Allegories*; that is, ſuch, wherein the proper name of the thing is expreſſed, which the whole ſimiltude reſpects. Of this kind is that in the ſpeech of king Philip of Macedon, given us by Juſtin where he ſais: *I perceive that cloud of a dreadful and bloody war ariſing in Italy, and a thunder ſtorm from the weſt, which will fill all places with a large ſhower of blood, wherever the tempeſt of victory ſhall carry it*[2]. The proper words *war*, *blood*, and *victory*, being joined to the tropes *cloud*, *ſhower*, and *tempeſt* in this ſentence render the ſeveral parts of the ſimilitude plain and evident. Quintilian thinks thoſe *Allegories* moſt beautiful, where the whole ſimili-

[1] *Pro Quint. c. 2.*

[2] *Lib. xxix. c. 3.*

similitude is expreſſed, and thoſe words, which in their proper ſenſe relate to one of the two things, between which the compariſon is made, are allegorically applied to the other. As when Cornelius Nepos ſais of Atticus: *If that pilot gains the greateſt reputation, who preſerves his ſhip in a boiſterous and rocky ſea; ought not he to be thought a man of ſingular prudence, who arrived in ſafety thro ſo many and ſo great civil tempeſts*[1]. Theſe are the *Allegories*, with which orators are cheifly concerned. But fables are alſo a kind of *Allegory*, and of very antient uſe for inculcating virtue, reproving vice, and giving directions for the conduct of life. We have many inſtances upon record of the favourable reception they have met with, and the influence they have had upon the minds of thoſe, to whom they have been addreſſed. And the beſt orators have ſometimes made uſe of them, eſpecially in addreſſing to the populace. So when Alexander after his conqueſt of Thebes ordered the Athenians to deliver up to him eight, or as others ſay, ten of their orators, Demoſthenes diſſuaded them from complying with this demand by a fable of the ſheep, who being prevailed with to give up their guardian

LECT. XXIX.

[1] *Cap.* x.

LECT. XXIX.

dian dogs to the wolf, became afterwards an eaſy prey to him themſelves [1].

[1] *Plutarch in Demos.*

THUS I have gone thro what relates to the ſubject of Tropes, and in my next diſcourſe ſhall procede to the conſideration of Figures.

LECT-

LECTURE XXX.

Of Figures.

THE firſt part of dignity, which conſiſts in *Tropes*, has been largely explained in ſeveral preceding diſcourſes; I ſhall therefore now go on to the ſecond, which relates to *Figures*. LECT. XXX.

THE term *Figure* ſeems to have been borrowed from the ſtage, where the different habits and geſtures of the actors, ſuitable to the ſeveral characters they ſuſtained, were by the Greeks called σχήματα, and by the Latins *figurae*. And it is not unuſual with us to ſay of a perſon, both with reſpect to his dreſs and action, that he makes *a very bad*, or *a very graceful figure*. And as language is the dreſs, as it were, of our thoughts, in which they appear, and are repreſented to others; ſo any particular manner of ſpeaking may in a large ſenſe of the word be called its *Figure*, in which latitude writers ſometimes uſe it[1]; but rhetoricians have reſtrained the ſenſe of the word to ſuch forms of ſpeech, as differ from the more common and ordinary ways of expreſſion; as the

[1] Cic. *De Orat. Lib.* iii. c. 52.

LECT. XXX.

theatrical habits of actors, and their deportment on the ſtage, are different from their uſual garb and behaviour at other times. A *Figure* therefore, in the ſenſe it is uſed by rhetoricians, is: *A mode of ſpeaking different from, and more beautiful and emphatical, than the ordinary and uſual way of expreſſing the ſame ſenſe.* Now as the habits and geſtures of our bodies are in a manner infinitely variable, ſo it is plain that the different forms of ſpeech are almoſt innumerable. But every alteration from the common manner ought not to be eſteemed a *Figure*, nor deſerves that character. It muſt contain ſome beauty, or expreſs ſome paſſion, to merit a place among rhetorical *Figures*, and be marked out for imitation.

BUT that I may procede in ſome order in treating upon this ſubject, I ſhall firſt conſider the nature and deſign of *Figures*; then ſhew the advantage of them to an orator; after that offer a few directions for the proper uſe of them; and in the laſt place give ſome account of the different kinds, into which they are uſually divided.

THE ſubject of *Figures* ſeems to have been one of the laſt things, which was brought into the art of oratory, in order to

to complete it. Ariſtotle, who treats ſo accurately upon other parts, ſais very little of this. But the Greek writers, who came after him, have abundantly ſupplied that deficiency. It is to them we owe the cheif obſervations, that have been made on this ſubject. They took notice of the ſeveral modes and turns of expreſſion, obſerved their force and beauty, and gave them particular names, by which they might be known and diſtinguiſhed from each other. And indeed they have treated the matter with that minuteneſs and ſubtilty, that Quintilian ſeems, not without reaſon, to think they have multiplied *Figures* to an exceſs [1]. But tho it was ſo late before they were taken notice of, and introduced into the art of ſpeaking; yet the uſe of them in diſcourſe was doubtleſs very antient. The author of Homer's life, which ſome have aſcribed to Plutarch, has ſhewn by examples taken out of him, that there is ſcarce a *Figure* mentioned by rhetoricians, but is to be met with in that moſt antient poet. And if we conſider the nature of ſpeech, we ſhall eaſily perceive, that as mankind muſt have been under a neceſſity very early to introduce the uſe of *Tropes*, for ſupplying the want of proper words,

LECT. XXX.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ix. c. 1.

LECT. XXX.

to expreſs their ſimple ideas; ſo the like neceſſity muſt have put them upon the uſe of *Figures* to repreſent their different paſſions. Tho both of them were afterwards increaſed, and improved in ſuch a manner, as to become the cheif ornaments of language. The paſſions of men have been always the ſame, they are implanted in us by nature, and we are all taught to diſcover them by the ſame ways. When the mind is diſturbed, we ſhew it by our countenance, by our actions, and by our words. Fear, joy, anger alter the countenance, and occaſion different emotions and geſtures of the whole body. And we know with what paſſion a man is affected by hearing his words, tho we do not ſee him. He does not expreſs himſelf as he uſually does at other times, when cool and ſedate. Objects appear to him in a different view, and therefore he cannot but ſpeak of them in a different way. He interrogates, he exclames, he admires, he appeals, he invokes, he threatens, he recalls his words, repeats them, and by many other different turns of expreſſion varies his ſpeech, no leſs than his countenance, from his common and ordinary manner. Now as nature ſeems to

teach

LECT. XXX.

teach us by these figurative expressions how to represent the different commotions of our minds, hence some have thought fit to call *Figures, the language of the passions*. And as these are given us, among other wise ends, to excite us the better to provide for our preservation and safety, this is done sometimes by force of arms, and at other times by discourse. And therefore Cicero very handsomly compares the conduct of an orator to the exercises of the *palaestra*, in which, as each combatant endeavours not only to defend himself, and attack his adversary, but likewise to do both with decency; so the principal weapons of an orator, as he represents them, are *Figures*[1], which being no less the ornaments of language than images of our passions, answer all these purposes. Besides *Figures* chiefly distinguish the different kinds of stile, furnish it with an agreable variety, and often serve to represent things in a clear and forcible manner.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 52.

FROM this short account of the nature of *Figures*, the advantage of them to an orator is very evident. They are a sort of natural eloquence, which every one falls into without attending to it, suitably to

LECT. XXX.

that temper of mind, with which he is affected himſelf, and is deſirous to affect others. In a cool and ſedate diſcourſe ſuch *Figures* as convey our ſentiments with the greateſt ſtrength and evidence are moſt proper. And there are others, which are ſuited to brighten and enliven more gay and ſprightly ſubjects. Others again are more peculiarly adapted to expreſs the diſorders and perturbations of the mind. To repeat the ſame thing again would many times be deemed a tautology and impertinent; but to do this when the mind is ruffled, is not only allowable, but the repetition renders it more ſtrong and affecting. So likewiſe to interrogate, exclame, or admire, under the influence of a paſſion, impreſſes the hearers, and diſpoſes them to attention; whereas at another time perhaps ſuch ways of ſpeaking would ſcarce be conſiſtent with prudence. There is a natural ſympathy in mens minds, which diſpoſes them to receive impreſſions from thoſe, with whom they converſe. Thus one gay and pleaſant companion gives a chearfulneſs and vivacity to a whole company; whereas on the contrary, one who is dull and flegmatic damps the ſpirits of all about him, and affects them with the ſame gloomy temper. *Figures*

are

are peculiarly ſerviceable to an orator for anſwering theſe different intentions. And as he finds them in life, from thence he muſt copy them; as a painter does the features of the countenance, and the ſeveral parts of the body; *Figures* being to him what lines and colors are to the other. The deſign of Catiline to deſtroy the Roman ſtate and burn the city is a ſtory well known. There was an army drawn together at a proper diſtance to favour the undertaking, and others were left in Rome, who had their parts aſſigned them for burning the city, and deſtroying thoſe, who ſhould eſcape the flames. And in a word every thing was ready for putting in execution this horrid and barbarous ſcheme. So that nothing retarded it but the taking off Cicero, who was then conſul, which was thought neceſſary to be done firſt. Cicero, upon information of the deſign againſt his life, finds means to prevent it, and the ſame day calls together the ſenate. And Catiline, who was a man of conſummate boldneſs, had the confidence to appear in that aſſembly. Upon their meeting, Cicero opens to them the whole affair of the conſpiracy, and the deſign againſt himſelf, in a moſt warm and pathetic harangue. In

LECT. XXX.

LECT. XXX.

which he had two things in view; to raiſe the indignation of the ſenate againſt the conſpirators, and particularly againſt Catiline; and either by terrifying, or exaſperating him, to oblige him to leave the city. Now he does not begin this ſpeech in his uſual manner at other times, by addreſſing to his audience, beſpeaking their favor and attention, or leting them gradually into the deſign of what he was about to ſay; but as Catiline was preſent, he immediately falls upon him with the greateſt vehemence, in the following manner: *How far, Catiline, will you abuſe our patience? How long will your fury inſult us? What bounds will you ſet to your unbridled rage? Does neither the night guard of the palace, nor the city watch, nor the peoples fear, nor the agreement of all good men, nor the meeting of the ſenate in this fortified place, nor the countenances and looks of this aſſembly at all move you? Do not you perceive your deſigns are diſcovered? and that all who are preſent know of your conſpiracy? Who of us do you think is ignorant of what you did the laſt night, and the night before, where you was, who were with you, and what you reſolved on? O times, O manners! The ſenate knows this, the conſul*

ſees

ſees it, and yet this man lives! lives? nay comes into the ſenate, joins in the public counſels, obſerves and marks out each of us for deſtruction[1]. And in the ſame impetuous ſtrain he procedes thro his whole ſpeech, interſperſing a great variety of the like ſtrong and moving *Figures*. And the diſcourſe had its deſired effect: for when Catiline ſtood up afterwards to make his defence, the whole ſenate was ſo inflamed, and their reſentments againſt him roſe ſo high, from what Cicero had ſaid, that they had not patience to hear him ſpeak; upon which he left both them and the city. Had Cicero inſtead of venting his juſt indignation againſt the author of ſo barbarous and inhumane a deſign, in the manner he did, by *Figures* ſuited to ſtrike the paſſions of his hearers; had he, I ſay, inſtead of this attempted to reaſon with him, and told the ſtory in a cold and lifeleſs manner, he would have expoſed himſelf to the contempt of Cataline; and by leaving the ſenate little or nothing moved at what he ſaid, prevented perhaps their coming to thoſe ſpeedy and vigorous reſolutions, which were neceſſary at ſo critical a juncture. Let us ſuppoſe him to have expoſtulated with Catiline in much the ſame words

LECT. XXX.

[1] *In Catil.* i. c. 1.

LECT. XXX.

words as before, but thrown into a different form, and diveſted of thoſe pathetic *Figures*. As thus: *Cataline, you have really abuſed our patience to a great degree. You have inſulted us with your furious proceedings a long while. You ſeem to have fixed no bounds to your unbridled rage. Neither the night guard of the palace, nor the city watch, nor the people's fear, nor the agreement among good men, nor the calling together of the ſenate in this fortified place, nor the countenances and looks of this aſſembly appear to move you in the leaſt. I aſſure you we are all of us appriſed of what you did the laſt night, and the night before, where you was, and who were with you, and what reſolutions you came to. Theſe are ſad times, the age is very degenerate: that the ſenate ſhould know all this, the conſul ſee it; and yet that this man ſhould live, come into the ſenate, hear all our debates, and mark us out to deſtroy us.* You ſee the ſenſe is intirely the ſame, and the words too in a great meaſure; ſo that there is little more than an alteration in the form of them. And yet who does not perceive how flat and languid ſuch a way of talking muſt have appeared at that time? and how much it loſes of that ſpirit and energy, which ſhews

LECT. XXX.

ſhews itſelf in Cicero's manner of expreſſion? Had he delivered himſelf thus, it might indeed have made the ſenate look upon Catiline as an abandoned wretch, loſt to all virtue and goodneſs, and perhaps have moved ſome to pity him on that account. As we are eaſily induced to compaſſionate perſons in ſuch circumſtances, eſpecially when deſcended from noble and virtuous anceſtors, which was his caſe. But ſure it would have been ill ſuited to fire their minds with that generous regard for their country, and the neceſſary precautions for its ſecurity, which the circumſtances of the ſtate then required. Nor would Cataline have been at all deterred by it, but rather encouraged in the proſecution of his deſigns, from the little effect a ſpeech ſo managed muſt probably have had upon the minds of the ſenators. But Cicero knew very well, that the paſſions of mankind are the ſprings of action: that it is many times not ſufficient for an orator to convince their minds by ſeting the truth in a clear light; but he muſt alſo raiſe their hopes, alarm their fears, inflame their anger, or excite ſome other ſuitable paſſion, before they will be brought to act with that zeal and fervor, which

SECT. XXX.

which the caſe may require. And as he was admirably well ſkilled in this art of touching the paſſions, he ſeldom fails to fix upon the moſt proper methods of doing it, and makes choice of ſuch *Figures* and modes of ſpeaking, as in the ſtrongeſt manner repreſent the emotions of his own mind. For every paſſion is not to be expreſſed by the ſame *Figures*, any more than it is drawn by the ſame lines, or painted with the ſame colors. When Dido finds that Aeneas is about to leave her, ſhe uſes all her arts to detain him. And as perſons in great diſtreſs are ſeldom at a loſs to expreſs their condition in the moſt affecting way; ſhe diſcovers her fear, anger, revenge, with the whole croud of diſorders, which then poſſeſſed her mind, in a variety of moving *Figures*, ſuited to raiſe the counter paſſions in his breaſt, as is finely repreſented by Virgil in that artful ſpeech he has made for her, which I forbear to recite for no other reaſon, but the length of it [1]. But what particular *Figures* are moſt accommodated to anſwer the ſeveral ends propoſed by them, will beſt appear, when I come to treat of them ſeparately.

[1] *Aen. Lib.* iv. *v.* 305.

I

LECT. XXX.

I SHALL therefore now procede to lay down a few directions for the proper uſe of *Figures*. And firſt they ſhould always be accommodated to the ſentiments, and riſe in proportion to the images, deſigned to be conveyed by them. So far as they are founded in reaſon, they are ſuited to impreſs the mind; but where the language out-ſtrips the thought, tho it may pleaſe the ear, and ſome weak perſons may be carried away with a pomp of words, yet an intelligent hearer will ſoon ſee thro the thin and airy dreſs. It is the ſenſe, which gives weight to the *Figure*, as that by ſtriking the imagination awakens the mind, and excites it to act in conformity to reaſon. Again in the uſe of pathetic *Figures* it is generally better to be nervous than copious, that the images, by their cloſer union, may impreſs the mind with greater force and energy; tho in ſuch *Figures* as are deſigned for ornament, or illuſtration, a more diffuſive way of painting is ſometimes agreable. But further, the too frequent uſe of *Figures* ought to be avoided. For what I obſerved in relation to *Tropes*, is alſo true with reſpect to theſe; that a great number of them is apt to darken and obſcure the ſtile.

LECT. XXX.

And beſides, Cicero's reflection in this caſe is very juſt, that: *It is hard to ſay, what ſhould be the reaſon, that thoſe things, which moſt affect us with a ſenſible pleaſure, and at firſt ſight ſooneſt move us, do likewiſe ſooneſt cloy and ſatiate us*[1]. But that it is ſo, we find by common experience. Laſtly, *Figures* ſhould be ſo interwoven in a diſcourſe, as not to render the ſtile rough and uneven, ſometimes high and at other times low; now dry and jejune, then pompous and florid. In a word they ſhould rather ſeem to ariſe from nature than art, to offer themſelves than to be the effect of ſtudy; and to appear not like patches upon a face, but the agreable beauty of a ſound and healthful complexion. But of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large hereafter, in treating upon the different kinds, or characters of ſtile.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 25.

As to the diviſion of *Figures*, which is what remains to be conſidered, they are uſually divided into two ſorts, *Figures* of words, and *Figures* of ſentences. The difference between them conſiſts in this; that in the former, if you alter the words, or ſometimes only the ſituation of them, you deſtroy the *Figure*; but in the latter the *Figure* remains, whatever words are made

made uſe of; or in what manner ſoever the order of them is changed. Thus when the name of a perſon or thing is repeated, to intimate ſome known property or quality belonging thereto, it is a verbal *Figure* called *Place*. Cicero was a true patriot and hearty lover of his country. And therefore I ſhould uſe this *Figure* in ſaying, that, *at the time of Cataline's conſpiracy Cicero appeared like Cicero*. The ſenſe would remain the ſame, but the *Figure* would be loſt, if I ſhould alter the words, and ſay, *at that time Cicero appeared like himſelf*. So when two or more ſentences, or members of a ſentence, end with the ſame word, it is called *Epiſtrophe*. As when I ſay: *To loſe all reliſh of life, is in effect to loſe life*. But if only the order of the words be changed in the latter clauſe thus: *To loſe all reliſh of life, is to loſe life in effect*: the *Figure* vaniſhes. And this is the nature of verbal *Figures*. But it is not ſo in *Figures* of ſentences; they continue the ſame, whatever alterations are made in the words. An orator ſometimes thinks it proper to change the form of his diſcourſe, and addreſs himſelf to his audience, or an abſent perſon, or elſe perhaps to introduce ſome

LECT. XXX

LECT. XXX. other perſon as ſpeaking to them, whoſe words may be ſuppoſed to carry greater weight and authority with them, than his own. The former of theſe is called *Apoſtrophe*, and the latter *Proſopopoeia* or *Imagery*; which require no certain words, or order of expreſſion. But this diſtinction between the two ſorts of *Figures* will appear more evident, as I procede to treat on them in order in ſome following diſcourſes.

LEC-

LECTURE XXXI.

Of Verbal Figures.

IN treating upon the diviſion of *Figures* in my laſt diſcourſe I obſerved, that they are commonly divided into two ſorts, *Figures of words*, and *Figures of ſentences*, the former of which I now propoſe to conſider. But as moſt of them depend either upon the ſound, or order of the words, they do not equally ſuit all languages. For it is evident that the antient languages from the inflexion of their declinable words by different terminations have this advantage of the modern, that they are capable of being ſo diſpoſed, as to cauſe a greater variety of pleaſing ſounds, as likewiſe a more frequent return of the ſame, or a like ſound, in which the nature of moſt of theſe *Figures* conſiſts. And therefore I ſhall content myſelf with treating only upon ſuch of them, as ſuit with our own language. And in doing this I ſhall diſtinguiſh them into three ſorts, as they conſiſt in a *deficiency* of words, a *redundancy*, or a *repetition*. LECT. XXXI.

LECT. XXXI. OF the first sort are *Ellipsis* and *Asyndeton*.

IT is called *Ellipsis*, when one or more words are wanting in a sentence, to complete the construction, and fully express the sense. This *Figure* is often used in proverbial speeches, as when we say: *Many men, many minds*, that is, *have many minds*: and: *The more danger, the more honor*, that is, *gains more honor*. But where more is intended by such expressions than mere brevity, and especially when they are the effect of some passion, the *Figure* receives another name, and is called *Apposiopesis*, which is placed among the *Figures* of sentences, where I shall consider it.

THE other *Figure* above mentioned, which consists in the omission of words, is *Asyndeton*. And it is so called, when the particles, that connect the members of a sentence one with another, are left out, to represent either the celerity of an action, or the haste and eagerness of the speaker. Thus Cæsar expresses his speedy conquest of Pharnaces: *I came, I saw, I conquered*[1]. If he had inserted the copulatives, and said: *I came, and I saw, and I conquered*: it would have retarded the expression, and not given so full and just an

[1] Suet. *in Vit. c.* 37.

an idea of the swiftness of the action. In my last discourse I took notice of the vehement and impetuous manner, in which Cicero attacked Catiline in his first oration, where his design was to fire the minds of the senate against him, and oblige him to leave the city; both which points he gained by that speech. The next day therefore, when Catiline was gone, he calls together the body of the citizens, and makes a speech to them, which in a sort of rapture, or transport of mind, he thus begins, by acquainting them with the departure of Catiline: *He is gone, departed, escaped, broke out:* intimating at the same time both the excessive rage, in which Catiline left Rome, and the great pleasure, with which he was himself affected on that account. This concise way of speaking adds likewise a considerable emphasis to an expression, and by bringing the several parts of a thing nearer together, affects the mind with greater force. Thus Cicero sets Cato's character in a very strong and beautiful light by the use of this *Figure*. *Nature itself*, sais he, *has made you a great and excellent man for integrity, gravity, temperance, magnaminity, justice, in a word for all virtues* [a].

LECT. XXXI.

[a] *Pro Muraen. c. 29.*

LECT. XXXI.

THE ſecond ſort of *verbal Figures* is contrary to theſe, and conſiſts in a redundancy or multiplicity of words; which are likewiſe two, *Pleonaſmus* and *Polyſyndeton*.

WHEN we uſe more words than are neceſſary to expreſs a thing, it is called *Pleonaſmus*. This is done ſometimes for greater emphaſis, as when we ſay: *Where in the World is he?* at other times it is deſigned to aſcertain the truth of what is ſaid. So the ſervant in Terence, when the truth of what he had related was called in queſtion, replies: *It is certainly ſo, I ſaw it with theſe very eyes*[1].

[1] *Adelph. Act.* iii. *Sc.* 2. *v.* 31.

WHEN the ſeveral parts of a ſentence are united by proper particles, it is called *Polyſyndeton*. This adds a weight and gravity to an expreſſion, and makes what is ſaid to appear with an air of ſolemnity; and by retarding the courſe of the ſentence, gives the mind an opportunity to conſider and reflect upon every part diſtinctly. We often meet with this *Figure* in Demoſthenes, which very well ſuits the gravity of his ſtile. So he encourages the Athenians to proſecute the war againſt king Philip of Macedon, from this conſideration, that now: *They had ſhips and men, and money, and ſtores, and all other things, which might*

contribute to the ſtrength of the city, in greater number and plenty, than in former times[1]. Every article here has its weight, and carries in it a proper motive to animate them to the war. And if you remove the copulatives, the ſentence will loſe much of its force. LECT. XXXI.

[1] *Philipp.* iii.

I PROCEDE now to the third kind of *verbal Figures*, which conſiſt in a *repetition*. And either the ſame word in ſound, or ſenſe is repeated; or one of a like ſound, or ſignification; or both.

I SHALL begin with the former ſort, of which there are ten, called *Antanaclaſis*, *Ploce*, *Epizeuxis*, *Climax*, *Anaphora*, *Epiſtrophe*, *Symploce*, *Epanalepſis*, *Anadiploſis*, and *Epanodos*. The two firſt of theſe agree in ſound, but differ in ſenſe; the eight following agree in both.

WHEN the ſame word in ſound, but not in ſenſe is repeated, it is called *Antanaclaſis*. This *Figure* ſometimes carries a poinancy in it, and when it appears natural and eaſy, diſcovers a ready turn of thought. As when a ſon to clear himſelf of ſuſpicion aſſured his father, *He did not wait for his death*; his father replied, *But I deſire you would wait for it*[2]. Here the word *wait* is taken in two different ſenſes.

[2] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. lib.* v. *c.* 2. §. 2.

LECT. XXXI. It is likewiſe uſed on ſerious occaſions, as in grave and moral precepts, which are apt to affect the mind with greater pleaſure, when delivered in an agreable dreſs. As this: *Care for thoſe things in your youth, which in old age may free you from care.* Where the word *care* in the former place ſignifies to *provide*, and in the latter *anxiety of mind.* And even our Saviour himſelf once uſes this *Figure*, when he ſais to one of his diſciples, who deſired to be diſmiſſed from attending him, that he might go and bury his father: *Follow me, and let the dead bury their dead*[1]. Where dead in one place denotes a *natural death*, and in the other a *moral* or *ſpiritual death.*

[1] *Matth.* viii. 21, 22.

SOMETIMES the name of ſome perſon or thing is repeated again, to denote ſome particular character or property, deſigned to be expreſſed by it. And then it is called *Ploce.* Thus *Cicero* ſais: *Young Cato wants experience, but yet he is Cato*[2]. Meaning he had the ſteady temper of the family. And ſo in the proverbial expreſſion: *An Ape is an ape, dreſs him never ſo fine*[3].

[2] *Ad Quint. frat. Lib.* i. *Ep.* 2. 6. 4.

[3] Eraſ. *Adag.* p. 627.

WHEN a word is repeated again with vehemence in the ſame ſenſe, it is called *Epizeuxis.* This *Figure* ſhews the earneſtneſs

LECT. XXXI.

neſs of the ſpeaker, and his great concern of mind about what he ſais; and therefore has a natural tendency to excite the attention of the audience. It is ſuited to expreſs anger, ſurprize, ſorrow, and ſeveral other paſſions. As when Cicero would expreſs his indignation againſt Antony for having been the cheif inſtrument in bringing on the civil war, he ſais to him: *You, you, Antony, puſhed Caeſar upon the civil war*[1]. And thus he tells *Catalina* in his firſt invective againſt him: *You live, and live, not to lay aſide, but to purſue your wicked deſign*[2], And when our Saviour would expreſs his great concern and ſorrow for the wickedneſs of the Jews, he does it in this pathetic manner: *O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, who killeſt the prophets*[3]!

[1] *Philipp.* ii. c. 22.

[2] *Cap.* 2.

[3] *Matth.* xxiii. 37.

CLIMAX is a beautiful kind of repetition, when the word, which ends the firſt member of a period, begins the ſecond, and ſo thro each member, till the whole is finiſhed. There is a great deal of ſtrength, as well as beauty in this *Figure*, when the ſeveral ſteps riſe naturally, and are cloſely connected with each other. As in this example: *There is no enjoyment of property without government, no government without a magiſtrate, no magiſtrate without obe-*

LECT. XXXI.

obedience, and no obedience, where every one acts as he pleases. But, as Quintilian obſerves, this *Figure* lies ſo open, that it is apt to look too much like art; for which reaſon he adviſes not to uſe it often [1]. To prevent this therefore orators ſometimes diſguiſe it, by not repeating the ſame word, which ſtood in the former member, but ſome other equivalent to it. As in the following inſtance of Cicero for Milo: *Nor did he commit himſelf only to the people, but alſo to the ſenate: nor to the ſenate only, but likewiſe to the public forces; nor to theſe only, but alſo to his power, with whom the ſenate had intruſted the whole common-wealth* [2].

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* ix. *c.* 3.

[2] *Cap.* 23.

When ſeveral ſentences, or members of a ſentence, begin with the ſame word, it is called *Anaphora*. This is a lively and elegant *Figure*, and ſerves very much to engage the attention. For by the frequent return of the ſame word the mind of the hearer is held in an agreable ſuſpence, till the whole is finiſhed. *You do nothing*, ſais Cicero to Catiline, *You attempt nothing, you think nothing; but what I not only hear, but alſo ſee, and plainly perceive* [3]. It is frequently uſed by way of queſtion, which renders it not only beautiful, but likewiſe ſtrong

[3] *In Catil.* i *c.* 3.

strong and nervous. As at the begining of the same speech: *Does neither the night guard of the palace, nor the city watch, nor the peoples fear, nor the agreement of all good men, nor the meeting of the senate in this fortified place, nor the countenances and looks of this assembly at all move you?* And in another of his orations: *What is so popular as peace, which seems to afford a pleasure, not only to beings endowed with sense, but even to inanimate nature? What is so popular as liberty, which even beasts as well as men seem to covet and prefer above all things? What is so popular as ease and leisure, for the enjoyment of which you and your ancestors have undergone the greatest labors*[1]*?* LECT. XXXI.

[1] Contra Rull. ii. c. 4.

EPISTROPHE is contrary to the former, and makes the repetition at the end of each member or sentence. As thus: *Since concord was lost, freindship was lost, fidelity was lost, liberty was lost, all was lost*[2]. And Cicero in the charge, which he brings against Mark Antony before the senate, makes use of this *Figure*, when he sais: *Do you lament the destruction of three Roman armies? The author of that destruction was Antony. Do you bewail the loss of most eminent citizens? They have been taken from you by Antony. Is the author-*

[2] Ad. ad Herenn. Lib. iv. c. 13.

rity

LECT. XXXI.

city of this order weakened? It is weakened by Antony[1].

[1] *Philipp.* ii. *c.* 22.

SIMPLOCE takes in both these last *Figures*. As in that of Cicero: *You would pardon and acquit him, whom the senate hath condemned, whom the people of Rome have condemned; whom all mankind have condemned*[2]. Here the several members both begin and end with the same word. We have a beautiful instance of it in St. Paul, when he says: *Are they Hebrews? so am I. Are they Israelites? so am I. Are they the seed of Abraham? so am I*[3].

[2] *Ad Herenn. Lib.* iv. *c.* 14.

[3] 2 *Cor.* xi. 22.

WHEN a sentence concludes with the word, with which it began, it is called *Epanalepsis*. As in that expression of Plautus: *Virtue contains all things; he wants no good thing who has virtue*[4]. The *Figure* is the same, but the principle not so honest, in the advice, which we find given by the miser in Horace, when he says: *Get money, if you can, honestly; but however get money*[5]. This *Figure* adds a force to an expression, when the principal thing designed to be conveyed is thus repeated, by leaving it last upon the mind. And it hightens the beauty of it, when the sentence has an agreable turn arising from

[4] *Amph. Act.* ii. *Sc.* 2. *v.* 21.

[5] *Epist.* i. 1. 65.

two

two oppoſite parts. As in Cicero's compliment to Caeſar: *We have ſeen your victory terminated by the war; your drawn ſword in the city we have not ſeen*[1]. Hermogenes calls this a *circle*, becauſe the ſentence returns again to the ſame word, as that geometrical figure is formed by the orbicular motion of a line to the ſame point[2]. LECT. XXXI.

[1] *Pro Marcell. c. 6.*

[2] *Sturm. De Univerſ. eloc. p. 410.*

When the following ſentence begins with the ſame word, with which the former concluded, it is termed *Anadiploſis*. As in the following inſtance: *Let us think no price too great for truth. Truth cannot be bought too dear.* So in that paſſage of St. John: *He came to his own, and his own received him not*[3]. This *Figure* generally ſuits beſt with grave and ſolemn diſcourſes.

[3] *Chap. i. 11.*

Epanodos is the inverſion of a ſentence, or repeating it backwards, ſo that it takes in the two laſt *Figures*; for it both begins and ends with the ſame word, and the ſame word is likewiſe repeated in the middle. This turn of expreſſion has a beauty in it, and ſhews a readineſs of thought. We have the following example of it in Minutius Felix, where he is expoſing the folly of the Egyptian ſuperſti-

tion,

LECT. XXXI.

tion. *Isis*, sais he, *with Cynocephalus, and her preists, laments, bemoans, and seeks her lost son; her attendants beat their breasts, and imitate the greif of the unhappy mother; in a little time the son is found, upon which they all rejoice. Nor do they cease every year to lose what they find, or to find what they lose. And is it not ridiculous to lament what you worship, or to worship what you la-*

[1] *Pag. 22.* *ment* [1]? It serves likewise to illustrate and enforce the sense, by seting it in two opposite views. As in that expression of the prophet: *Wo unto them, who call good evil, and evil good; who put darkness for light,*

[2] *Is. v. 10.* *and light for darkness* [2].

I COME now in the last place to the consideration of those *Figures*, which consist in a repetition of words of a like sound or signification, or both. And these are four, *Paronomasia*, *Homoioptoton*, *Synonymia*, and *Derivatio*; the two first of which respect words, that are similar in sound only, the third in sense, and the last in both.

WHEN two words very near in sound, but different in sense, respect each other in the same sentence, it is called *Paronomasia*. As when we say: *After a feast comes a fast.* And: *A freind in need is a freind in deed.* We usually call it a pun, which

which when new, and appoſitely uſed, paſſes for wit, and ſerves to enliven converſation. Nor is it wholly to be excluded from grave and ſerious diſcourſes: for a witty jeſt has many times had a better effect than a ſolid argument; and prevailed with thoſe, who could not be moved by cloſe reaſoning. And therefore Cicero and the beſt ſpeakers have ſometimes recourſe to it, upon weighty and ſolemn occaſions, as will be ſhewn hereafter in its proper place. LECT. XXXI.

WHEN the ſeveral parts of a ſentence end with the ſame caſe, or tenſe of a like ſound, this alſo is conſidered as a *Figure*, and named *Homoioptoton*. As thus: *No marvel tho wiſdom complains, that ſhe is either wilfully deſpiſed, or careleſsly neglected; either openly ſcorned, or ſecretly abhored.* This *Figure* is eſteemed moſt beautiful when the parts are all of the ſame length, or pretty near it; as it adds to the harmony of the period, and renders the cadency of the ſeveral members more muſical, from the juſt proportion between them. The Greek rhetoricians were much addicted to this figure, and Iſocrates is particularly celebrated for it. But ſome of the beſt orators ſeem to have induſtriouſly

LECT. XXXI.

avoided it, as carrying in it too much appearance of art[1]. And it is remarkable, that this *Figure* appears no where so much in all the works of Demosthenes, as in an oration, which he did not speak himself, but wrote for his freind Diodorus, a man of that taste, who was to pronounce it as his own.

[1] *Sturm. De Univers. eloc.* 419.

THE next *Figure* above mentioned is *Synonymia*. Now strictly speaking synonymous words are those, which have exactly the same sense. But there being few such, the use of the term is so far extended, as to comprehend words of a near affinity in their signification, which in discourse are frequently put for one another. So, *to desire* and *entreat*, are sometimes used as equivalent terms; whereas *to desire* is no more than to wish for a thing, and *to entreat* is to express that inclination in words. In like manner, *esteem* and *honor*, are often taken for synonymous words, tho they have not precisely the same sense, but one is the usual consequence of the other; for esteem is the good opinion, we entertain of a person in our mind, and honor the outward expression of that opinion. When two or more such words come together, they constitute this *Figure*.

4. As

As when Cicero ſpeaking of Piſo ſais: *His whole countenance, which is the tacit language of the mind, has drawn men into a miſtake, and deceived, cheated, impoſed on thoſe, who did not know him*[1]. This *Figure* ſometimes adds force to an expreſſion by enlivening the idea; and it often promotes the harmony and juſt cadency of a ſentence, which otherwiſe would drop too ſoon, and diſappoint the ear. LECT. XXXI.

[1] *Gell. Lib. xiii. c. 24.*

WHEN ſuch words, as ſpring from the ſame root, as juſtice, juſt, injuſtice, unjuſt, and the like, come together in the ſame ſentence, they make the *Figure* called *Derivatio*, which is the laſt of thoſe I propoſed to conſider in this diſcourſe. Cicero obſerving the vanity of the philoſophers, who affected praiſe, at the ſame time they decried it, uſes this *Figure*, when he ſais of them: *The philoſophers ſet their names to thoſe very books, which they write of the contempt of glory; and are deſirous to be honoured and applauded, even for what they ſay in contempt of honor and applauſe*[2]. This *Figure* receives an additional beauty, when repeated, eſpecially in two oppoſite members. As: *He wiſhed rather to die a preſent death, than to live a miſerable life.*

[2] *Pro Arch. c. 10.*

LECT. XXXI. I HAVE now gone thro the principal *verbal Figures*, which ſuit with our language; and in my next diſcourſe ſhall proceede to the *Figures of ſentences*.

LECT.

LECTURE XXXII.

Of Figures of Sentences. Particularly thoſe ſuited for Proof.

IN my laſt diſcourſe I treated on *verbal Figures*, and ſhall now, as I then promiſed, procede to *Figures of Sentences*. Among the antients, as *Iſocrates* is thought cheifly to have excelled in the beauties and delicacies of the former, ſo Demoſthenes is moſt celebrated for expreſſing the force and energy of the latter [1]. And Cicero lais ſo great ſtreſs upon theſe *Figures*, that he repreſents them as the brighteſt part of oratory; and makes the power and efficacy of the art to depend in a great meaſure upon a thorough knowledge and proper application of them. But rhetoricians have no leſs exceded in multiplying theſe, than verbal *Figures*; for which reaſon I ſhall treat only upon thoſe, which are more conſiderable. And becauſe ſome of them are principally adapted for reaſoning, and others to move the paſſions, I ſhall diſtinguiſh them under thoſe two heads, and begin with the former.

LECT. XXXII.

[1] Cic. *Orat.* c. 39.

LECT. XXXII.

AND theſe are ſix, *Prolepſis*, *Hypobole*, *Anacoinoſis*, *Epitrope*, *Parabole*, and *Antitheſis*, which I ſhall endeavour to explain in order.

Prolepſis, or *Anticipation*, is ſo called, when the orator firſt ſtarts an objection, which he foreſees may be made either againſt his conduct or cauſe, and then anſwers it. Its uſe is to foreſtall an adverſary, and prevent his exceptions, which cannot afterwards be introduced with ſo good a grace. Tho it has likewiſe a farther advantage, as it ſerves to conciliate the audience, while the ſpeaker appears deſirous to repreſent matters fairly, and not to conceal any objection, which may be made againſt him. The occaſions of this *Figure* are various, and the manner of introducing it very different. Sometimes the orator thinks it neceſſary to begin with it, in order to juſtify his conduct, and remove any exceptions, which may be made againſt his deſign. Cicero for ſeveral years together, after he firſt began to plead, had always been for the defendant in criminal caſes. And therefore when he was prevailed with to undertake the accuſation of Verres, he begins his oration with this apology for himſelf: *If any one preſent ſhould*

LECT. XXXII.

ſhould wonder, that when for ſeveral years paſt I have ſo conducted myſelf, as to defend many, and accuſe none; I now on a ſuddain alter my cuſtom, and undertake an accuſation; when he ſhall have heard the occaſion and reaſon of my deſign, he will both approve of it, and think no perſon ſo proper to manage this affair as myſelf[1]. And then he procedes to give an account of the reaſons, which moved him to engage in it. At other times the objection is admited as an exception to what has been ſaid, but not ſo as to affect it in general. Thus when Cicero has repreſented the advantages of literature and the polite arts, he ſtarts this objection to what himſelf had ſaid: *But ſome one will aſk, whether thoſe great men, the memory of whoſe glorious actions is delivered down to poſterity, were acquainted with that ſort of learning I ſo applaud?* To which he replies: *Indeed this can ſcarce be ſaid of them all. However the anſwer is eaſy. I have known ſeveral perſons of excellent abilities, who without learning, by the force of an extraordinary genius, have been men of great virtue and ſolidity. Nay I will add, that nature without learning has oftener produced theſe qualifications, than learning without a genius. But yet it*

[1] *In Divinat.*

LECT. XXXII.

must ſtill be owned, that where both theſe meet, they form ſomething very excellent and ſingular [1]. Again at other times the orator artfully repreſents the objection, as ſomething conſiderable and important, to give the greater weight to his anſwer, when he has confuted it. Cicero in his celebrated oration for the Manilian law could not omit to take notice, that Lucullus had already gained ſeveral very conſiderable advantages over Mithridates. And therefore having before deſcribed the war, as very great and dangerous, apprehending theſe two accounts might appear ſomewhat inconſiſtent, and be liable to an objection; he puts it thus artfully himſelf: *But now after what I have ſaid of Lucullus, it may probably be aſked: How then can the war be ſo great? Be pleaſed to hear, for there ſeems to be very juſt reaſon for this queſtion* [2]. And then he procedes to ſhew from the power of king Mithridates at that time, his great abilities, long experience in military affairs, and freſh alliances, that the war was yet very great and dangerous. But ſometimes, when the orator is ſenſible, that what he has advanced lies open to an objection, he omits to make it in expreſs terms, and yet procedes to vindicate what he had ſaid, as

[1] *Pro Arch. c. 7.*

[2] *Pro Leg. Manil. c. 9.*

as if it had been made. Thus when Cicero had charged Verres with having plundered the inhabitants of Sicily of all their plate, jewels, and other valuable moveables, which he thought worth while to carry away; as the audience might imagine this to be ſcarce credible, he takes it for granted they thought ſo, and therefore immediately adds: *As ſtrange as this is, I affirm it poſitively, without any intention to aggravate the crime*[1]. And ſo he goes on to the proof of his aſſertion. But this *Figure* is likewiſe made uſe of to guard againſt ſome objection, which the ſpeaker apprehends may be made againſt what he deſigns to ſay. And thus Cicero uſes it in his oration for Sextius. *My province*, ſais he, *as I ſpeak laſt, ſeems to call for affection to my freind, rather than his defence; complaint, rather than eloquence; expreſſions of greif, rather than art. And therefore, if I ſhall expreſs myſelf with more warmth, or greater freedom, than thoſe who have ſpoke before me; I hope you will grant me all that liberty of ſpeech, which you judge reaſonable to be allowed to an affectionate ſorrow, and juſt reſentment*[2]. This *Figure* requires great prudence and diſcretion in the management of it. The ſpeaker muſt

LECT. XXXII.

[1] *In Verr. L.* iv. *c.* 8.

[2] *Cap.* 2.

LECT. XXXII.

conſider well the temper, bias, and other circumſtances of his hearers, in order to form a right judgement, what parts of his diſcourſe may be moſt liable to exception. For to object ſuch things, which the hearers would never have thought of themſelves, is to give himſelf a needleſs trouble; and to ſtart ſuch difficulties, which he cannot afterwards fairly remove, will expoſe both himſelf and his cauſe. But as nothing gives an audience greater pleaſure and ſatisfaction, than to have their ſcruples fully anſwered, as they riſe in their thoughts; ſo on the contrary, be a diſcourſe otherwiſe ever ſo entertaining and agreable, if there be any doubt left upon the minds of the hearers, it gives them a pain, that continues with them, till it be removed.

THE figure *Hypobole* or *Subjection* is not much unlike the former. And is ſo called, when ſeveral things are mentioned, that ſeem to make for the contrary ſide, and each of them refuted in order. It conſiſts of three parts when complete; a propoſition, an enumeration of particulars with their anſwers, and a concluſion. Thus Cicero upon his return from baniſhment vindicates his conduct in withdrawing ſo quietly,

quietly, and not oppoſing the faction that ejected him. *My departure*, ſais he, *is objected to me, which charge I cannot anſwer without commending myſelf. For what muſt I ſay? That I fled from a conſciouſneſs of guilt? But what is charged upon me as a crime, was ſo far from being a fault, that it is the moſt glorious action ſince the memory of man:* he means his puniſhing the aſſociates of Catiline. *That I feared being called to an account by the people? That was never talked of, and if it had been done, I ſhould have come off with double honor. That I wanted the ſupport of good and honeſt men? That is falſe. That I was afraid of death? That is a calumny. I muſt therefore ſay, what I would not, unleſs compelled to it, that I withdrew to preſerve the city*[1]. When the objections are put by way of queſtion, as in the example here given, they add a briſkneſs and poinancy to the *Figure*. All the parts of it are not conſtantly expreſſed. For thus Cicero in his defence of Plancius introduces his adverſary objecting, and himſelf anſwering: *The people judged ill, but they did judge; they ſhould not have done it, but they had a power; I cannot ſubmit to it, but many very great and wiſe men*

LECT. XXXII.

[1] *Pro dom.* c. 35.

LECT. XXXII.

have[1]. Both the propoſition and concluſion are here omited.

[1] *Cap.* 4.

THE next *Figure* in order is *Anacoinoſis*, or *Communication*, by which the ſpeaker deliberates either with the judges, the hearers, or the adverſary himſelf. Thus Cicero addreſſes the judges in his accuſation of Verres: *Now I deſire your opinion, what you think I ought to do. And I know your advice will be, tho you do not declare it, what appears to me neceſſary to be done*[2]. In another place we find him reaſoning in this manner with the adverſe party: *What could you have done in ſuch a caſe, and at ſuch a time? When to have ſat ſtill, or withdrew would have been cowardice; when the wickedneſs and fury of Saturninus the tribune had called you into the capitol, and the conſuls, to defend the ſafety and liberty of your country, whoſe authority, whoſe voice, which party would you have followed, and whoſe command would you have choſe to obey*[3]? This *Figure* carries in it an air of modeſty and condeſcenſion, when the ſpeaker ſeems unwilling to determine in his own cauſe, but refers it to the opinion of others. It likewiſe ſhews a perſuaſion of the equity of his cauſe, that he can leave it to their arbitration; and ſerves very

[2] *Proem. in Verr. c.* 11.

[3] *Pro Rabir. c.* 8.

very much to conciliate their minds, while he joins them, as it were, with himſelf, and makes them of his party. And when the appeal is made to the adverſe party, it is of conſiderable advantage, either to extort a confeſſion, or at leaſt to ſilence him. And therefore the ſacred writers ſometimes very beautifully introduce God himſelf thus expoſtulating with mankind. As the prophet Malachi: *A ſon honoureth his father, and a ſervant his maſter. If then I be a father, where is mine honour? and if I be a maſter, where is my fear*[1]? [1] *Chap.* i. 6.

LECT. XXXII.

ANOTHER *Figure*, that comes under this head, is *Epitrope* or *Conceſſion*? which grants one thing to obtain another more advantageous. It is either real or feigned. And either the whole of a thing, or a part only is granted[2]. I ſhall conſider each of theſe ſeparately, and illuſtrate them with proper examples. Nothing more confounds an adverſary, than to grant him his whole argument, and at the ſame time either to ſhew that it is nothing to the purpoſe, or to offer ſomething elſe, which may invalidate it. *I allow*, ſais the claimant by will againſt the heir at law, *that nobody was more nearly related to the deceaſed than you; that he was under ſome obligations* [2] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* v. c. 11. §. 4, 5.

LECT. XXXII.

tions to you; that you were in the army together; but what is all this to the will[1]? And thus Cicero in his defence of Ligarius, who was accuſed by Tubero for having joined with Pompey in the civil war between him and Caeſar: *You have, Tubero, what an accuſer would moſt deſire, the accuſed perſon confeſſing the charge; but ſo as to affirm, that he was of the ſame party with you, and your excellent father. Therefore own firſt that it was a crime in yourſelf, before you charge it as ſuch upon Ligarius*[2]. Sometimes the orator gives up ſome particular point, that would well admit of a diſpute, to gain ſomething more conſiderable, which he thinks cannot fairly be denied him. In the affair of Roſcius, where the proof depended upon circumſtances, Cicero, who defended him, enquires what reaſon could be alledged for his commiting ſo black a crime, as to kill his father. And after he has ſhewn there was no probable reaſon to be aſſigned for it, he adds: *Well; ſince you can offer no reaſon, altho this might be ſufficient for me, yet I will recede from my right; and upon the aſſurance I have of his innocency I will grant you in this cauſe, what I would not in another. I do not therefore inſiſt upon your telling me, why he killed*

[1] *Rut. Sup. p.* 12.

[2] *Cap.* i.

killed his father, but aſk how he did it[1]? This appearance of candor and ingenuity in ſuch conceſſions removes the ſuſpicion of art, and gives greater credit to what is denied. We have an example of a feigned or ironical conceſſion in Cicero's defenſe of Flaccus, where interceding for him on the account of his former good ſervices, in the time of Catiline's conſpiracy; he ſais in a way of irony, if ſuch things are to be overlooked: *Let us appeaſe the ghoſts of Lentulus and Cethegus, let us recall thoſe who are in exile, and let us be puniſhed for our too great affection, and love for our country*[2], By this artful inſinuation the orator (as an ingenious writer obſerves) after he has uſed all his arguments to perſuade his hearers, does as it were ſet them at liberty, and leave them to their own election; it being the nature of man to adhere more ſtedfaſtly to what is not violently impoſed, but refered to their own free and deliberative choice[3]. And to theſe feigned conceſſions may be refered ſuch ways of reaſoning, by which the orator both juſtifies a charge brought againſt him, upon the ſuppoſition of its being true; and alſo proves that the charge itſelf is falſe. Thus Cicero in his defenſe of

LECT. XXXII.

[1] *Cap.* 27.

[2] C. 38.

[3] Blackw. *Introd. to the Claſſ.* p. 24.

LECT. XXXII. of Milo repreſents the taking off Clodius, with which Milo was accuſed, as a glorious action; after he has ſhewn that Milo's ſervants did it without the knowledge of their maſter [1].

[1] *Cap.* 10. *et* 27.

THE next *Figure* of this kind is *Parabole* or *Similitude*, which illuſtrates a thing by comparing it with ſome other, to which it bears a reſemblance. Similitudes are indeed generally but weak arguments, tho often beautiful and fine ornaments. And where the deſign of them is not ſo much to prove what is doubtful, as to ſet things in a clear and agreable light, they come properly under the notion of *Figures*. They are of two ſorts, ſimple and compound. Thoſe are called ſimple, in which one thing only is likened or compared to another in this manner: *As ſwallows appear in ſummer, but in winter retreat; ſo falſe freinds ſhow themſelves in proſperity, but fly all away, when adverſity approaches* [2]. Compound ſimilitudes are ſuch, wherein one thing is likened or compared to ſeveral others, as thus: *What light is to the world, phyſic to the ſick, water to the thirſty, and reſt to the weary; that is knowledge to the mind.* The more exact the agreement is between the things thus compared, they give

[2] *Ad Heren. Lib.* iv. *c.* 48.

give the greater beauty and grace to the *Figure*. LECT. XXXII.

THE laſt *Figure* above mentioned was *Antitheſis* or *Oppoſition*, by which things contrary or different are compared to render them more evident. Thus Cicero ſais: *The Roman people hate private luxury, but love public grandeur* [1]. This is a very florid *Figure*, and ſuited no leſs for amplification than proof. As in the following inſtance of Cicero, where ſpeaking of Pompey he ſais: *He waged more wars, than others had read: conquered more provinces than others had governed: and had been trained up from his youth to the art of war, not by the precepts of others, but by his own commands; not by miſcarriages in the feild, but by victories; not by campaigns, but triumphs* [2]. It is eſteemed a beauty in this *Figure*, when any of the members are inverted, which ſome call *Antimetatheſis*. As where Cicero, oppoſing the conduct of Verres when governor of Sicily to that of Marcellus, who took Syracuſe the capital city of that iſland, ſais: *Compare this peace with that war, the arrival of this governor with the victory of that general, his profligate troops with the invincible army of the other, the luxury of the former with the temperance of the latter:*

[1] *Pro Muræn. c. 36.*

[2] *Pro Leg. Man. c. 10.*

LECT. XXXII.

ter: you will say, that Syracuse was founded by him, who took it; and taken by him, who held it when founded[1]. To this *Figure* may also be refered *Oxymoron*, or *seeming Contradiction*, that is, when the parts of a sentence disagree in sound, but are consistent in sense. As when Ovid says of Althea that, *She was impiously pious*[2]. And so Cato used to say of Scipio Africanus, that, *He was never less at leisure, than when he was at leisure; nor less alone, than when alone.* By which he meant, as Cicero tells us, that, *Scipio was wont to think of business in his retirement, and in his solitude to converse with himself*[3]. This is a strong and bold *Figure*, which awakens the mind, and affords it an agreable pleasure to find upon reflection, that what at first seemed contradictory is not only consistent with good sense, but very beautiful.

[1] *In Verr. Lib.* iv. *c.* 52.

[2] *Metam. Lib.* viii. *v.* 477.

[3] *De Offic. Lib.* iii. *init.*

In my next discourse I shall procede to such *Figures*, as are more peculiarly adapted to move the passions.

LEC-

LECTURE XXXIII.

Of Figures of Sentences ſuited to move the Paſſions.

HAVING in my laſt diſcourſe treated upon thoſe *Figures*, which are more frequently uſed in reaſoning, I ſhall now enter upon the conſideration of others, which are more peculiarly adapted to move, and influence the paſſions. LECT. XXXIII.

THERE are ſix of theſe, which at preſent I ſhall endeavour to explain, namely, *Epanorthoſis*, *Paraleipſis*, *Parrheſia*, *Aparithmeſis*, *Exergaſia*, and *Hypotypoſis*.

EPANORTHOSIS, or *Correction*, is a *Figure*, by which the ſpeaker either recalls or amends what he had laſt ſaid. It is uſed different ways. For ſometimes one or more words are recalled by him, and others ſubjoined in their room. At other times, without recalling what has been ſaid, ſomething elſe is ſubſtituted as more ſuitable. This is a very extenſive *Figure*, and made uſe of in addreſſing to different paſſions. We have an inſtance of it in Terence's *Self-tormentor*, where the old man, whoſe extraordinary concern for

LECT. XXXIII.

the abſence of his ſon gave occaſion to the name of the play, thus bewails his condition to his neighbour: *I have an only ſon, Chremes. Alas! did I ſay, that I have? I had indeed: but it is now uncertain, whether I have, or not* [1]. Here to aggravate his misfortune he recalls a pleaſing word, and ſubſtitutes another more affecting in its place. And Cicero in his defenſe of Milo ſpeaking to the judges concerning Clodius ſais; *Are you only ignorant, what laws, if they may be called laws, and not rather torches and plagues of the ſtate, he was about to impoſe and force upon us* [2]. Again in his defenſe of *Plancius* he ſais: *What greater blow could thoſe judges, if they are to be called judges, and not parricides of their country, have given to the ſtate, than when they baniſhed him, who when pretor freed the republic from a neighbouring war, and when conſul from a civil one* [3]? He is ſpeaking there of Opimius. But in commending the moderation of Lucius Mummius, who did not inrich himſelf, but his country, by demoliſhing the wealthy city of Corinth, he thus recalls his whole expreſſion, and by giving it a new turn, hightens the complement he deſigned him. *He choſe rather*, ſais he, *to adorn Italy, than his*

[1] *Act.* i. *Sc.* 1. *v.* 41.

[2] *Cap.* 12.

[3] *Cap.* 29.

LECT. XXXIII.

his own houſe; tho by adorning Italy his houſe ſeems to have received the greateſt ornament[1]. And ſometimes the correction is made by ſubſtituting ſomething contrary to what had been ſaid before. As in the following paſſage of Cicero: *Caeſar* (meaning Auguſtus) *tho but a youth, by an incredible and ſurprizing reſolution and courage, when Antony was moſt enraged, and we dreaded his cruel and pernicious return from Brundiſium, at a time when we neither aſked, nor expected, nor deſired it (becauſe it was thought impoſſible) raiſed a very powerful army of invincible veterans, to effect which he threw away his whole eſtate. Tho I have uſed an improper word; for he did not throw it away, but employed it for the ſafety of the Government*[2]. At other times, as has been ſaid, the correction is made by adding a more ſuitable word, without any repetition of the former. Thus Cicero, after he has inveighed againſt the crimes of Verres, breaks out into this pathetic exclamation: *O the clemency, or rather wonderful and ſingular patience of the Roman people*[3]*!* He did not think the word *clemency* ſtrong enough, and therefore adds *patience*, as better anſwering his deſign. The ſuddain and unexpected turn

[1] *De Off. Lib.* ii. *c.* 22.

[2] *Philip.* iii. *c.* 2.

[3] *Lib.* v. *c.* 23.

LECT. XXXIII.

of this *Figure* gives a ſurprize to the mind, and by that means renders it the more pathetic.

PARALEPSIS, or *Omiſſion*, is another of theſe *Figures*, when the ſpeaker pretends to omit, or paſs by, what at the ſame time he declares. It is uſed either in praiſe or diſpraiſe. Thus Cicero in his defenſe of Sextius introduces his character in this manner, with a deſign to recommend him to the favor of the court: *I might ſay many things of his liberality, kindneſs to his domeſtics, his command in the army, and moderation during his office in the province; but the honor of the ſtate preſents itſelf to my view, and calling me to it, adviſes me to omit theſe leſſer matters* [r]. But in his oration to the ſenate againſt Rullus the tribune, who had propoſed a law to ſell the public lands, he makes uſe of this *Figure* to repreſent the pernicious effects of ſuch a law, particularly with reſpect to the lands in Italy. *I do not complain*, ſais he, *of the diminution of our revenues, and the woful effects of this loſs and damage. I omit what may give every one occaſion for a very greivous and juſt complaint, that we could not preſerve the principal eſtate of the public, the fineſt poſſeſſion of the Roman people,*

[r] *Cap.* 3.

LECT. XXXIII.

ple, the fund of our proviſions, the granary of our wants, a revenue intruſted with the ſtate; but that we muſt give up thoſe lands to Rullus, which after the power of Sylla, and the largeſſes of the Gracchi are yet left us. I do not ſay this is now the only revenue of the ſtate, which continues when others ceaſe, is an ornament in peace, fails us not in war, ſupports the army, and does not fear an enemy. I paſs over all theſe things, and reſerve them for my diſcourſe to the people, and only ſpeak at preſent of the danger of our peace and liberties[1]. His view here was to raiſe the indignation of the ſenate againſt Rullus, and excite them to oppoſe the law. There is a beautiful inſtance of this *Figure* in St. Paul's epiſtle to Philemon, where after he has earneſtly intreated him to receive again Oneſimus, his ſervant, who had run from him, and promiſed, that if he had wronged him, or owed him any thing, he would repay it, he adds: *That I may not ſay, you owe even yourſelf to me*[2]. Nothing could be a ſtronger motive to ſoften his diſpleaſure againſt his ſervant, from a ſenſe of gratitude to the apoſtle. Hermogenes has obſerved, that the deſign of this *Figure* is to poſſeſs the minds of the audience with more than the words expreſs,

[1] *In Rull.* i. c. 7.

[2] *Verſ.* 19.

LECT. XXXIII.

preſs, and that it is principally made uſe of on three occaſions; either when things are ſmall, but yet neceſſary to be mentioned; or well known, and need not be enlarged on; or ungrateful, and therefore ſhould be introduced with caution, and not ſet in too ſtrong a light[1].

[1] *Method. c.* 1.

THE next *Figure* above mentioned was *Parrheſia*, or *Reprehenſion*. Not that whenever a perſon admoniſhes or reproves another, it is to be eſteemed a *Figure*; but when it is done with art and addreſs, and in ſuch circumſtances, as render it difficult not to diſpleaſe. The orator therefore ſometimes prepares his hearers for this, by commending them firſt, urging the neceſſity of it, repreſenting his great concern for them as his motive, or joining himſelf with them[2]. Thus Cicero charges the ſenate with the death of Servius Sulpicius, for ſending him to Mark Antony under a very ill ſtate of health. And his deſign in it was to bring them more readily into a motion, he was about to make, that both a ſtatue and ſepulchral monument might be erected to his memory at the public expence. *You*, ſais he, *it is a very ſevere expreſſion, but I cannot help ſaying it; you, I ſay, have deprived Servius Sulpicius of his life.*

[2] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* v. *c.* 13. §. 1.

LECT. XXXIII.

life. It was not from cruelty indeed (for what is there, with which this aſſembly is leſs chargeable?) but when his diſtemper pleaded his excuſe, more than his words, from the hopes you conceived, that there was nothing, which his authority and wiſdom might not be able to effect, you vehemently oppoſed his excuſe, and obliged him, who always had the greateſt regard for your commands, to recede from his reſolution[1]. Sometimes indeed the orator aſſumes an air of reproof, with a view only to paſs a compliment with the better grace. As Cicero in his addreſs to Caeſar, when he ſais: *I hear that excellent and wiſe ſaying from you with concern, that you have lived long enough, either for the purpoſes of nature, or glory: for nature perhaps, if you think ſo; and, if you pleaſe, for glory; but what is principally to be regarded, not for your country*[2]. It adds both a beauty and force to this *Figure*, when it is expreſſed in a way of compariſon. As in the following inſtance of Cicero: *But ſince my diſcourſe leads me to this; conſider how you ought to be affected for the dignity and glory of your empire. Your anceſtors often engaged in war to redreſs the injuries of their merchants or ſailors: how ought you then to reſent it, that ſo many thou-*

[1] *Philip. ix. c. 4.*

[2] *Pro Marcell. c. 8.*

LECT. XXXIII.

ſand Roman citizens were murdered by one meſſage, and at one time? Your forefathers deſtroyed Corinth, the principal city in Greece, for the haughty treatment of their ambaſſadors: and will you ſuffer that king to go unpuniſhed, who has put to death a Roman legate, of conſular dignity, in the moſt ignominious, as well as moſt cruel manner? See, leſt as it was their honour to leave you the glory of ſo great an empire, it ſhould prove your diſgrace not to be able to maintain and defend, what you have received from them[1]. By this *Figure* an addreſs is made to the more tender paſſions, modeſty, ſhame, and emulation, the attendants of an ingenuous temper, which is ſooneſt touched, and moſt affected, by a juſt reproof.

[1] *Pro Leg. Man. c. 4.*

ANOTHER of theſe pathetic *Figures* is *Aparithmeſis*, or *Enumeration*, when that, which might be expreſſed in general by a few words, is branched out into ſeveral particulars, to enlarge the idea and render it the more affecting. Cicero in pleading for the Manilian law, where his deſign is to conciliate the love and eſteem of the people to Pompey, thus enlarges upon his character: *Now what language can equal the virtue of Cneius Pompey? what can be ſaid either worthy of him, or new to you, or which*

LECT. XXXIII.

which every one has not heard? For those are not the only virtues of a general, which are commonly thought so; labor in affairs, courage in dangers, industry in acting, dispatch in performing, design in contriving; which are greater in him, than in all other generals, we have ever seen, or heard of[1]. And so likewise, when he endeavours to dispossess Pompey of the apprehension, that Milo designed to assassinate him. *If, says he, you fear Milo, if you imagine that either formerly, or at present, any ill design has been formed by him against your life; if the soldiers raised thro Italy (as some of your officers give out) if these arms, if these cohorts in the capitol, if the centries, if the watch, if the guards, which defend your person and house, are armed to prevent any attempt of Milo, and all of them appointed, prepared, and stationed on his account; he must be thought a person of great power, and incredible resolution, above the reach and capacity of a single man, that the most consummate general, and the whole republic are in arms against him only. But who does not perceive, that all the disordered and sinking parts of the state are commited to you, to ratify and support them by these forces*[2]? This might have been said in a few words,

[1] Pro Leg. Man. c. 11.

[2] Cap. 25.

LECT. XXXIII.

that ſuch vaſt preparations could never be intended for ſo low a purpoſe. But the orator's view was to expoſe that groundleſs report, and ſhame it out of countenance. And ſoon after he endeavours to raiſe compaſſion for Milo under thoſe prejudices, by the ſame *Figure: See, how various and changeable is the ſtate of human life, how unſteady and voluble is fortune, what infidelity in freinds, what diſguiſes ſuited to the times, what flights, what fears, even of the neareſt acquaintance at the approach of dangers*[1]. Had no addreſs to the paſſions been deſigned here; fewer of theſe reflections might have been ſufficient. The uſe of this *Figure* in amplification is very evident from the nature of it, which conſiſts in unfolding of things, and by that means enlarging the conception of them.

[1] *Cap.* 26.

EXERGASIA, or *Expoſition*, has an affinity with the former *Figure*. But it differs from it in this, that it conſiſts of ſeveral equivalent expreſſions, or nearly ſuch, in order to repreſent the ſame thing in a ſtronger manner; whereas the other enlarges the idea by an enumeration of different particulars. So that this *Figure* has a near relation to *Synonymia*, of which I treated before under *Verbal Figures*. We have

have an inſtance of it in Cicero's defenſe of Sextius, where he ſais: *Thoſe, who at any time have incited the populace to ſedition, or blinded the minds of the ignorant by corruption, or traduced brave and excellent men, and ſuch who deſerved well of the public, have with us always been eſteemed vain, bold, ill, and pernicious citizens. But thoſe, who repreſſed the attempts and endeavours of ſuch, who by their authority, integrity, conſtancy, reſolution, and prudence withſtood their inſolence; have been always accounted men of ſolidity, the cheifs, the leaders, and ſupporters of our dignity and government*[1], Nothing more is intended by this paſſage, but to ſet the oppoſite characters of factious perſons and true patriots in the ſtrongeſt light, with a view to recommend the one, and create a juſt hatred and deteſtation of the other. So elſewhere he repreſents the juſtice of ſelf defenſe in no leſs different terms. *If reaſon*, ſais he, *preſcribes this to the learned, and neceſſity to barbarians, cuſtom to nations, and nature itſelf to brutes, always to ward off all manner of violence, by all poſſible ways, from their body, from their head, from their life; you cannot judge this to be a criminal and wicked action, without judging at the*

LECT. XXXIII.

[1] Cap. 66.

LECT. XXXIII.

the ſame time that all perſons, who fall among robers and aſſaſſines, muſt either periſh by their weapons, or your ſentence[1]. He is addreſſinghere to the judges in favor of Milo. The warmth and vehemence of the ſpeaker often runs him into this *Figure*, when he is affected with his ſubject, and thinks no words, no expreſſions, forcible enough to convey his ſentiments; and therefore repeats one after another, as his fancy ſuggeſts them. This flow of expreſſion, under the conduct of a good judgement, is often attended with advantage; as it warms the hearers, and impreſſes their minds, excites their paſſions, and helps them to ſee things in a ſtronger light.

[1] *Pro Miloni. c.* 11.

THE laſt *Figure* I ſhall conſider at preſent, is *Hypotypoſis*, or *Imagery*, which is a deſcription of things painted in ſuch ſtrong and bright colours, as may help the imagination of the hearers to conceive of them, rather as preſent to their view, than deſcribed in words. It is peculiarly ſuited for drawing characters, and often affords the fineſt ornaments in poetry and hiſtory, as well as oratory. Nor is it leſs moving, but ſuited to ſtrike different paſſions, according to the nature of the ſubject, and artful management of the ſpeaker. Cicero

has thus drawn the picture of Catiline, consisting of an unaccountable mixture of contrary qualities. *He had*, says he, *the appearance of the greatest virtues; he made use of many ill men to carry on his designs, and pretended to be in the interest of the best men; he had a very engaging behaviour, and did not want industry nor application; he gave into the greatest lewdness, but was a good soldier. Nor do I believe there was ever the like monster in the world, made up of such jarring and repugnant qualities and inclinations. Who at one time was more acceptable to the best men, and who more intimate with the worst? Who was once a better patriot, and who a greater enemy to this state? Who more devoted to pleasures, who more patient in labors? Who more rapacious, and yet more profuse? He suited himself to the humours of all he conversed with, was serious with the reserved, and pleasant with the jocose; grave with the aged, and facetious with the young; bold with the daring, and extravagant with the profligate*[1]. Such a character of a man when accompanied with power and interest, must render him no less the object of fear, than detestation; which was the design of Cicero in this description. And

SECT. XXXIII.

[1] *Pro Cael.* c. 5.

else-

LECT. XXXIII.

elſewhere, in order to prevail with the ſenate to direct the execution of thoſe conſpirators with Catiline, who were then in priſon, he paints the moſt diſmal ſcene of that horrid deſign in the ſtrongeſt colours. *Methinks*, ſais he, *I ſee this city, the light of the world, and citadel of all nations, ſuddenly falling into one fire; I perceive heaps of miſerable citizens unburied in their ruined country; the countenance and fury of Cethegus raging in your ſlaughter preſents itſelf to my view*[1]. This *Figure* is very ſerviceable in amplification, as I have formerly ſhewn, in treating upon that ſubject. But no ſmall judgement is required in the management of deſcriptions. Leſſer circumſtances ſhould either be wholly omited, or but ſlightly touched; and thoſe, which are more material drawn in their due proportion. Nature is as much the rule of the orator, as the painter, and what they both propoſe to imitate. And therefore let a thought be ever ſo pleaſing and beautiful in itſelf, it muſt not be introduced, when foreign to the purpoſe, or out of its place; any more than a painter ſhould attempt to alter nature, when he propoſes to copy it. This *Figure* requires likewiſe a vigorous and lively genius. For the

[1] *Catil.* iv. c. 6.

the images in deſcription can riſe no higher, than the conception of the ſpeaker; ſince the idea muſt firſt be formed in his own mind, before he can convey it to others; and agreably to the clearneſs, with which he conceives it himſelf, he will be able to expreſs it in words. LECT. XXXIII.

LEC-

LECTURE XXXIV.

Of more Figures of Sentences, ſuited to expreſs the Paſſions.

LECT. XXXIV. IN my laſt diſcourſe I entered upon the conſideration of the pathetic *Figures*, and went thro ſix of them, *Epanorthoſis*, *Paralepſis*, *Parrheſia*, *Aparithmeſis*, *Exergaſia*, and *Hypotypoſis*. There are ſeven others yet remaining, which I propoſe to treat on at preſent, and they are, *Aporia*, *Apoſiopeſis*, *Eroteſis*, *Ecphoneſis*, *Epiphonema*, *Apoſtrophe*, and *Proſopopeia*.

APORIA, or *Doubt*, expreſſes the debate of the mind with itſelf upon a preſſing difficulty. A perſon in ſuch a ſtate is apt to heſitate, or ſtart ſeveral things ſucceſſively, without coming to any fixed reſolution. The uneaſineſs ariſing from ſuch a diſorder of thought is naturally very moving. Of this kind is that of Cicero for Cluentius, when he ſais: *I know not which way to turn myſelf. Shall I deny the ſcandal thrown upon him of bribing the judges? Can I ſay the people were not told of it? that it was not talked of in the court? mentioned in the ſenate? Can I remove an opinion*

LECT. XXXIV.

nion ſo deeply and long rooted in the minds of men? It is not in my power. You, judges, muſt ſupport his innocence, and reſcue him from this calamity[1]. Orators ſometimes choose to begin their diſcourſe with this *Figure*. A diffidence of mind at firſt is not unbecoming, but graceful. It carries in it an air of modeſty, and tends very much to conciliate the affections of the hearers. Livy gives us a very elegant example of this, in a ſpeech of Scipio Africanus to his ſoldiers, when calling them together after a ſedition, he thus beſpeaks them: *I never thought I ſhould have been at a loſs, in what manner to addreſs my army. Not that I have applied myſelf more to words, than things; but becauſe I have been accuſtomed to the genius of ſoldiers, having been trained up in the camp almoſt from my childhood. But I am in doubt, what or how to ſpeak to you, not knowing what name to give you. Shall I call you citizens, who have revolted from your country? Soldiers, who have diſowned the authority of your general, and broke your military oath? Enemies? I perceive the mein, the aſpect, and habit of citizens; but diſcern the actions, words, deſigns, and diſpoſitions of enemies*[2].

[1] *Cap.* 1.

[2] *Lib.* xxviii. *c.* 27.

SOME-

LECT. XXXIV.

SOMETIMES a paſſion has that effect, not ſo much to render a perſon doubtful what to ſay, as to ſtop him in the midſt of a ſentence, and prevent his expreſſing the whole of what he deſigned. And then it is called *Apoſiopeſis*, or *Concealment*. It denotes different paſſions. As anger, which by reaſon of its heat and vehemence, cauſes perſons to break off abruptly in their diſcourſe. So the old man in Terence, when he was jealous, that his ſervant obſtructed his deſigns, uſes this imperfect, but threatning expreſſion: *Whom if I find*[1]. And Neptune, when deſcribed by Virgil as very angry, that the winds ſhould preſume to diſturb the ſea without his permiſſion, after he has called them to him to know the reaſon of it, threatens them in this abrupt manner:

[1] *And. Act.* i. *Sc.* 1. *v.* 137.

Whom I: but firſt I'll lay the ſtorm[2].

But Cicero in writing to Atticus applies it to expreſs greif, where he ſais: *I know nothing of Pompey, and beleive he muſt be taken, if he is not got on ſhipboard. O incredible ſwiftneſs! But of our freind. Tho I cannot accuſe him without greif, for whom I am in ſo much concern and trouble*[3]. And in a letter to Caſſius he uſes it to expreſs fear, when he ſais to him: *Brutus could ſcarce ſupport him-*

[2] *Aen. Lib.* i. *v.* 139.

[3] *Ad Fam. Lib.* vii. *Ep.* 22.

LECT. XXXIV.

himſelf at Mutina, if he is ſafe, we have carried the day. But if: heaven avert the omen! all muſt have recourſe to you[1]. His meaning is, *if Brutus ſhould be defeated.*

[1] *Ibid. Lib.* xii. *Ep.* 6.

THE next *Figure* is *Eroteſis* or *Interrogation*. But every interrogation or queſtion is not figurative. When we enquire about a thing that is doubtful, in order to be informed, this is no *Figure*, but the natural form of ſuch expreſſions. As if I aſk a perſon, *Where he is going*, or *What he is doing*. But it then becomes figurative, when the ſame thing may be expreſſed in a direct manner; but the puting it by way of queſtion, gives it a much greater life and ſpirit. As when Cicero ſais: *Catiline, how long will you abuſe our patience? do not you perceive your deſigns are diſcovered*[2]? He might indeed have ſaid, *You abuſe our patience a long while. You muſt be ſenſible your deſigns are diſcovered.* But it is eaſy to perceive, how much this latter way of expreſſion falls ſhort of the force and vehemence of the former. And ſo when Medea ſais: *I could ſave; and do you aſk, if I can deſtroy*[3]. Had ſhe ſaid, *I could ſave, and I can deſtroy*, the ſentence had been flat, and very unfit to expreſs the rage and fury, in which the poet there repreſents her.

[2] *In Cat.* i. c. 1.

[3] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. c. 5.

LECT. XXXIV.

her. This *Figure* is ſuited to expreſs moſt paſſions, and emotions of the mind, as anger, diſdain, fear, deſire, and others. It ſerves alſo to preſs and bear down an adverſary. Cicero frequently makes this uſe of it. As in his defence of Plancius: *I will make you this offer*, ſais he, *chooſe any tribe you pleaſe, and ſhew, as you ought, by whom it was bribed; and if you cannot, as I beleive you will not undertake it, I will prove, how he gained it. Is this a fair conteſt? Will you engage on this foot? I cannot give you fairer play. Why are you ſilent? Why do you diſſemble? Why do you heſitate? I inſiſt upon it, urge you to it, preſs it, require and even demand it of you*[1]. Such a way of puſhing an antagoniſt ſhews the ſpeaker has great confidence in his cauſe; otherwiſe he would never lay himſelf ſo open, if he was not aſſured the other party had nothing to reply. This *Figure* likewiſe diverſifies a diſcourſe, and gives it a beautiful variety, by altering the form of expreſſion; provided it be neither too frequent, nor continued too long at once. And beſides the warmth and eager manner, in which it is expreſſed, enlivens the hearers, and quickens their attention.

[1] *Cap.* 19.

ECPHONESIS, or *Exclamation*, is a vehement extenſion of the voice, occaſioned by

by a commotion of mind, naturally venting itſelf by this *Figure*, which is uſed by Cicero to expreſs a variety of paſſions. It often denotes reſentment or indignation. Thus after his return from baniſhment, reflecting on thoſe who had occaſioned it, he breaks out into this moving exclamation: *O mournful day to the ſenate, and all good men, calamitous to the ſtate, afflictive to me and my family; but glorious in the view of poſterity*[1]! His deſign was to excite an odium againſt the authors of his exile, when recalled in ſo honorable a manner. And again in his defence of Caelius: *O the great force of truth, which eaſily ſupports itſelf againſt the wit, craft, ſubtilty, and artful deſigns of men*[2]! He had juſt been ſhewing the abſurdity of the charge againſt Caelius, and now endeavours to expoſe his accuſers to the indignation of the court. At other times it is uſed to expreſs diſdain or contempt. As when ſpeaking of Pompey's houſe, which was bought by Mark Antony, he ſais: *O conſummate impudence! dare you go within that houſe? dare you enter the venerable threſhold, and ſhow your audacious countenance to the tutelar deities, which reſide there*[3]? Nor is it leſs ſuited to indicate

LECT. XXXIV.

[1] *Pro Sext. c. 12.*

[2] *Cap. 26.*

[3] *Philipp. ii. c. 27.*

813460 A

LECT. XXXIV.

greif, as when he ſais of Milo: *O that happy country, which ſhall receive this man! ungrateful this, if it baniſh him! miſerable, if it loſe him*[1]! And ſometimes it ſerves to expreſs admiration. As when in compliment to Caeſar he ſais: *O admirable clemency! worthy of the greateſt praiſe, the higheſt encomiums, and moſt laſting monuments*[2]! It has its uſe alſo in ridicule and irony. As in his oration for Balbus, where he derides his accuſer, by ſaying: *O excellent interpreter of the law! maſter of antiquity! corrector and amender of our conſtitution*[3]! The ſacred writers ſometimes uſe it by way of entreaty or wiſh. As the royal Pſalmiſt: *O that I had the wings of a dove, that I might flee away, and be at reſt*[4]! And at other times in triumph and exultation, as in that of St. Paul: *O death, where is thy ſting! O grave, where is thy victory*[5]! It is frequently joined with the preceding figure *Interrogation*, as appears in ſome of the inſtances here brought from Cicero. And it generally follows the repreſentation of the thing, which occaſions it. Tho ſometimes it is made uſe of to introduce it, and then it ſerves to prepare the mind by exciting its attention. Thus Cicero in his defenſe of Caelius, to render the character

[1] *Pro Milon. ſub fin.*

[2] *Pro Ligar. c. 2.*

[3] *Cap. 8.*

[4] *Pſal. lv. 6.*

[5] *1 Cor. xv. 25.*

LECT. XXXIV.

racter of Clodia more odious, at whoſe inſtigation he was accuſed, inſinuates that ſhe had before poiſoned her huſband. And to highten the barbarity of the fact, and make it appear the more ſhocking, he introduces the account of it, with this moving exclamation: *O heavens, why do you ſometimes wink at the greateſt crimes of mankind, or delay the puniſhment of them to futurity*[1]*!*

[1] *Cap.* 24.

EPIPHONEMA, or *Acclamation*, has a great affinity with the former *Figure*. And it is ſo called, when the ſpeaker, at the concluſion of his argument, makes ſome lively and juſt remark upon what he has been ſaying, to give it the greater force, and render it the more affecting to his hearers. It is not ſo vehement and impetuous as *Exclamation*, being uſually expreſſive of the milder and more gentle paſſions. And the reflection ought not only to contain ſome plain and obvious truth, but likewiſe to ariſe naturally from the diſcourſe, which occaſioned it, otherwiſe it loſes its end. When Cicero has ſhewn, that recourſe is never to be had to force and violence, but in caſes of the utmoſt neceſſity, he concludes with the following remark: *Thus to think is prudence, to act fortitude, both to think and act perfect and conſummate virtue.*

LECT. XXXIV.

tue[1]. And elſewhere, after he has deſcribed a ſingular inſtance of cruelty and breach of freindſhip. *Hence*, ſais he, *we may learn, that no duties are ſo ſacred and ſolemn, which covetouſneſs will not violate*[2]. This *Figure* is frequently expreſſed in a way of admiration. As when Cicero has obſerved, that all men are deſirous to live to an advanced age, but uneaſy under it, when attained; he makes this juſt reflection upon ſuch a conduct: *So great is their inconſtancy, folly, and perverſeneſs*[3]!

[1] *Pro Sext. c.* 40.

[2] *Pro Quinct. c.* 6.

[3] *De Senect. c.* 2.

THE next *Figure* in order is *Apoſtrophe*, or *Addreſs*, when the ſpeaker breaks off from the ſeries of his diſcourſe, and addreſſes himſelf to ſome particular perſon preſent or abſent, living or dead; or to inanimate nature, as indued with ſenſe and reaſon. By this means he has an opportunity of ſaying many things with greater freedom, than perhaps would be conſiſtent with decency, if immediately directed to the perſons themſelves. He can admoniſh, chide, or cenſure, without giving offence. Nor is there any paſſion, but may be very advantageouſly expreſſed by this *Figure*. When an orator has been ſpeaking of any particular perſon, on a ſudden to turn upon him, and apply the diſcourſe to that per-

LECT. XXXIV.

ſon himſelf, is very moving; it is like attacking an adverſary by ſurprize, when he is off from his guard, and where he leaſt expects it. Thus Cicero: *I deſire, ſenators, to be merciful, but not to appear negligent in ſo great dangers of the ſtate; tho at preſent I cannot but condemn myſelf of remiſſneſs. There is a camp formed in Italy, at the entrance of Etruria, againſt the ſtate; our enemies encreaſe daily; but we ſee the commander of the camp, and general of the enemies within our walls, in the very ſenate, contriving ſome inteſtine ruin to the ſtate. If now, Catiline, I ſhould order you to be ſeized and put to death, I have reaſon to fear, that all good men would rather think I had deferred it too long, than charge me with cruelty. But I am prevailed with for a certain reaſon not to do that yet, which ought to have been done long ſince*[1]. This ſudden turn of the diſcourſe to Cataline himſelf, and the addreſs to him in that unexpected manner, muſt have touched him very ſenſibly. So in his defence of Milo, expreſſing his concern if he ſhould not ſucceed in it, he ſais: *And how ſhall I anſwer it to you, my brother Quintus, the partner of my misfortunes, who art now abſent*[2]. And elſewhere addreſſing to the ſoldiers of the

[1] *In Catil.* i. c. 2.

[2] *Cap.* 37.

LECT. XXXIV.

Martian legion, who had been killed in an engagement with Mark Antony, he thus beſpeaks them: *O happy death, which due to nature, was paid to your country! I may eſteem you truly born for your country, who likewiſe received your name from Mars; ſo that the ſame deity ſeems to have produced this city for the world, and you for this city*[1]. And in his oration for Balbus he thus calls upon dumb nature to witneſs to Pompey's virtues: *I invoke you mute regions, you moſt diſtant countries, you ſeas, havens, iſlands, and ſhoars. For what coaſt, what land, what place is there, in which the marks of his courage, humanity, wiſdom, and prudence are not extant*[2]? An appeal to heaven, or any part of inanimate nature, has ſomething very ſublime and ſolemn in it, which we often meet with in ſacred writ. So the divine prophet: *Hear O heavens, and give ear O earth, for the Lord hath ſpoken*[3]. And in like manner the prophet Jeremy: *Be aſtoniſhed, O ye heavens, at this*[4].

[1] *Philipp.* xiv. *c.* 12.

[2] *Cap.* 5.

[3] *Iſaiah* i. 2.

[4] *Chap.* ii. 12.

THE laſt *Figure* above mentioned was *Proſopopeia*, or *the fiction of a perſon*, by which, either an abſent perſon is introduced ſpeaking; or one who is dead, as if he was alive and preſent; or ſpeech is attributed to ſome inanimate being. There is

no

LECT. XXXIV.

no *Figure* perhaps, which ſerves more or better purpoſes to an orator, than this. For by this means he is enabled to call in all nature to his aſſiſtance, and can aſſign to every thing ſuch parts, as he thinks convenient. There is ſcarce any thing fit to be ſaid, but may be introduced this way. When he thinks his own character not of ſufficient weight to affect his audience, in the manner he deſires, he ſubſtitutes a perſon of greater authority than himſelf to engage their attention. When he has ſevere things to ſay, and which may give offence, as coming from himſelf; he avoids this by putting them into the mouth of ſome other perſon, from whom they will be better taken; or makes inanimate nature bring a charge, or expreſs a reſentment, to render it the more affecting. And by the ſame method he ſometimes chooſes to ſecure himſelf from a ſuſpicion of flattery, in carrying a compliment too high. We meet with ſeveral very beautiful inſtances of this *Figure* in Cicero; but I ſhall content myſelf with one of each ſort, begining with that of an abſent perſon, from his defence of Milo, whom he thus introduces, as ſpeaking to the citizens of Rome: *Should he holding the bloody ſword cry out, attend,*

LECT. XXXIV.

attend, I pray, hearken, O citizens, I have killed Publius Clodius; by this ſword, and by this right hand, I have kept off his rage from your necks, which no laws, no courts of judicature, could reſtrain; it is by my means, that juſtice, equity, laws, liberty, ſhame, and modeſty remain in the city. Is it to be feared how the city would bear this action? Is there any one now, who would not approve and commend it[1]? And in his oration for Balbus, he introduces Marius, who was then dead, to plead in his defence: *Can Balbus, ſais he, be condemned, without condemning Marius for a like fact? Let him be preſent a little to your thoughts, ſince he cannot be ſo in perſon; that you may view him in your minds, tho you cannot with your eyes. Let him tell you, he was not unacquainted with leagues, void of examples, or ignorant of war*[2]. And again, in his firſt invective againſt Catiline, he repreſents his country, as thus expoſtulating with himſelf, and upbraiding him for ſuffering ſuch a criminal as Catiline to live. *Should my country, ſais he, which is much dearer to me than my life, ſhould all Italy, all the ſtate, thus addreſs me. Mark Tully, what do you do? Do you ſuffer him, whom you have found to be an enemy, who you ſee is to*

[1] *Cap.* 28.

[2] *Cap.* 20.

LECT. XXXIV.

to be at the head of the war, whom you perceive our enemies wait for in their camp, as their general, who has been the contriver of this wickedneſs, the cheif of the conſpiracy, the exciter of ſlaves and profligate citizens, to leave the city, which is rather to bring him in, than let him out? Will not you order him to be impriſoned, condemned, and executed. What prevents you? The cuſtom of our anceſtors? But private perſons have often puniſhed pernicious citizens in this ſtate. The laws relating to the puniſhment of Roman citizens? But traitors never had the rights of citizens. Do you fear the cenſure of poſterity? Truly you make a very handſome return to the people of Rome, who have advanced you from an obſcure condition ſo early to the higheſt dignity; if you neglect their ſafety to avoid envy, or from the apprehenſion of any danger. And if you fear cenſure; which is moſt to be dreaded, that which may ariſe from juſtice and fortitude, or from cowardice and treachery? When Italy ſhall be waſted by a war, cities plundered, and houſes burnt, do you think then to eſcape the ſevereſt cenſure[1]? In the management of this *Figure*, care ſhould be taken, that what is ſaid be always conſiſtent with the character introduced, in

[1] *Cap.* 11.

which

LECT. XXXIV.

which both the force and beauty of it conſiſt.

In treating upon *Figures*, I have hitherto conſidered them ſeparately; but it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that ſome expreſſions conſiſt of a complication of them, and may come under the denomination of ſeveral *Figures*, as well verbal, as thoſe of ſentences, differently conſidered. Thus when Cicero ſais: *What, Tubero, did your drawn ſword do in the Pharſalian battle? at whoſe ſide was its point directed? what was the intention, of your arms*[1]? As he ſpeaks to Tubero, it is an *Apoſtrophe*; as the expreſſions have much the ſame import, and are deſigned to highten and aggravate the fact, it is *Exergaſia*; and as they are put by way of queſtion, it is *Interrogation*. So likewiſe in his ſecond Philippic, where he ſais: *What can I think? that I am contemned? I ſee nothing in my life, intereſt, actions, or abilities, as moderate as they are, which Antony can deſpiſe. Did he think he could eaſily leſſen me in the ſenate? But they, who have commended many famous citizens for their good government of the ſtate, never thanked any but me for preſerving it. Would he contend with me for eloquence? This would be a favor indeed. For what could be a larger*

[1] *Pro Ligar.* 7. c. 3.

LECT. XXXIV.

larger and more copious ſubject, than for me to ſpeak for myſelf againſt Antony? His deſign was really this: he thought he could not convince his aſſociates, that he was truly an enemy to his country, unleſs he was ſo firſt to me [1]. There are three *Figures* in this paſſage, *Doubt*, *Interrogation*, and *Subjection*. And again, when he introduces Sicily thus addreſſing to Verres in a way of complaint: *Whatever gold, whatever ſilver, whatever ornaments in my cities, dwellings, temples, whatever right of any kind I poſſeſſed by the favor of the ſenate and people of Rome; you, Verres, have plundered, and taken from me* [2]. Here is a *Proſopopeia*, joined with the verbal figure *Anaphora*, as ſeveral members of the ſentence begin with the ſame word. The like inſtances of complex *figures* frequently occur, and therefore I need not multiply examples of them here.

[1] *Cap.* 1.

[2] *In Caecil. c.* 5.

I HAVE now finiſhed, not only the ſubject of *Figures*, but likewiſe all the other parts of *Elocution* in general; the uſe and application of them, in forming the different ſorts of ſtile, will be the ſubject of ſome following diſcourſes.

LEC-

LECTURE XXXV.

Of Stile, and its different Characters.

LECT. XXXV.

WHEN I entered upon the ſubject of *Elocution*, I obſerved, that it is twofold, *general* and *particular*. One treats of the ſeveral properties and ornaments of language in common; the other conſiders them, as they are made uſe of to form different ſorts of ſtile. The former of theſe I have endeavoured to explain in ſeveral diſcourſes, and now procede to the latter. And here I ſhall firſt conſider the principal reaſons, that occaſion a variety of ſtile; and then treat of its ſeveral characters or degrees.

THE word *ſtile* properly ſignifies the inſtrument, which the antients uſed in writing. For as they commonly wrote upon thin boards covered over with wax, and ſometimes upon the barks of trees; they made uſe of a long inſtrument, like a bodkin, pointed at one end, with which they cut their letters; and broad at the other, to eraſe any thing, they choſe to alter. And this the Latins called *ſtilus*. But tho this be the firſt ſenſe of the word, yet

yet afterwards it came to denote the manner of expreſſion. In which ſenſe we likewiſe uſe it, by the ſame kind of trope, that we call any one's writing his hand. But as to the reaſons, which occaſion a variety of ſtile, they are principally theſe. LECT. XXXV.

SINCE both ſpeech and writing are only ſenſible expreſſions of our thoughts, by which we communicate them to others; as all men think more or leſs differently, ſo conſequently they in ſome meaſure differ in their ſtile. No two perſons, who were to write upon one ſubject, would make uſe of all the ſame words. And were this poſſible, yet they would as certainly differ in their order and connexion; as two painters, who uſed the ſame colors in painting the ſame picture, would neceſſarily vary their mixtures and diſpoſition of them, in the ſeveral gradations of lights and ſhades. As every painter therefore has ſomething peculiar in his manner, ſo has every writer in his ſtile. It is from theſe internal characters, in a good meaſure, that critics undertake to diſcover the true authors of anonymous writings; and to ſhew that others are ſpurious, and not the genuine productions of thoſe, whoſe names they bear: as they judge of the age of

LECT. XXXV.

of ſuch writings from the words and manner of expreſſion, which have been in uſe at different times. And we may often obſerve in perſons a fondneſs for ſome particular words, or phraſes; and a peculiarity in the turn, or connexion of their ſentences, or in their tranſitions from one thing to another; by which their ſtile may be known, even when they deſign to conceal it. For theſe things, thro cuſtom and habit, will ſometimes drop from them, notwithſtanding the greateſt caution to prevent it.

THERE is likewiſe very often a conſiderable difference in the ſtile of the ſame perſon, in ſeveral parts of his life. Young perſons, whoſe invention is quick and lively, commonly run into a pompous and luxuriant ſtile. Their fancy repreſents the images of things to their mind in a gay and ſpritely manner, cloathed with a variety of circumſtances; and while they endeavour to ſet off each of theſe in the brighteſt and moſt glittering colors, this renders their ſtile verboſe and florid, but weakens the force and ſtrength of it. And therefore, as their imagination gradually cools, and comes under the conduct of a more mature judgement, they find it proper

to

LECT. XXXV.

to cut off many ſuperfluities; ſo that by omiting unneceſſary words and circumſtances, and by a cloſer connexion of things placed in a ſtronger light, if their ſtile becomes leſs ſwelling and pompous, it is however more correct and nervous. But as old age ſinks the powers of the mind, chills the imagination, and weakens the judgement; the ſtile too in proportion uſually grows dry and languid. Critics have obſerved ſomething of this difference in the writings even of Cicero himſelf[1]. To be maſter of a good ſtile therefore it ſeems neceſſary, that a perſon ſhould be endued with a vigorous mind and lively fancy, a ſtrong memory, and a good judgement. It is by the imagination that the mind conceives the images of things. If the impreſſions of thoſe images be clear and diſtinct, the ſtile will be ſo too; ſince language is nothing but a copy of thoſe images firſt conceived by the mind. But if the images are faint and imperfect, the ſtile will accordingly be flat and languid. This is evident from the difference between ſuch objects, as are repreſented to our ſight, and things, of which we have only read or heard. For as the former generally make a deeper impreſſion upon our minds, ſo we can de-

[1] *Dial. of Eloq. p* 70.

LECT. XXXV.

ſcribe them in a more ſtrong and lively manner. And we commonly find, that accordingly as perſons are affected themſelves, when they ſpeak; they are able to affect others with what they ſay. Now perſons are more or leſs affected with things in proportion to the impreſſions, which the images of thoſe things make upon the mind. For the ſame reaſon alſo, if the imagination be dull, and indiſpoſed to receive the ideas of things, the ſtile will be ſtiff and heavy; or if the images are irregular and diſordered, the ſtile will likewiſe be perplexed and confuſed. When things lie ſtraight (as we ſay) in the mind, we expreſs them with eaſe, and in their juſt connexion and dependence; but when they are warpt and crooked, we deliver them with pain and difficulty, as well as diſorder. A good fancy ſhould likewiſe be accompanied with a happy memory. This helps us to retain the names of thoſe things, the ideas whereof are preſented to the mind by the imagination, together with proper and ſuitable phraſes to expreſs them in their ſeveral connexions and relations to each other. When the images of things offer themſelves to the mind, unleſs the names of them preſent themſelves at the ſame time, we are

are at a loſs to expreſs them, or at leaſt in danger of doing it by wrong and improper terms. Beſides variety is neceſſary in diſcourſe to render it agreable; and therefore without a large furniture of words and phraſes, the ſtile will neceſſarily become inſipid and jejune, by the frequent return of the ſame terms and manner of expreſſion. But to both theſe a ſolid judgement is highly requiſite to form a juſt and accurate ſtile. A fruitful imagination will furniſh the mind with plenty of ideas, and a good memory will help to cloath them in proper language; but unleſs they are both under the conduct of reaſon, they are apt to hurry perſons into many inconveniences. Such are generally great talkers, but far from good orators. 'Freſh images continually croud in upon them, faſter than the tongue can well expreſs them. This runs them into long and tedious diſcourſes, abounding with words, but empty of ſenſe. Many impertinencies, if not improprieties, neceſſarily mix themſelves with what they ſay. And they are frequently carried off from their point, by not having their fancies under a proper regulation. So that ſuch diſcourſes, tho compoſed perhaps of pretty expreſſions, rhetorical flowers, and ſprightly

LECT. XXXV.

LECT. XXXV.

ſallies of wit; yet fall very much ſhort of a ſtrong and manly eloquence. But where reaſon preſides and holds the reins, every thing is weighed before it is ſpoken. The propereſt words are made choice of, which beſt ſuit the ideas they are deſigned to convey; rather than the moſt gay and pompous. All things are not ſaid, which offer themſelves to the mind, and fancy dictates; but ſuch only as are fit and proper, and the reſt are droped. Some things are but ſlightly mentioned, and others diſcourſed on more largely and fully, according to their different importance. And every thing is placed in that order, and cloathed in ſuch a dreſs, as may repreſent it to the greateſt advantage. So that in a word, the foundation of a good ſtile is cheifly good ſenſe. Where theſe qualities all meet in a conſiderable degree, ſuch perſons have the happineſs to excell, either in ſpeaking or writing. But this is not generally the caſe. Many perſons of a vigorous, and ſpritely imagination, have but a weak judgement; and others much more judicious can think but ſlowly. And it is this in a great meaſure, which makes the difference between ſpeaking and writing well, as one or the other of theſe qualities is predominant.

dominant. A perſon of a lively fancy, ready wit, and voluble tongue, will deliver himſelf off hand much better, and more acceptably; than one who is capable upon due premeditation to diſcern farther into the ſubject, but cannot command his thoughts with the ſame eaſe and freedom. And this latter would have the ſame advantage of the other, were they both coolly to offer their ſentiments in writing. Many things appear well in ſpeaking, which will not bear a ſtrict ſcrutiny. While the hearer's attention is obliged to keep pace with the ſpeaker, he is not at leiſure to obſerve every impropriety or incoherence, but many ſlips eaſily eſcape him, which in reading are preſently diſcovered. Hence it is often found that diſcourſes, which were thought very fine, when heard, appear to have much leſs beauty, as well as ſtrength, when they come to be read. And therefore it is not without reaſon, that Cicero recommends to all ſuch, who are candidates for eloquence, and deſirous to become maſters of a good ſtile, to write much [1]. This affords them an opportunity to digeſt their thoughts, weigh their words and expreſſions, and give every thing its proper force and evidence; as likewiſe by reviewing a diſcourſe when

LECT. XXXV.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 33.

LECT. XXXV.

compoſed, to correct its errors, or ſupply its defects; till by practice they gain a readineſs both to think juſtly, and to ſpeak with propriety and eloquence. But it is time to procede to ſome other cauſes of the diverſity of ſtile.

DIFFERENT countries have not only a different language, but likewiſe a peculiarity of ſtile ſuited to their temper and genius. The eaſtern nations had a lofty and majeſtic way of ſpeaking. Their words are full and ſonorous, their expreſſions ſtrong and forcible, and warmed with the moſt lively and moving figures. This is very evident from the Jewiſh writings in the Old Teſtament, in which we find a moſt agreable mixture of ſimplicity and dignity. On the contrary, the ſtile of the more northern languages generally partakes of the chilneſs of their climate. Give me leave to recite the judgement of a great writer of our own upon this head. *There is*, ſais he, *a certain coldneſs and indifference in the phraſes of our European languages, when they are compared with the oriental forms of ſpeech. And it happens very luckily, that the Hebrew idioms run into the Engliſh tongue with a peculiar grace and beauty. Our language has received innumerable ele-*

LECT. XXXV.

gancies and improvements from that infuſion of Hebraiſms, which are derived to it out of the poetical paſſages in holy writ. They give a force and energy to our expreſſions, warm and animate our language, and convey our thoughts in more ardent and intenſe phraſes, than any that are to be met with in our own tongue. There is ſomething ſo pathetic in this kind of diction, that it often ſets the mind in a flame, and makes our hearts burn within us[1]. Thus far this judicious writer.

[1] Spect. N. 405.

AGAIN, people of different nations vary in their cuſtoms and manners, which occaſions a diverſity in their ſtile. This was very remarkable in the Attics, Aſiatics, and Rhodians, and is often taken notice of by antient writers. The Athenians, while they continued a free ſtate, were an active, induſtrious, and frugal people; very polite indeed, and cultivated arts and ſciences beyond any other nation; but as they had powerful enemies, and were exceding jealous of their liberties, this preſerved them from wantonneſs and luxury. And their way of ſpeaking was agreable to their conduct, accurate and cloſe, but very full and expreſſive. The Aſiatics, on the other hand, were more gay, and looſe in their manners,

LECT. XXXV.

devoted to luxury and pleaſure, and accordingly they affected a florid and ſwelling ſtile, filled with redundancies and ſuperfluities of expreſſion. Indeed, ſome of the antients have attributed this looſeneſs of ſtile to their way of purſuing eloquence at firſt. For as they were put upon it by converſing with the Greek colonies, who ſettled among them, they ſuppoſe, that in imitating them, before they were maſters of the language, they were often obliged to make uſe of circumlocutions, which afterwards became habitual, and very much weakened the force of their expreſſions, as it naturally would do. But one would think, if they were put to this neceſſity at firſt, when they found its ill effect, they might eaſily have amended it afterwards, as they grew better acquainted with the Greek language, had they been inclined ſo to do. The Rhodian ſtile was a medium between the other two, not ſo conciſe and expreſſive as the Attic, nor yet ſo looſe and redundant as the Aſiatic. Quintilian ſais, it had a mixture of its author, and the humour of the people; and like plants ſet in a foreign ſoil, degenerated from the Attic purity, but not ſo as wholly to loſe it. They firſt received it from Aeſchines, who

being worſted in his famous conteſt with Demoſthenes, retired thither, and taught rhetoric, which put them upon the ſtudy of eloquence [1]. LECT. XXXV.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xii. *c.* 10.

THE ſtile of the ſame country likewiſe very much alters in different ages. Cicero tells us, that the firſt Latin hiſtorians aimed at nothing more than barely to make themſelves intelligible, and that with as much brevity as they could. Thoſe who ſucceded them advanced a ſtep further, and gave ſomewhat a better turn and cadency to their ſentences, tho ſtill without any dreſs or ornament. But afterwards, when the Greek language became faſhionable at Rome, by copying after their writers, ſuch as Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and others, they endeavoured to introduce all their beauties into their own tongue [2], which in Cicero's time was brought to its higheſt perfection. But it did not long continue in that ſtate. A degeneracy of manners ſoon altered their taſte, and corrupted their language, which Quintilian very much complains of in his time [3]. The caſe was the ſame with reſpect to the Greek tongue, tho that had the good fortune to continue its purity much longer than the Latin. Nor can any language be

[2] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 12, *&c.*

[3] *De Cauſ. corrupt. eloq.*

LECT. XXXV.

be exempt from the common fate of all human productions, which have their begining, perfection, and decay. Beſides, there is a ſort of faſhion in language, as well as other things, and the generality of people are always fond of runing into the mode. Perhaps ſome one or a few perſons fall into a manner, which happens to pleaſe. This gives them a reputation, and others immediately copy after them, till it generally prevail. Cicero tells us, that the moſt antient Greek orators, whoſe writings were extant in his time, ſuch as Pericles, Alcibiades, and others, were ſubtle, acute, conciſe, and abounded in ſenſe, rather than words. But another ſet that followed them, of which were Critias, Theramenes, and Lyſias, retained the good ſenſe of the former, and at the ſame time took more care of their ſtile, not leaving it ſo bare as the former had done, but furniſhing it with a better dreſs. After theſe came Iſocrates, who added all the flowers and beauties of eloquence. And as he had abundance of followers, they applied theſe ornaments and decorations according to their different genius; ſome for pomp and ſplendor, and others to invigorate their ſtile, and give it the greater force and energy. And in this latter

latter way Demoſthenes principally excelled. Now as each of theſe manners had its peculiar beauties, and generally prevailed in different ages, Cicero thinks this could not have happened otherwiſe than from imitation. And he attributes it to the ſame cauſe, that afterwards they ſunk into a ſofter and ſmoother manner, not leſs exact and florid, but more cold and lifeleſs [1]. If we take a view of our own tongue, Chaucer ſeems to have been the firſt, who made any conſiderable attempts to cultivate it. And whoever looks into him, will perceive the difference to be ſo great, from what it is at preſent, that it ſcarce appears to be the ſame language. The gradual improvements it has ſince received, are very evident in the writers almoſt of every ſucceding age ſince that time. And how much farther it may ſtill be carried, time only can diſcover. It ſhould ſeem capable of higher improvement, if we conſider how little care has yet been taken to bring it to a ſtandard, in compariſon of what has been done by ſome of our neighbours.

LECT. XXXV.

[1] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 23.

ANOTHER cauſe of the variety of ſtile ariſes from the different nature, and properties of languages. A difference in the letters,

LECT. XXXV.

letters, the make of the words, and the order of them, do all affect the ſtile. So Quintilian obſerves, that the Latin tongue cannot equal the Greek in pronunciation, becauſe it is harſher. The Latins want two of the ſofteſt Greek letters, υ and ζ; and uſe others of a very hard ſound, which the Greeks have not, as *f* and *q*. Again, many Latin words end in *m*, a letter of a broad and hollow ſound, which never terminates any Greek word; but ν does frequently, whoſe ſound is much ſofter and ſweeter. Beſides, in the combination of ſyllables, the letters *b* and *d* are often ſo ſituated, as to require too ſtrong and unequal a force to be laid upon them, as in the words *obverſus*, and *adjungo*. Another advantage of the Greek tongue ariſes from the variety and different ſeat of the accents; for the Greeks often accent the laſt ſyllable, which both enlivens the pronunciation, and renders it more muſical; whereas the Latins never do this. But the greateſt advantage of the Greeks lies in their plenty and variety of words; for which reaſon they have leſs occaſion for tropes or circumlocutions, which when uſed from neceſſity, have generally leſs force, and weaken the ſtile. But under theſe diſadvantages, Quintilian

tilian ſeems to give his countrymen the beſt advice the caſe will admit of. That what they cannot do in words, they ſhould make up in ſenſe. If their expreſſions are not ſo ſoft and tender, they ſhould excede in ſtrength; if they are leſs ſubtle, they ſhould be more ſublime; and if they have fewer proper words, they ſhould excell in the beauty, as well as number of their figures [1]. If this account of Quintilian be juſt, that the Greek tongue does ſurpaſs the Latin in all theſe inſtances; it is certain that both of them have much greater advantages of ſome modern languages. The varying all their declinable words, both nouns and verbs by terminations, and not by ſigns, contributes very much to the ſmoothneſs and harmony of their periods. Whereas in the modern languages, thoſe ſmall particles and pronouns, which diſtinguiſh the caſes of nouns, and the tenſes and perſons of verbs, hinder the run of a period, and render the ſound much more rough and uneven. Beſides, the antient languages ſeem to have a better and more equal mixture of vowels and conſonants, which makes their pronunciation more eaſy and muſical.

LECT. XXXV.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xii. *c.* 10.

BUT

LECT. XXXV.

BUT the cheif diſtinction of ſtile ariſes from the different ſubjects, or matter of diſcourſe. The ſame way of ſpeaking no more ſuits all ſubjects, than the ſame garment would all perſons. A prince and a peaſant ought not to have the ſame dreſs, and another different from both becomes thoſe of a middle ſtation in life. The ſtile therefore ſhould always be adapted to the nature of the ſubject, which rhetoricians have reduced to three ranks or degrees; the *low* or *plain* ſtile, the *middle* or *temperate*, and the *lofty* or *ſublime*. Which are likewiſe called *characters*, becauſe they denote the quality of the ſubject, upon which they treat [1]. This diviſion of ſtile into three characters, was taken notice of very early by antient writers. Some have obſerved it even in Homer, who ſeems to aſſign the *ſublime* or magnificent to Ulyſſes, when he repreſents him as ſo copious and vehement an orator, that his words came from him *like a winter ſnow* [2]. On the contrary, he deſcribes Menelaus as a *polite* ſpeaker, but *conciſe* and *moderate* [3]. And when he mentions Neſtor, he repreſents his manner as between theſe two, not ſo high and lofty as the one, nor yet ſo low and depreſſed as the other; but ſmooth, even, and pleaſant,

[1] *Art of ſp. p.* 4. *c.* 24.

[2] *Il.* γ. *v.* 222.

[3] *Ibid. v.* 213.

or,

LECT. XXXV.

or, as he expreſſes it, *more ſweet than honey* [1]. Quintilian obſerves, that altho accuracy and politeneſs were general characters of the Attic writers; yet among their orators, Lyſias excelled in the low and familiar way; Iſocrates for his elegancy, ſmoothneſs, and the fine turn of his periods; and Demoſthenes for his flame and rapidity, by which he carried all before him [2]. And Gellius tells us, that the like difference was found in the three philoſophers, who were ſent from the Athenians to Rome (before the Romans had any reliſh for the polite arts) to ſolicite the remittance of a fine laid upon them, for an injury done to a neighbouring ſtate. Carneades, one of thoſe ambaſſadors, was *vehement and rapid* in his harangues, Critolaus *neat and ſmooth*, and Diogenes *modeſt and ſober* [3]. The eloquence of theſe orators, and the agreable variety of their different manner, ſo captivated the Roman youth, and inflamed them with a love of the Grecian arts, that old Cato, who did all he could to check it, by hurrying away the ambaſſadors, could not prevent their vigorous purſuit of them, till the ſtudy became in a manner univerſal. And the old gentleman afterwards learned the Greek language him-

[1] *Il. a. v.* 249. See Geſſ. *Lib.* vii. *c.* 14.

[2] Voſſ. *Inſt. Orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 1. §. 1.

[3] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xii. *c.* 10.

[3] Gell. *Lib.* vii. *c.* 14.

LECT. XXXV.

himſelf, when it became more faſhionable. Which a noble writer of ours repreſents as *a puniſhment upon him for his former crime* [1]. It ſeldom happens, that the ſame perſon excells in each of theſe characters. They ſeem to require a different genius, and moſt people are naturally led to one of them more than another; tho all of them are requiſite for an orator upon different occaſions, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

[1] Lord Bacon.

I SHOULD now procede to explain the nature of theſe ſeveral characters, and the particular properties, by which they are diſtinguiſhed from each other; but this will be the ſubject of ſome following diſcourſes.

LEC-

LECTURE XXXVI.

Of the low Stile.

THAT there is a great variety in ſtile, is manifeſt to every one, who makes any obſervation upon what he either reads or hears. This, as was ſhewn in my laſt diſcourſe, ariſes among other reaſons from a diverſity of ſubjects; and has been reduced by rhetoricians to three degrees or characters, called the *low* or *plain ſtile*, the *middle* or *temperate*, and the *lofty* or *ſublime*. I ſhall now procede, as I then promiſed, to treat of the nature and properties of theſe ſeveral characters, begining with the *low ſtile*. And that I may do this with the greater clearneſs, I ſhall conſider it under two heads, *thoughts* and *language*, in each of which theſe ſeveral characters are diſtinguiſhed one from another. LECT. XXXVI.

AND with reſpect to the former, as the ſubjects proper for this ſtile are either common things, or ſuch as ſhould be treated in a plain and familiar way; ſo plain thoughts are moſt ſuitable to it, and diſtinguiſh it from the other characters.

LECT. XXXVI.

Now by plain thoughts are meant ſuch, as are ſimple and obvious, and ſeem to riſe naturally from the ſubject, when duly conſidered; ſo that any one, upon firſt hearing them, would be apt to imagine, they muſt have occured to himſelf. Not that this is really the caſe, but becauſe the more natural a thing is, the more eaſy it ſeems to be; tho in reality it is often otherwiſe, and the perfection of art lies in its neareſt reſemblance to nature. And therefore in order to ſpeak plainly and clearly upon any ſubject, it muſt firſt be duly conſidered, well underſtood, and throughly digeſted in the mind; which tho it require labor and ſtudy, yet the more a perſon is maſter of what he ſais, the leſs that labor will appear in his diſcourſe. This natural plaineſs and ſimplicity, without any diſguiſe or affectation, very much contributes to give credit to what is ſaid. Nor is any thing more apt to impoſe on us, than the appearance of this, when artfully aſſumed. Cicero's account of the fight between Milo and Clodius, in which Clodius was killed, is a remarkable inſtance of this. *When Clodius knew,* ſais he, *that Milo was obliged to go to Lanuvium upon a ſolemn and neceſſary occaſion, he immediately haſtened from Rome*

LECT. XXXVI.

Rome the day before, to aſſaſſinate him, before Clodius's own houſe, as appeared afterwards by the event. And this he did at a time, when his turbulent mob in the city, wanted his aſſiſtance; whom he would not have left, but for the advantage of that place and ſeaſon to execute his wicked deſign. But the next day Milo was in the ſenate, where he continued till they broke up, then went home, changed his dreſs, ſtaid there ſome time, till his wife was ready, and afterwards ſet forward ſo late, that if Clodius had deſigned to return to Rome that day, he might have been here by that time. Clodius, prepared for his deſign, met him on horſeback, having no chariot, no equipage, no Greek attendants, as uſual, and without his wife, which was ſcarce ever known; whereas Milo was in a chariot with his wife, wrapt up in a cloak, and attended by a large retinue of maid ſervants, pages, and other perſons unfit for an engagement. He met with Clodius before his houſe, about five a clock in the evening, and was preſently aſſaulted from an higher ground by many armed men, who killed the coachman. Upon which Milo throwing off his cloak, leaped out of the chariot, and bravely defended himſelf; and thoſe who were with Clodius having their ſwords drawn, ſome make up to

LECT. XXXVI.

the chariot to attack Milo; and others, who now thought he had been killed, began to fall upon his ſervants, who were behind. And of theſe, ſuch who had courage, and were faithful to their maſter, ſome were killed; and others, when they ſaw the ſkirmiſh at the chariot, and could do their maſter no ſervice (for they heard Clodius himſelf ſay that Milo was killed, and really thought it was ſo) did that, not by their maſter's order, nor with his knowledge, nor when he was preſent, which every one would have his own ſervants to do in the like circumſtances. I do not ſay this to fix any crime upon them, but only to relate what happened[1]. His meaning is, they killed Clodius; which he avoids mentioning, to render what he ſais leſs offenſive. Can any thing be told in a more plain and ſimple manner than this? Here is nothing ſaid, but what in itſelf ſeems highly probable, and what one would imagine the fact might eaſily ſuggeſt to any ordinary ſpectator. But in this both the art and ſkill of it conſiſt. For in the whole account, as on the one hand Milo is ſo deſcribed, as to render it highly improbable, he could have any deſign at that time againſt Clodius; ſo on the other, no one circumſtance is omited, which might ſeem proper

[1] *Pro Mil.* c. 10.

proper to perſuade the hearers, that Clodius was the aggreſſor in that engagement. And yet, if we may beleive Aſconius, the quarrel was begun by ſome of Milo's retinue, and Clodius was afterwards killed by his expreſs order. But as things are ſometimes beſt illuſtrated by their oppoſites, I ſhall here produce a contrary inſtance of a very affected and unnatural way of relating a fact. Val. Maximus tells us of a learned man at Athens, who by a blow, which he received by a ſtone upon his head, entirely forgot all his learning, tho he continued to remember every thing elſe. And therefore, as he ſais, ſince this misfortune deprived him of the greateſt enjoyment of his life; it had been happier for him never to have been learned, than afterwards to loſe that pleaſure. This is the plain ſenſe of the ſtory. But now let us hear him relate it. *A man,* ſais he, *of great learning at Athens, having received a blow upon his head by a ſtone, retained the memory of all other things very perfectly, and only forgot his learning, to which he had cheifly devoted himſelf. The direful and malignant wound invading his mind, and as it were deſignedly ſurveying the knowledge repoſited there, cruelly ſeized on that part of it in*

LECT. XXXVI.

LECT. XXXVI.

particular, from which he received the greateſt pleaſure, and buried the ſingular learning of the man with an invidious funeral. Who ſince he was not permited to enjoy his ſtudies, had better never have obtained acceſs to them, than afterwards to have been deprived of the delight they afforded him [1]. What an unnatural way is this of relating ſuch an accident, to talk of *a wound invading the mind*, and *ſurveying the knowledge repoſited there*, and *cruelly ſeizing a particular part of it*, and *burying it with an invidious funeral?* There is nothing in the ſtory could lead him to this, but an over fondneſs to refine upon it in a very affected manner. But there are two properties of plain thoughts, one of which ought conſtantly to attend them in common with all thoughts; and the other is often neceſſary to animate and enliven this character.

[1] *Lib.* i. *De Mirac. extr.* 2.

THE former of theſe is juſtneſs and propriety, which is what reaſon dictates in all caſes. What Cicero ſays of the death of Craſſus the orator, ſeems very juſt, as well as natural. *It was*, ſais he, *an affliction to his freinds, a loſs to his country, and a concern to all good men; but ſuch public calamities followed upon it, that heaven ſeemed rather to have favoured him with death, than*

than to have deprived him of life[1]. This thought ſeems very juſt, and agreable to the ſentiments of a good man, as Craſſus was, to chooſe death, rather than to outlive the happineſs of his country, to which he himſelf had ſo much contributed. Quintilian has a reflection upon a like occaſion, which is not ſo juſt and becoming. It is upon the death of his only ſon, a youth of very uncommon parts, as he repreſents him; and for whoſe uſe he had deſigned his *Inſtitutions of Oratory*, but he died before they were finiſhed. The paſſage is this. *I have loſt him, of whom I had formed the greateſt hopes, and in whom I had repoſed the greateſt comfort of my old age. What can I do now? Or of what further uſe can I think myſelf to be, thus diſappointed by heaven? What good parent will pardon me, if I can any longer ſtudy? and not condemn ſuch reſolution, if, thus ſurviving all my family, I can make any other uſe of my voice, than to accuſe the gods, and declare that providence does not govern the world*[2]? Allowance may be made for the ſallies of paſſion even in wiſe men, upon ſome ſhocking occaſions; but when it procedes to ſuch a degree, as to become impious, it is very indecent, as well as unjuſt. And all inde-

LECT. XXXVI.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. 2.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *prooem.*

SECT. XXXVI.

cency is unnatural, as it is diſagreable to reaſon, which always directs to a decorum. That ſeems to be a very natural, as well as juſt thought of Pliny the younger, when he ſais: *The death of thoſe perſons always appear to me too haſty and unſeaſonable, who are preparing ſome laſting work. For perſons wholly devoted to pleaſures live, as it were, from day to day, and daily finiſh the end for which they live; but thoſe who have a view to poſterity, and preſerve their memory by their labors, always die untimely, becauſe they leave ſomething unfiniſhed* [1]. I ſhall mention but one more inſtance, and that in a comparative view, to make it the more evident. The two ſons of Junius Brutus, the firſt Roman conſul, having been convicted of treaſon in aſſociating with Tarquin's party, were ordered among others to be put to death; and their father not only pronounced the ſentence, but preſided at the execution. This fact is mentioned by ſeveral of the Roman hiſtorians; and, as it carries in it not only the appearance of rigorous juſtice, but likewiſe of cruelty in Brutus, to have been preſent at the execution of his ſons, they endeavour to vindicate him different ways. What Florus ſais, ſeems rather an affectation of wit,

[1] *Lib.* v. *ep.* 5.

wit, than a juſt defence of the fact. *He beheaded them*, ſais he, *that being a public parent, he might appear to have adopted the whole body of the people* [1]. Nor does Val. Maximus come up to the caſe, who ſais: *He put off the father to act the conſul; and choſe rather to loſe his ſons, than be wanting to public juſtice* [2]. This might be a reaſon for condemning them, and would have been equally true, had he not been preſent at their execution. But Livy, whoſe thoughts are generally very juſt and natural, aſſigns the beſt reaſon, which perhaps can be given for his vindication, when he ſais: *Fortune made him the executioner of the ſentence, who ought not to have been a ſpectator* [3]. By ſaying, *fortune made him* ſo, he repreſents it not as matter of choice, like the other hiſtorians; but of neceſſity, from the nature of his office, which then obliged him to ſee the execution of that ſentence, he had himſelf before pronounced; as is the cuſtom at preſent, in ſome popular governments.

LECT. XXXVI.

[1] *Lib.* i. c. 9.

[2] *Lib.* v. c. 8. §. 1.

[3] *Lib.* ii. c. 5.

THE other property, which ſhould often accompany plain and ſimple thoughts is, that they be gay and ſpritely. This, as has been ſaid, is neceſſary to animate and enliven ſuch diſcourſes, as require the low ſtile.

LECT. XXXVI.

ſtile. The fewer ornaments it admits of, the greater ſpirit and vivacity is requiſite to prevent its being dry and jejune. A thought may be very briſk and lively, and at the ſame time appear very natural, as the effect of a ready and flowing wit. Such thoughts, attended with agreable turns, are very ſuitable to this ſtile; but care ſhould be taken, leſt while fancy is too much indulged, the juſtneſs of them be overlooked. I ſhall give one inſtance, in which this ſeems to have been the caſe, from a celebrated Engliſh work, where the ingenious writer endeavours to ſhew the diſadvantage of perſons not attending to their natural genius, but affecting to imitate others in thoſe things, for which they were not formed. *The great misfortune*, ſais he, *of this affectation is, that men not only loſe a good quality, but alſo contract a bad one; they not only are unfit for what they are deſigned, but they aſſign themſelves to what they are unfit for; and inſtead of making a very good figure one way, make a very ridiculous one another. Could the world be reformed to the obedience of that famed dictate*, follow nature, *which the oracle of Delphos pronounced to Cicero, when he conſulted what courſe of ſtudies he ſhould purſue, we ſhould ſee almoſt every*

LECT. XXXVI.

every man as eminent in his proper ſphere, as Tully was in his. For my part, I could never conſider this prepoſterous repugnancy to nature any otherwiſe, than not only as the greateſt folly; but alſo one of the moſt heinous crimes, ſince it is a direct oppoſition to the diſpoſition of Providence, and (as Tully expreſſes it) like the ſin of the giants, an actual rebellion againſt heaven[1]. The advantages that ariſe from perſons attending to their own genius, and purſuing its dictates, are here repreſented in a very lively and agreable manner. But there is one thing aſſerted, which I fear will not hold; which is, that, *Could the world be reformed to that dictate,* follow nature, *we ſhould ſee almoſt every man as eminent in his proper ſphere, as Tully was in his.* For tho doubtleſs perſons would generally ſuccede beſt, if they kept to this rule; yet different degrees of ability are often found, where the bias and inclination is the ſame, and that accompanied with equal labor and diligence. If this was not ſo, how happened it, that no one came up to Tully in the art of oratory; eſpecially in his own age, when there were the greateſt opportunities for that ſtudy, and the higheſt encouragements were given to it, as it paved the way to riches, honors,

[1] *Spect. Vol.* vi. *N.* 404.

LECT. XXXVI.

honors, and all the grand offices of the ſtate? It cannot well be queſtioned, but that there were other gentlemen, who had all the ſame advantages, accompanied with as ſtrong a paſſion for this art, as Tully had; who yet fell much ſhort of him in point of ſucceſs. And experience ſhews, that the caſe has been the ſame in all other purſuits.

BUT it is time to procede to the other head, I propoſed to ſpeak to, namely, the language proper for this ſtile. And here it may be obſerved in general, that the dreſs ought to be agreable to the thoughts, plain, ſimple, and unaffected.

BUT the firſt thing that comes under conſideration is elegance, or a proper choice of words and expreſſions; which ought always to ſuit the idea, they are deſigned to convey. And therefore when an antient writer, ſpeaking of *cruelty*, calls it *naevus crudelitatis* [1], the *blemiſh of cruelty*; and another applying the ſame word to *ingratitude*, ſais *naevus ingratitudinis* [2], the *blemiſh of ingratitude*: that term does not ſufficiently convey to us the odious nature of either of thoſe vices, as indeed it was not their deſign it ſhould. But otherwiſe, where the ſpeaker has not ſome particular

[1] Sidon. Apoll. *Lib.* xi. *ep.* 8.

[2] Caſſiod. Var. *Lib.* v. x.

LECT. XXXVI.

view in doing it, to ſink too low is as much a fault, as to riſe too high. So to call antient Rome *the miſtreſs of Italy*, would as much leſſen the juſt notion of the extent of her power; as the Roman writers aggrandiſe it, when they ſtile her *miſtreſs of the world*. But purity, both in the choice of words and expreſſions, is never more neceſſary, than it is here. This may be called neatneſs in language. And to be plain and neat at the ſame time, is not only very conſiſtent; but the former can no other way recommend itſelf, than as joined with the latter. Beſides, the fewer advantages any thing has to ſet it off, the more carefully they ought to be obſerved. Perſpicuity is always to be regarded, and ſerves very much to keep up the attention, where other ornaments are wanting. Epithets ſhould be ſparingly uſed, ſince they enlarge the images of things, and contribute very much to highten the ſtile. Indeed they are ſometimes neceſſary, to ſet a thing in its juſt light; and then they ſhould not be droped. Thus, in ſpeaking of Xerxes, it would be too low and flat to ſay: *He deſcended with his army into Greece*. Here is no intimation given of their vaſt and unparalleled numbers, which ought to be done.

LECT. XXXVI.

done. Herodotus ſais his whole army, of ſea and land forces, amounted to twenty three hundred ſeventeen thouſand and upwards [1]. Therefore, unleſs the number be mentioned, the leaſt that can be ſaid is, that, *He deſcended with a vaſt army.*

[1] *Lib.* vii. *c.* 184.

THE next thing to be regarded is compoſition, which here does not require the greateſt accuracy and exactneſs. A ſeeming negligence is ſometimes a beauty in this ſtile, as it appears more natural. Short ſentences, or thoſe of a moderate length, are likewiſe upon the whole beſt ſuited to this character. Long and accurate periods, finely wrought up, with a gradual riſe, harmonious numbers, a due proportion of the ſeveral parts, and a juſt cadency, are therefore improper, as they are plainly the effect of art. But yet ſome proportion ſhould be obſerved in the members, that neither the ears be too much defrauded, nor the ſenſe obſcured. Of this kind is that expreſſion of a Greek orator, blamed by Demetrius: *Ceres came readily to our aſſiſtance, but Ariſtides not* [2]. The latter member of this ſentence is too ſhort, and by droping ſo ſuddenly, both diſappoints the ears, and is ſomewhat obſcure. It would have been plainer, and more agreable

[2] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 5. §. 6.

able thus, *but Ariſtides did not come.* As to order, the plaineſt and cleareſt diſpoſition, both of the words and members of ſentences, and what is moſt agreable to the natural conſtruction, beſt ſuits with this character. For one of its principal beauties is perſpicuity. And a proper connection likewiſe of ſentences, with a regular order in the dependence of things one upon another, very much contribute to this end. With regard to the colliſion of ſyllables in different words, for preventing either an hollowneſs or aſperity of ſound, greater liberty may be taken in this ſtile, than in the other characters. Here it may be allowed to ſay: *Virtue is amiable to all, tho all do not purſue it.* But in an higher character perhaps, in order to prevent the hollow ſound of the words, *tho all*, a perſon would chooſe to vary the expreſſion a little, and ſay, *tho few purſue it.* So, *Xerxes's expedition*, may be tolerable here; but in the florid ſtile, *the expedition of Xerxes*, would ſound much better. LECT. XXXVI.

THE laſt thing to be conſidered, with reſpect to the language, is dignity, or the uſe of tropes and figures. And as to tropes, they ought to be uſed cautiouſly; unleſs ſuch as are very common, and by time have

LECT. XXXVI.

have either come into the place of proper words, or at leaſt are equally plain and clear. So in the inſtance mentioned above, Diodorus Siculus, ſpeaking of the forces of Xerxes, calls them an *innumerable company* [1]. Where, by a *ſynecdoche*, he has choſe to make uſe of an uncertain number for a certain, as leſs liable perhaps to exception. Other examples might be given, if neceſſary. And with regard to figures, as moſt of thoſe which conſiſt in words, and are therefore called verbal figures, ſerve cheifly to enliven an expreſſion, and give an agreable turn, they are often not improper for this character. Nor are figures of ſentences wholly to be excluded, eſpecially ſuch as are cheifly uſed in reaſoning or demonſtration. But thoſe which are more peculiarly adapted to touch the paſſions, or paint things in the ſtrongeſt colors, are the more proper ornaments of the higher ſtiles, as will be ſhewn hereafter.

[1] *Lib.* ii. *c.* 5.

UPON the whole therefore, pure nature, without any colouring, or appearance of art, is the diſtinguiſhing mark of the low ſtile. The deſign of it is to make things plain and intelligible, and ſet them in an eaſy light. And therefore the proper ſubjects of it are epiſtles, dialogues, philoſophical

phical diſſertations, or any other diſcourſes, that ought to be treated in a plain and familiar manner, without much ornament, or addreſs to the paſſions. A freedom and eaſe both of thought and expreſſion, attended with an agreable humor and pleaſantry, are its peculiar beauties, that engage us. As we ſee perſons of faſhion and good breeding, tho in the plaineſt habit, have yet ſomething in their air and manner of behaviour, that is very taking and amiable. Somewhat of the like nature attends this ſtile. It has its difficulties, which are not ſo eaſily diſcerned, but from experience. For it requires no ſmall ſkill, to treat a common ſubject in ſuch a manner, as to make it entertaining. The fewer ornaments it admits of, the greater art is neceſſary to attain this end. Lofty ſubjects often engage and captivate the mind by the ſublimity of the ideas. And the florid ſtile calls in all the aſſiſtance of language and eloquence. But the plain ſtile is in a great meaſure ſtriped of thoſe advantages; and has little more to recommend it, than its own native beauty and ſimplicity. LECT. XXXVI.

LECTURE XXXVII.

Of the Middle Stile.

LECT. XXXVII.

HAVING in my laſt diſcourſe finiſhed what relates to the low ſtile, I now procede to give ſome account of the middle character, which I ſhall treat in the ſame manner as I did the former, by conſidering firſt the matter, and then the language proper for it.

AND as the ſubjects proper for this ſtile are things of weight and importance, which require both a gravity and accuracy of expreſſion; ſo fine thoughts are its diſtinguiſhing mark, as plain thoughts are of the low character, and lofty thoughts of the ſublime. Now a fine thought may deſerve that character from ſome or other of the following properties.

AND the firſt property I ſhall mention, is gravity and dignity. Thus Cicero in a ſpeech to Caeſar ſais: *It has been often told me, that you have frequently ſaid, you have lived long enough for yourſelf. I beleive it, if you either lived, or was born for yourſelf only* [1]. Nothing could either be more fit and proper, than this was, when it

[1] *Pro Marcell. c. 8.*

it was ſpoken; or at the ſame time a finer compliment upon Caeſar. For the civil war was now over, and the whole power of the Roman government in the hands of Caeſar; ſo that he might venture to ſay, he had lived long enough for himſelf, there being no higher pitch of glory, to which his ambition could aſpire. But then there were many things in the ſtate, that wanted redreſſing, after thoſe times of diſorder and confuſion, which he had not yet been able to effect, and of which Cicero here takes an opportunity to remind him. I ſhall produce another example from Curtius. Philotas, one of Alexander's captains, having formed a conſpiracy againſt him, was convicted of it, and put to death. Amintas, who was ſuſpected of the ſame crime, by reaſon of his great intimacy with Philotas, when he comes to make his defence, among other things ſpeaks thus: *I am ſo far from denying my intimacy with Philotas, that I own I courted his freindſhip. Do you wonder that we ſhewed a regard to the ſon of Parmenio, whom you would have to be next to yourſelf, giving him the preference to all your other freinds? You, Sir, if I may be allowed to ſpeak the truth, have brought me into this danger. For to whom elſe is it*

LECT. XXXVII.

LECT. XXXVII.

owing, that thoſe, who endeavoured to pleaſe you, addreſſed themſelves to Philotas? By his recommendation we have been raiſed to this ſhare of your freindſhip. Such was his intereſt with you, that we courted his favor, and feared his diſpleaſure. Did we not all in a manner engage ourſelves by oath, to have the ſame freinds, and the ſame enemies, which you had? Should we have refuſed to take this, which you as it were propoſed to us? Therefore if this be a crime, you have few innocent perſons about you, nay indeed none. For all deſired to be the freinds of Philotas; tho all could not be ſo, who deſired it. Therefore if you make no difference between his freinds and accomplices; neither ought you to make any between thoſe, who deſired to be his freinds, and thoſe who really were ſo [1]. Could any thing be finer ſpoken, more proper, and becoming the character of a ſoldier, than this defence; eſpecially to a prince of ſo great and generous a ſpirit, as Alexander? There is ſomething, which appears like this in Tacitus, with relation to the emperor Tiberius, but falls vaſtly ſhort of it in the juſtneſs and dignity of the ſentiment. Sejanus, his great favourite, and partner in his crimes, falling under his diſpleaſure, was, like Philotas, put

[1] Q. Curt. Lib. vii. c. 1.

put to death for a conſpiracy. Now a Roman knight, who apprehended himſelf in danger, on account of his freindſhip with Sejanus, thus apologizes for himſelf to the emperor, in the manner of Amintas: *It is not for us to examine the merit of a perſon, whom you raiſe above others, nor your reaſons for doing it. The gods have given you the ſovereign power of all things, to us the glory of obeying. Let conſpiracies formed againſt the ſtate, or the life of the emperor, be puniſhed; but as to freindſhips and private regards, the ſame reaſon that juſtifies you, Caeſar, renders us innocent* [1]. The turn of the expreſſions is not much different from that in the caſe of Amintas; but the beauty of the thought is ſpoiled, by the flattery of complimenting Tiberius upon an exceſs of power, which he employed to the deſtruction of many excellent men. There is not that impropriety in the defence of Amintas, which is equally brave and juſt.

LECT. XXXVII.

[1] *Ann. Lib.* vi. *c.* 8.

ANOTHER property of a fine thought is beauty and elegance. It is a fine compliment, which Pliny pays to the emperor Trajan, when he ſais: *It has happened to you alone, that you was father of your country, before you was made ſo* [2].

[2] *Paneg. c.* 21.

LECT. XXXVII.

Some of the Roman emperors had been complimented with the title of *father of their country*, who little deſerved it. But Trajan had a long time refuſed it, tho he was really ſo, both by his good government, and in the eſteem of his ſubjects, before he thought fit to accept of it. And Pliny, among other inſtances of the generoſity of that prince, which he mentions in the ſame diſcourſe, ſpeaking of the liberty, that he gave the Romans to purchaſe eſtates, which had belonged to the emperors, and the peaceable poſſeſſion they had of them, does it by a turn of thought no leſs beautiful, than the former. *Such*, ſais he, *is the prince's bounty, ſuch the ſecurity of the times, that he thinks us worthy to enjoy, what has been poſſeſſed by emperors; and we are not afraid to be thought ſo*[1]. There is a ſpritelineſs in this image, which gives it a beauty; as there is likewiſe in the following paſſage of the ſame diſcourſe, where he ſais to Trajan: *Your life is diſpleaſing to you, if it be not joined with the public ſafety; and you ſuffer us to wiſh you nothing, but what is for the good of thoſe who wiſh it*[2]. And of the ſame kind is that of Cicero to Caeſar, when he ſais: *You, Caeſar, are wont to forget*

[1] *Ibid.* c. 50.

[2] *Ibid.* c. 67.

LECT. XXXVII.

get nothing, but injuries. It is a very handſom, as well as juſt reflection, made by Tacitus upon Galba's government, that, *He ſeemed too great for a private man, while he was but a private man; and all would have thought him worthy of the empire, had he never been emperor*[1]. The beauty of a thought may give us delight, tho the ſubject be ſorrowful; and the images of things in themſelves unpleaſant, may be ſo repreſented, as to become agreable. Siſigambis, the mother of Darius, after the death of her ſon, had been treated by Alexander with the greateſt regard and tenderneſs, in whoſe power ſhe then was. So ſoon as ſhe heard therefore that he was dead, ſhe grew weary of life, and could not bear to outlive him. Upon which Q. Curtius makes this fine reflection: *Tho ſhe had courage to ſurvive Darius, yet ſhe was aſhamed to outlive Alexander*[2].

[1] *Hiſt. Lib.* i. *c.* 49.

[2] *Lib.* x. *c.* 5.

THE next property of a fine thought, which I ſhall mention, is delicacy. As in the objects of our ſenſes, thoſe things are ſaid to be delicate, which affect us gradually in a ſoft and agreable manner; ſo a delicate thought is that, which is not wholly diſcovered at once, but by degrees opening and unfolding itſelf to the mind,

LECT. XXXVII.

diſcloſes more than was at firſt perceived. Quintilian ſeems to refer to this, when he ſais: *Thoſe things are grateful to the hearers, which when they apprehend, they are delighted with their own ſagacity; and pleaſe themſelves, as tho they had not heard, but diſcovered them* [1]. Such thoughts are not unlike the ſketches of ſome pictures, which let us into the deſign of the artiſt, and help us to diſcern more, than the lines themſelves expreſs. Of this kind is that of Salluſt: *In the greateſt fortune, there is the leaſt liberty* [2]. This is not often ſo in fact, but ought to be; both to guard againſt an abuſe of power, and to prevent the effects of a bad example to inferiors. Pliny, ſpeaking of the emperor Trajan's entry into Rome, ſais: *Some declared upon ſeeing you, they had lived long enough; others, that now they were more deſirous to live* [3]. The compliment is fine either way, ſince both muſt eſteem the ſight of him the greateſt happineſs in life; and in that conſiſtency lies the delicacy of the thought. It was a fine character given of Grotius, when very young, on the account of his ſurpriſing genius, and uncommon proficiency in learning, that, *He was born a man.* As if nature, at his coming into the world, had

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 2.

[2] *Bell. Catil. c.* 50.

[3] *Paneg. c.* 22.

had at once furniſhed him with thoſe endowments, which others gradually acquire by ſtudy and application. LECT. XXXVII.

THE laſt property of a fine thought, which I ſhall take notice of, is novelty. Mankind is naturally pleaſed with new things, and when at the ſame time they are ſet in an agreable light, this very much hightens the pleaſure. Indeed there are few ſubjects, but what have been ſo often conſidered, that it is not to be expected, they ſhould afford many thoughts intirely new; but the ſame thought ſet in a different light, or applied to a different occaſion, has in ſome degree a claim of novelty. And even where a thing hath been ſo well ſaid already, that it cannot eaſily be mended, the revival of a fine thought often affords a pleaſure and entertainment to the mind, tho it can have no longer the claim of novelty. Cicero, in his treatiſe *Of an orator*, among ſeveral other encomiums, which he there gives to Craſſus, ſais of him: *Craſſus always excelled every other perſon, but that day he excelled himſelf*[1]. He means as an orator. But elſewhere he applies the ſame thought to Caeſar, upon another account, and with ſome addition to it. *You had*, ſais he, *before conquered all other conquerors*

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 1.

LECT. XXXVII.

querors by your equity and clemency, but to day you have conquered yourself; you seem to have vanquished even victory herself, therefore you alone are truly invincible [1]. This thought, with a little variation of the phrase, has since appeared in several later writers. And it is now grown common to say of a person, who excells in any way, upon his doing better than he did before, that he has outdone himself. The like has happened to another thought, which, with a little alteration, has been variously applied. It was said by Varro: *That if the Muses were to talk Latin, they would talk like Plautus* [2]. The younger Pliny, applying this compliment to a freind of his, says: *His letters are so finely writen, that you would think the Muses themselves talked Latin* [3]. And Cicero tells us: *It was said of Xenophon, that the Muses seemed to speak Greek with his voice* [4]. And elsewhere, that *Philosophers say, if Jupiter speaks Greek, he must speak like Plato* [5]. The thought is much the same in all these instances, and has been since revived by some modern writers.

[1] *Pro Marcell. c.* 4.

[2] Quintil. *Inst. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 1.

[3] *Lib.* ii. *Ep.* 13.

[4] Cic. *orat. c.* 19.

[5] *De Clar. Orat. c.* 31.

I HAVE done with the thoughts, and shall now consider the language proper for the middle stile. And in general it may be

be obſerved, that as the proper ſubjects of it are things of weight and importance, tho not of that exalted nature as wholly to captivate the mind, and divert it from attending to the diction; ſo all the ornaments of ſpeech, and beauties of eloquence have place here. LECT. XXXVII.

AND firſt with regard to elegance, it is plain that a different choice of words makes a very great difference in the ſtile, where the ſenſe is the ſame. Sometimes one ſingle word adds a grace and weight to an expreſſion, which, if removed, the ſenſe becomes flat and lifeleſs. Now ſuch words, as are moſt full and expreſſive, ſuit beſt with this character. Epithets alſo, which are proper and well choſen, ſerve very much to beautify and enliven it, as they enlarge the ideas of things, and ſet them in a fuller light.

THE moſt accurate compoſition, in all the parts of it, have place here. Periods the moſt beautiful and harmonious, of a due length, and wrought up with the moſt exact order, juſt cadency, eaſy and ſmooth connexion of the words, and flowing numbers, are the genuine ornaments, which greatly contribute to form this character.

BUT

LECT. XXXVII.

But the principal diſtinction of ſtile ariſes from tropes and figures. By theſe it is chiefly animated, and raiſed to its different degrees or characters, as it receives a leſſer or greater number of them; and thoſe either more mild, or ſtrong and powerful.

As to tropes, thoſe which afford the moſt lively and pleaſing ideas, eſpecially metaphors, ſuit the middle character. It is a pretty remark, which has been made by ſome critics upon two verſes of Virgil; one in his *Eclogues*, and the other in his *Georgics*. The former of theſe works is for the moſt part writen in the low ſtile, as the language of ſhepherds ought to be; but the latter in the middle ſtile, ſuitable to the nature of the ſubject, and the perſons for whom it was deſigned, the greateſt men in Rome not thinking it below them, to entertain themſelves with rural affairs. Now in the *Eclogue*, as ſome copies read the verſe, the ſhepherd, complaining of the barrenneſs of his land, ſais:

[1] *Eclog.* v. 37. *Infelix lolium et ſteriles naſcuntur avenae*[1].

In Engliſh thus:

Wild oats and darnel grow inſtead of corn.

But

But in the *Georgic*, where the ſame ſenſe is intended, inſtead of the proper word *naſcuntur*, *grow*, the author ſubſtitutes a metaphor, *dominantur*, *command*, and ſais: LECT. XXXVII.

Infelix lolium et ſteriles dominantur avenae[1]. That is in Engliſh: [1] *Georg. Lib.* i. *v.* 154.

Where corn is ſown, darnel and oats command.

It was fit and natural for the ſhepherd to expreſs his ſenſe in the plaineſt terms, and it would have been wrong to repreſent him going ſo far out of his way, as to fetch a metaphor from government, in talking upon his own affairs. But in the *Georgic*, where the poet ſpeaks in his own perſon, the metaphor is much more beautiful, and agreeable to the dignity of the work. This inſtance may ſhew in ſome meaſure, how the ſtile is hightened by tropes, and the ſame thought may be accommodated to the ſeveral characters of ſtile, by the different manner of expreſſion.

THE like may alſo be ſaid of figures, either of words or ſentences, in reference to this character; which admits of the fineſt deſcriptions, moſt lively images, and brighteſt figures, that ſerve either for delight, or to influence the paſſions, without tranſport or extaſy, which is the property

LECT. XXXVII.

of the ſublime. This is indeed the proper ſeat of ſuch embelliſhments, which ſupport and make up a principal part of the middle or florid ſtile. To enumerate theſe would be unneceſſary, as I have lately treated ſo largely upon each of them in ſeveral lectures; and therefore I ſhall only briefly mention ſome of the moſt conſiderable.

DESCRIPTIONS are not only a great ornament to a diſcourſe, but repreſent things in a very lively and agreable manner. In what a beautiful light has Cicero placed the polite arts and ſciences, when deſcribing them from their effects, he thus repreſents to us the great advantages, as well as pleaſure, which they afford to the mind? *Other ſtudies neither ſuit with all times, nor all ages, nor all places; but theſe improve youth, delight old age, adorn proſperity, afford a refuge and ſolace in adverſity; pleaſe at home, are no hindrance abroad, ſleep, travel, and retire with us* [1]. And they often affect us very powerfully, when they are addreſſed to the ſenſes. Quintilian has painted the calamities of a city taken by ſtorm in the brighteſt and ſtrongeſt colors, which he repreſents by: *Flames ſpreading themſelves over the houſes and temples, the cracking of falling buildings, and a*

[1] *Pro Arch. c. 7.*

LECT. XXXVII.

confuſed noiſe from a variety of cries and ſhouts; ſome runing they know not where, others in the laſt embraces of their freinds, the ſcreeks of children, women, and old men unhappily reſerved to ſuch diſtreſs; the plundering of all places civil and ſacred, the hurry and confuſion in carrying off the booty, captives driven before their victors, mothers endeavouring to guard their infants, and quarrels among the conquerors, where the plunder is largeſt [1]. This ſeems to be a very natural, as well as moving image of ſo dreadful a calamity.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* viii. *c.* 3.

PROSOPOPEIA is another very ſtrong and beautiful figure, very proper for this character. Seneca has a fine inſtance of it, in his *Conſolatary letter to Marcia*, upon the death of her ſon. After many arguments he had made uſe of to alleviate her greif, he at laſt introduces her father, Cremutius Cordus, as thus addreſſing to her. *Imagine your father*, ſais he, *from the celeſtial regions, ſpeaking to you in this manner: Daughter, why do you ſo long indulge your greif? why are you ſo ignorant, as to think it unhappy for your ſon, that, weary of life, he has withdrawn himſelf to his anceſtors? Are you not ſenſible what diſorders fortune occaſions every where? and that ſhe is kindeſt*

to

LECT. XXXVII.

to thoſe, who have leaſt concern with her? Need I mention to you princes, who had been extremely happy, had a more timely death ſecured them from impending evils? Or Roman generals, who wanted nothing to conſummate their glory, but that they lived too long? Why then is he bewailed longeſt in our family, who died moſt happily? There is nothing, as you imagine, deſirable among you, nothing great, nothing noble; but, on the contrary, all things are mean, full of trouble and anxiety, and partake very little of the light which we enjoy[1]. This advice was very ſuitable for a philoſopher, and he ſeems to have choſen this way of introducing it, to inforce the argument drawn from the happineſs of good men in a future ſtate, from the teſtimony of a perſon, who was actually in the poſſeſſion of it.

[1] *Conſolat. ad Marciam, c.* 26.

SIMILITUDES and compariſons are another great ornament of this ſtile, and oftenеſt found here. Nothing can be finer, than the compariſon between thoſe two great orators, Demoſthenes and Cicero, made by Quintilian, when he ſais: *Demoſthenes and Cicero differ in their elocution: one is more cloſe, and the other more copious; the former concludes more conciſely, and the latter takes a larger compaſs; the one always with*

with pungency, and the other generally with weight; one can have nothing taken from him, and the other nothing added to him; the later has more of art, and the former more of nature. But this muſt be allowed to Demoſthenes, that he made Cicero in a great meaſure what he was. For as Tully gave himſelf wholly to an imitation of the Greeks, he ſeems to me to have expreſſed the force of Demoſthenes, the fluency of Plato, and the pleaſantry of Iſocrates [1]. Similitudes, taken from natural things, ſerve very much to enliven the ſtile, and give it a chearfulneſs; which is a thing ſo common, and well known, that I need not ſtay to give any inſtances of it.

LECT. XXXVII.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib. xii. c. 1.*

ANTITHESIS, or oppoſition, both in the words and ſenſe, has often the like beautiful effect. There is an agreable contraſt in that paſſage of Seneca: *Caeſar does not allow himſelf many things, becauſe he can do all things: his watching defends all others ſleep, his labor their quiet, his induſtry their pleaſure, his buſineſs their eaſe; ſince he has governed the world, he has deprived himſelf of it* [2]. Had he ſaid no more than only in general, that, *Caeſar does not allow himſelf many things, becauſe he can do all things*; it might have paſſed for a fine thought;

[2] *Conſolat. ad Polyb. c. 26.*

LECT. XXXVII.

but by adding ſo many particulars, all in the ſame form of expreſſion, and begining each member with the ſame word, he has both enlarged the idea, and beautified the antitheſis, by a bright verbal figure.

THESE, and ſuch like florid figures, are ſometimes found in hiſtorians, but oftener in orators; and indeed this middle character, in the whole of it, is beſt accommodated to the ſubjects of hiſtory and oratory.

LEC-

LECTURE XXXVIII.

Of the Sublime Stile, as it relates to the thoughts.

IN my two laſt diſcourſes I treated upon the *low* and *middle ſtile*, and ſhall now procede to treat on the *ſublime*; which being the moſt noble, as well as the moſt difficult part of our orator's province, it may not be improper to conſider it ſomewhat more largely and diſtinctly. It is this principally, which Cicero requires in his perfect orator, whom he could not deſcribe in words, but only conceive of in his mind [1]. And indeed, the nobleſt genius and greateſt art are both requiſite to form this character. For where nature has been moſt liberal in furniſhing the mind with lofty thoughts, bright images, and ſtrong expreſſions; yet without the aſſiſtance of art, there will ſometimes be found a mixture of what is low, improper, or miſplaced. And a great genius, like a too rich ſoil, muſt produce flowers and weeds promiſcuouſly, without cultivation. But the juſteſt propriety, joined with the greateſt ſtrength and higheſt elevation

LECT. XXXVIII.

[1] *Orat.* 29.

LECT. XXXVIII.

of thought, are required to complete the true ſublime. Art therefore is neceſſary to regulate and perfect the taſte of thoſe, who are deſirous to excell in this character. Whoever conſiders theſe difficulties, will not wonder, that ſo few have ſucceded in it, and perhaps ſee reaſon to think, it is ſcarce poſſible there ſhould be a perfect writer in this way. Longinus ſeems to have been of this opinion, who ventures to ſay, he could obſerve ſome ſlips in the greateſt and moſt celebrated writers of antiquity. However, as theſe are ſo few, in comparison of their many and ſurpriſing excellencies, they ſcarce deſerve notice; and therefore he concludes, that the ſublime, with ſome faults, is preferable to the moſt exact and perfect mediocrity. His judgement, as a critic, is ſo univerſally eſteemed, that it may be worth while to hear his reaſons. *I am ſenſible*, ſais he, *that things ſublime, from their greatneſs, are not without their imperfections; for the nearer any thing is raiſed to its higheſt pitch, the greater danger it is in of ſinking. It is in ſublimity, as in immenſe wealth, ſomething muſt be overlooked. To prevent this, low and mean wits, by runing no hazards, and not aſpiring to riſe, generally continue ſafe,*

and

and ſecure themſelves from falling; while those more exalted, are in danger from their elevation. Beſides, I am not ignorant, that mankind are naturally prone to judge of the performances of others in the worſt light, and always to remember their blemiſhes, when their beauties are ſoon forgot. But tho I have myſelf obſerved ſeveral faults in Homer, and others the moſt celebrated writers, which have not a little diſpleaſed me; yet I would not call them faults, but rather ſlips thro inadvertency, which have eſcaped them, while their minds have been wholly wrapt up in a ſublimity of thought. And I cannot but think, that the greater excellencies, tho not every where equally ſupported, ought always to have the preference, upon the ſole account of their ſublimity. Tho Apollonius, who wrote the poem of the Argonauts, never ſlips once; and in Theocritus, excepting that in ſome paſſages he departs from the genuine character of eclogue, every thing is very happily deſigned; nevertheleſs, would you rather chooſe to be Apollonius than Homer? The Erigone of Eratoſthenes is a poem, in which you cannot find a ſingle fault; but Archilochus is often irregular and confuſed, being hurried away by the force of that ſublime ſpirit, which he could not keep under his command. Is Era-

LECT. XXXVIII.

LECT. XXXVIII.

toſthenes therefore the better poet? In like manner in lyrics, had you rather be Bacchylides, than Pindar? or in tragedy Ion of Chios, than Sophocles? becauſe the former make no falſe ſteps, and are always ſmooth and elegant; but tho Pindar and Sophocles, like a rapid flame, burn all before them, their fire ſometimes dies on a ſuddain, and they fall unhappily. And yet there is no man of ſenſe, but would prefer the ſingle Oedipus of Sopha-

[1] Sect. 33. *cles, to all the works of Ion* [1]. Tho the examples here given by Longinus, are all taken from the poets, yet the caſe is the ſame as to proſe writers, and he puts the queſtion equally with reſpect to both. And the younger Pliny, a perſon of as elegant a taſte, as any at the time in which he lived, declared himſelf of the ſame opinion, ſome ages before Longinus. I ſhall cite the paſſage, becauſe he ſpeaks only of orators. *I think*, ſais he, *the character, which I gave of a correct orator of our age, but not grand and ſublime, was juſt and proper; that* he offends in nothing, but that he does not offend. *For an orator ought to be raiſed and elevated, ſometimes to take fire and flame out, and often advance to the very edge of a precipice, in which high and lofty places frequently terminate. The way*

thro

LECT. XXXVIII.

thro a plain is ſafer, but lower; and thoſe, who run, oftener fall, than thoſe who only creep. But theſe gain no praiſe by keeping on their legs, and the others are applauded, tho they ſlip. For eloquence, as well as ſome other arts, gains commendation from nothing more than dangers. You ſee what ſhouts are given to rope dancers, when they ſeem juſt upon the point of falling. Thoſe things raiſe the greateſt wonder, which are leaſt expected, and moſt perilous. And therefore the pilot cannot diſcover the ſame ſkill in a calm, as in a ſtormy and boiſterous ſea. Where there is no danger, he has no honor, and comes into port diſregarded; but when the tackle gives way, the maſt bends, and the rudder cracks, then he is extolled, and almoſt worſhiped like a ſea deity [1]. I might add other authorities to the ſame purpoſe, were not theſe ſufficient to ſhew the opinion of the antients in relation to the ſublime [2].

[1] *Lib.* ix. *Ep.* 26.

[2] See Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 1.

BUT it is time to procede to a more particular explication of the nature and properties of this character; and in order to this, I ſhall, as in the two former, conſider firſt the *thoughts*, and then the *language*, in each of which it is diſtinguiſhed from them.

LECT. XXXVIII.

AND in the first place, lofty and grand sentiments are the basis and foundation of the true sublime. Longinus therefore advises those, who aspire at this excellence, to accustom themselves to think upon the noblest subjects [1]. A mind that always dwells upon low and common objects, can never raise itself sufficiently, to represent things great and magnificent in their full extent and proper light. But he, who inures himself to conceive the highest and most exalted ideas, and renders them familiar to his thoughts, will not often be at a loss how to express them; for where proper words are wanting, by metaphors and images taken from other things, he will be able to convey them in a just and adequate manner. What is more common than for two persons to conceive very differently of the same thing, from the different manner of thinking, to which they have been accustomed? After the great battle in Cilicia, between Alexander and Darius, in which the latter was routed, he sent ambassadors to Alexander with proposals of peace, offering him half his kingdom, with his daughter in marriage. Parmenio, one of Alexander's cheif captains, says to him upon this occasion: *For my part, was I*

[1] *Sect.* 9.

Alexander, I would accept of theſe conditions. LECT. XXXVIII.
And ſo would I, replies that aſpiring monarch, was I Parmenio [1]. The half of ſo vaſt a kingdom at preſent, and a right of ſucceſſion to the whole by marriage, was the higheſt ambition, to which the thoughts of Parmenio could riſe. But Alexander had vaſtly higher views, he aimed at nothing leſs than univerſal monarchy; and therefore ſuch a propoſal ſeemed much beneath his regard. Noble and lofty thoughts are principally thoſe, which either relate to divine objects; or ſuch things as among men are generally eſteemed the greateſt and moſt illuſtrious.

[1] Long. Sect. 9.

OF the former ſort is that of Homer, when, deſcribing the godeſs Diſcord, he ſais, that ſhe

Walks on the ground, and hides her head in clouds.

This ſtretch of thought, ſais Longinus, as great as the diſtance between heaven and earth, does not more repreſent the ſtature of the godeſs, than the meaſure of the poet's genius and capacity [2]. But ſuch images, however beautiful in poetry, are not ſo proper for an orator, whoſe buſineſs it is to make choice of thoſe, which are more ſuited to the nature of things, and the com-

[2] Sect. 9.

LECT. XXXVIII.

common reaſon of mankind. When Numa, the ſecond king of Rome, was ſettled in his government, and at peace with his neighbours, in order to ſoften the feirce and martial temper of his ſubjects, who had been always accuſtomed to wars during the reign of his predeceſſor Romulus, he endeavoured to impreſs their minds with an awe of the deity; and for that end introduced a number of religious ceremonies, which he pretended to have received from the godeſs Egeria. This muſt be eſteemed an artful peice of policy at that time. But that ſentiment is far more juſt and noble, with which Cicero endeavours to inſpire the members of a community, in his treatiſe *Of Laws*, when he ſais, that, *Citizens ought firſt to be perſuaded, that all things are under the rule and government of the gods; that every affair is directed by their wiſdom and power; that the higheſt regard is due to them from men, ſince they obſerve every one's conduct, how he acts and behaves himſelf, and with what temper and devotion he worſhips them; and that they make a difference between the pious and impious* [1]. Perſons under the influence of ſuch a perſuaſion, could not fail of behaving well in ſociety. And what he ſais to

[1] *Lib.* ii. *c.* 7.

to Caeſar is no leſs in this ſtile, when interceding for Ligarius, he tells him, that, *Men in nothing approach nearer to deity, than in giving life to men* [1]. And Velleius Paterculus, ſpeaking of Cato, gives him this ſublime character: *That he was more like the gods than men; who never did a good thing, that he might ſeem to do it* [2]. LECT. XXXVIII.

[1] *Pro Ligar. ſub fin.*

[2] *Lib. ii. c. 35.*

THE other kind of lofty thoughts, mentioned above, are thoſe which relate to power, wiſdom, courage, beneficence, and ſuch other things, as are of the higheſt eſteem among mankind. *Your fortune,* ſais Tully to Caeſar, *has given you nothing greater than a power, nor your nature than a will to ſave many* [3]. He ſubjoins this compliment, to what I juſt now cited from him, and applies that to Caeſar, which was before only expreſſed in general, leaving him to draw the inference of his ſimilitude to deity, from the clemency of his nature. And elſewhere, as in a ſort of tranſport for his ſucceſs in defeating the conſpiracy of Catiline, he thus beſpeaks the Roman ſenate: *You have always decreed public thanks to others for their good government of the ſtate, but to me alone for its preſervation. Let that Scipio ſhine, by whoſe conduct and valor Hannibal was forced to leave Italy,*

[3] *Pro Ligar. ſub fin.*

SECT. XXXVIII.

Italy, and retire to Africa. Let the other Scipio be greatly honored, who deſtroyed Carthage and Numantia, two cities the moſt dangerous to this empire; let Lucius Paulus be in high eſteem, whoſe triumphal chariot was adorned with Perſes, once a moſt powerful and noble prince; let Marius be in eternal honor, who twice delivered Italy from an invaſion, and the dread of ſervitude; let Pompey's name excell all theſe, whoſe actions and virtues are terminated by no other bounds, but the courſe of the ſun: yet, among all their praiſes, there will ſtill ſome place be left for my glory; unleſs indeed it be a greater thing to open for us new provinces, to which we may reſort, than to ſecure a place for our victorious generals to return in triumph [1].

[1] *In Catil. iv. c. 10.*

And Velleius Paterculus, as if he thought no encomium too high for this great orator, laments his unhappy fate in theſe lofty ſtrains, addreſſed to M. Antony, by whoſe order he was put to death: *You have taken from Cicero old age, and a life more miſerable than death under your government; but his fame, and the glory of his actions and words, you have been ſo far from deſtroying, that you have encreaſed them. He lives, and will live in the memory of all ages; and while this ſyſtem of nature, however conſtituted, ſhall*

ſhall remain (which ſcarce any Roman but himſelf conceived in his mind, comprehended by his genius, and illuſtrated with his eloquence) the praiſe of Cicero ſhall accompany it; and all poſterity, while it admires his writings againſt you, will curſe your treatment of him; and ſooner ſhall mankind be loſt to the world, than his name.[1] It was a noble reply of Porus the Indian king, when after his defeat by Alexander, being brought before him and aſked, how he expected to be treated, he anſwered, *Like a king*.[2] And Valerius Maximus, ſpeaking of Pompey's treatment of Tigranes, king of Armenia, after he had vanquiſhed him, expreſſes it in a manner ſuited to the dignity and beneficence of the action, when he ſais: *He reſtored him to his former fortune, eſteeming it as glorious to make kings, as to conquer them*.[3]

LECT. XXXVIII.

[1] *Lib.* ii. *c.* 66.

[2] Arrian. *Lib.* v. *c.* 19.

[3] *Lib.* v. 1. 9.

But the true ſublime is conſiſtent with the greateſt plainneſs and ſimplicity of expreſſion. And generally ſpeaking, the more plain and natural the images appear, the more they ſurprize us. How ſuccinct, and yet how majeſtic, is that expreſſion of Caeſar, upon his victory over Pharnaces? *I came, I ſaw, I conquered*.[4] But there cannot be a greater or more beautiful exam-

[4] Suet. *in Vit.* 37.

ple

LECT. XXXVIII.

ple of this, than what Longinus has taken notice of from Moſes. *The legiſlator of the Jews*, ſais he, *no ordinary perſon, having a juſt notion of the power and majeſty of the deity, has expreſſed it in the begining of his laws in the following words. And God ſaid: what? Let there be light, and there was light. Let the earth be made, and it was made*[1]. This inſtance from the divine writer, and the character here given of him by that excellent critic, is the more remarkable, as he was himſelf a pagan. And certainly, no laboured deſcription could raiſe in the mind an higher conception of the infinite power of the deity, than this plain and ſhort narration. To command nature itſelf into being by a word, repreſents it at once altogether boundleſs and unlimited.

[1] Sect. 9.

IT ſometimes very much contributes, to highten the image of a thing, when it is expreſſed in ſo undetermined a manner, as to leave the mind in ſuſpenſe what bounds to fix to the thought. Of this kind is that of Cicero, when he firſt raiſes an objection againſt the neceſſity of an acquaintance with polite literature, in order to form a great man; and then anſwers it. The objection is founded upon the examples of

ſeveral

LECT. XXXVIII.

ſeveral great and excellent perſons among the Romans, who had raiſed themſelves to the higheſt pitch of honor and dignity, and been very ſerviceable to their country, by the help of a good genius, without the advantage of much learning. In reply to which he allows, that where theſe are not united, nature or genius is of itſelf much preferable, and will carry a perſon further in the purſuit of great and noble deſigns, than learning without a genius; but that both are neceſſary to complete and perfect a truly great man. But I ſhall give you what he ſais himſelf on this head, by which that property of a ſublime thought, I am now endeavouring to explain, will appear, from his manner of expreſſion. *I acknowledge*, ſais he, *that many perſons of an exalted mind and virtue, have, from a divine temper, without inſtruction, become moderate and grave; and I add likewiſe, that nature, without the aſſiſtance of learning, has frequently more contributed to honor and virtue, than learning, where a genius has been wanting: but yet I muſt ſay, that where the direction and improvement of learning is added to a great and excellent genius, it is wont to produce ſomething admirable and ſingular, which I know not how to deſcribe*[1]. He knew

[1] *Pro Archia. c. 7.*

LECT. XXXVIII.

knew very well, that by leaving the minds of his hearers thus in ſuſpence, they would form to themſelves higher conceptions of what he intended, than from any idea he could convey to them in words. I may add to this another example, from the ſame great orator, where he ſais: *Truly if the mind had no views to poſterity, and all its thoughts were terminated by thoſe bounds, in which the ſpace of life is confined; it would neither fatigue itſelf with ſo great labors, nor be diſquieted with ſo many cares and watchings, nor ſo often expoſe itſelf to death. But there is a certain active principle in every good man, which conſtantly excites his mind by motives of glory; and reminds him, that the remembrance of his name is not to end with his life, but extend itſelf to all poſterity* [1]. Of the like nature is that of Milton, when he deſcribes Satan, as flying from hell in queſt of our earth, then newly formed. For having repreſented, that his wings failed him in the vaſt vacuity, he thus deſcribes his fall:

[1] *Pro Arch. c. 11.*

Down he drops
Ten thouſand fathom deep, and to this hour
Down had been falling, had not by ill chance
The ſtrong rebuff of ſome tumultuous cloud,
Inſtinct

LECT. XXXVIII.

Inſtinct with fire and nitre, hurried him
As many miles aloft [1].

[1] *Parid. Loſt. B.* ii.

Thoſe words, by which his fall is expreſsed,

and to this hour
Down had been falling,

leave the mind in ſuſpence, and unable to fix any bounds to the vacuity; and by that means raiſe a greater and more ſurprizing idea of its ſpace, than any direct expreſſion could have done. This image is very beautiful, where it ſtands; but ſo much out of the common way of thinking, as to ſuit better with an epic poem, than the diſcourſe of an orator.

HITHERTO I have conſidered the ſublime, as it conſiſts only in the thought; how it ariſes from the language and dignity of expreſſion, will be ſhewn in my next diſcourſe.

LECTURE XXXIX.

Of the Sublime Stile, with regard to the language.

LECT. XXXIX. HAVING in my laſt diſcourſe treated on the ſublime, as it relates to the thoughts; I am now to conſider the language proper for this character. Greatneſs of mind, and elevation of thought, are indeed in a great meaſure the gift of nature; but yet they may be improved by ſtudy, and frequent converſe with noble ſubjects. Beſides, a ſublime thought may ſometimes be obſcured or depreſſed by an ill manner of expreſſing it. Nay, and where a thought in itſelf is but low, and ſinks beneath the dignity of the ſubject, it may often be ſupported by the aſſiſtance of language. It is ſaid, that Apelles being to draw the picture of his freind, who had loſt one eye in the wars, drew him in profile, with that ſide of his face in view, which had no defect; the like art is required here, that every thing may appear grand and magnificent, without any mixture of what is mean and trivial.

WHAT

LECT. XXXIX.

WHAT I have to offer upon this ſubject, will come under the three heads of *Elegance*, *Compoſition*, and *Dignity*, which comprehend all the properties of ſtile.

Now as to *Elegance*, thoſe words and expreſſions cheifly contribute to form the ſublime, which are moſt ſonorous, and have the greateſt ſplendor, force, and dignity. And they are principally ſuch as theſe. Long words, when equally expreſſive, are rather to be choſen, than ſhort ones, and eſpecially monoſyllables. So to *conquer* or *vanquiſh* an enemy, carries in it a fuller and more grand ſound, than *to beat* an enemy. For which reaſon likewiſe, compound words are often preferable to ſimple ones. So if we ſay: *Caeſar's army, when he was preſent, was always invincible:* this manner of expreſſion has more of ſublimity in it, than ſhould we ſay: *Caeſar's army, when he was preſent, could never be conquered.* But the antient languages have much the advantage of ours in both theſe reſpects; for their words are generally longer, and they are abundantly more happy in their compoſitions. The uſe of proper epithets does alſo in a particular manner contribute to this character. For as they denote the qualities and modes of things;

LECT. XXXIX.

they are, as it were, ſhort deſcriptions, ſo that being joined to their ſubjects, they often greatly enlarge and highten their image. Thus when the character of *divine poet* is given to Homer or Virgil, or *prince of orators* to Demoſthenes or Cicero; it conveys to the mind a more ſublime idea of them, than the bare mention of their name.

THE next thing to be conſidered is *compoſition*. The force of which, as Longinus obſerves, is ſo great, that ſometimes it creates a kind of ſublime, where the thoughts themſelves are but mean, and gives a certain appearance of grandeur to that, which otherwiſe would ſeem but common [1]. But *compoſition* conſiſts of ſeveral parts, the firſt of which, in the order I have hitherto conſidered them, is *period*. And here the caſe is much the ſame as with animal bodies, which owe their cheif excellency to the union and juſt proportion of their parts. The ſeveral members, when ſeparate from each other, loſe both that beauty and force, which they have when joined together in a complete body. In like manner ſublimity ariſes from the ſeveral parts of a period ſo connected, as to give force, as well as beauty, to the whole. The periods

[1] *Sect.* 39.

therefore in this character ſhould be of a proper length. If they are too ſhort, they loſe their juſt weight and grandeur, and are gone almoſt before they reach the ear; as on the contrary, when they are too prolix, they become heavy and unweildly, and by that means loſe their force. But more eſpecially, nothing ſuperfluous ought to be admitted, which very much enervates the force of a ſentence. I ſhall exemplify this in a paſſage from Herodotus, where he is giving an account of the famous battle at Thermopylae, between the Perſians and Lacedemonians. *Dieneces*, ſais he, *the Spartan, being told by a Trachinian, before the engagement with the Medes, that when the barbarians came to ſhoot their arrows, they would fly ſo thick, as to obſcure the light of the ſun; he was ſo far from being terrified at this, that deſpiſing their number, he replied: He was pleaſed with what his freind told him, ſince if the ſun was obſcured, they ſhould fight in the ſhade, and not in the ſun*[1]. The ſenſe here is great and noble, but the ſublimity of the expreſſion is ſpoilt in a great meaſure by thoſe laſt words, *and not in the ſun*, which are wholly ſuperfluous. Cicero was ſenſible of this, and therefore he omits that member in relating

LECT. XXXIX.

[1] *Lib.* vii. *c.* 226.

LECT. XXXIX.

ting the ſame ſtory, and ſais only: *A Spartan hearing, that one of the Perſians ſhould ſay in an inſulting manner, that when they came to engage, they ſhould not be able to ſee the ſun, for the multitude of their darts and arrows, replies: Then we ſhall fight in the ſhade* [1]. By ſtopping here, he gives the ſentence much more life and emphaſis. The next thing to be conſidered in *compoſition*, is the order and diſpoſition of the ſeveral words and members of a ſentence. The different placing but of one or two words will ſometimes wholly deſtroy the grandeur of a ſentence, and make it extremely flat. *This public act*, ſais Demoſthenes, *diſpelled the danger, which at that time, like a cloud, hung over the city* [2]. Let us vary the order a little, and read it thus: *This public act diſpelled the danger, which, like a cloud, hung over the city at that time.* What a different turn does the expreſſion receive for the worſe? The ſpirit and majeſty of it are intirely loſt. And in placing the ſeveral parts or members, they ought to be ſo diſpoſed, that what is moſt weighty and important ſhould ſtand laſt. So Tully ſais of Catiline: *We ought to return thanks to heaven, that we have ſo often eſcaped ſo odious, ſo frightful, ſo dangerous a plague of*

[1] *Tuſc. quaeſt. Lib.* i. *c.* 42.

[2] Long. §. 38.

the ſtate [1]. A thing may be *odious*, and *frightful*, and yet not *dangerous*; therefore he puts this in the laſt place, to give it the greater force, and make the deepeſt impreſſion. Another thing to be attended to in *compoſition*, is the connexion of words, with regard to the ſound; that the pronunciation, in paſſing from one to another, may be moſt agreable to the ear, and beſt ſuited to the nature of the ſubject. And as this is generally ſomething grand and magnificent, ſuch a contexture of them, as will give the greateſt force and energy to the expreſſion, is moſt proper for the ſublime. Soft and languid ſounds are very unſuitable to this character. They ſooth and pleaſe the ear, but rather ſink and depreſs the mind, than excite it to things great and noble. In this reſpect therefore, our tongue, by its multitude of conſonants, is more ſuited for ſublime diſcourſes, than ſome other modern languages, which abound with vowels.

LECT. XXXIX.

[1] *In Catil.* i. c. 5.

THE laſt head to be conſidered, is the proper uſe of tropes and figures, which is here ſo neceſſary, that the title of *dignity* ſeems to have been given to this part of elocution, from the aſſiſtance it more eſpecially affords to this character. For if, as

LECT. XXXIX.

has been obſerved from Longinus, *compoſition* will ſometimes create a ſort of ſublimity; this much oftener happens from the force and efficacy of ſome lively tropes and ſtrong figures.

AND as to tropes, bright *metaphors* are peculiarly ſuited to raiſe and animate the ſtile. This is manifeſt from the nature of them, as they conſiſt of contracted ſimilies, reduced to a ſingle word; which if taken from things lofty and grand, muſt of conſequence give a ſublimity to the ſtile. What can ſuggeſt to us a greater idea of the valour of Ajax, than Homer's calling him, *the bulwark of the Greeks*[1]; or of the Scipios, than when they are ſtiled by Virgil, *the two thunderbolts of war*. A number of theſe well choſen, contribute no leſs to the grandeur, than beauty of a diſcourſe. *Hyperbole* ſometimes gives the ſame force to an expreſſion, if cautiouſly uſed, and ſo as not to excede all appearance of truth. But the cheif uſe of it is, where proper words will not expreſs the juſt idea of the thing deſigned to be conveyed; and it may ſeem rather the offspring of neceſſity, than choice. Of this nature is that of Herodotus, when ſpeaking of the Lacedemonians at Thermopylae, he ſais: *They defended*

[1] *Il.* γ. 229.

fended themſelves with the ſwords they had left, and even with their hands and teeth, till the barbarians buried them under their arrows[1]. It cannot be ſuppoſed ſtrictly true, that ſo many arrows were thrown at them, as to bury them; but having in the former part of the ſentence repreſented their reſolute defence in the ſtrongeſt terms, by ſaying, that naked and without arms, they engaged armed men with their hands and teeth; the following hyperbole ſeems not unnatural, and to intimate nothing more, than what was neceſſary to quell ſuch obſtinate reſolution and courage.

LECT. XXXIX.

[1] Long. §. 37.

As to figures, whether verbal or thoſe which conſiſt in the ſenſe, the nature of this character will eaſily direct to ſuch as are moſt proper. But with reſpect to the latter, poets take greater liberties in the uſe of them, than would be allowed in an orator. As their images are often formed for pleaſure and delight, ſo they carry in them more of rapture and tranſport. But the orator's uſe of them being to ſet things in a ſtronger and clearer light, they are more ſedate and moderate. Beſides, an orator ſcarce ever has occaſion for ſuch fictitious images, as we often meet with in poetry; tho his ought to appear as natural,

LECT. XXXIX.

ral, and its painting as ſtrong and lively. I ſhall juſt mention ſome of the cheif of thoſe figures, which ſeem beſt ſuited for this purpoſe; tho they are no leſs ſuited to the middle ſtile, as has been ſhewn already, when taken from ſubjects of an inferior nature.

THE firſt I ſhall mention is *deſcription*, of which Juſtin gives us a fine inſtance, in a ſpeech of king Philip the fifth of Macedon, wherein he repreſents the neceſſity of falling upon the Romans, who at that time were engaged in a war with Hannibal. *I behold*, ſais he, *a cloud of a moſt dreadful and bloody war riſing in Italy. I ſee a ſtorm of thunder and lightning from the weſt, which will overſpread all places with a vaſt ſhower of blood, into whatever country the tempeſt of victory ſhall drive it. Greece has undergone many violent ſhocks in the Perſian, Gallic, and Macedonian wars; but theſe would all be found unworthy of regard, if the armies now engaged in Italy, ſhould march out of that country. I view the terrible and cruel wars, which involve thoſe nations thro the courage of their forces, and ſkill of their generals. This rage and fury cannot ceaſe by the deſtruction of one party, without the ruin of their neighbours. Indeed, Macedon has*

LECT. XXXIX.

has leſs reaſon to dread the ſavage conquerors, than Greece; becauſe more prepared, and better able to defend itſelf: but I am ſenſible, thoſe who attack each other ſo impetuouſly, will not confine their victories within thoſe bounds; and that it will be our lot to engage the conquerors [1]. So lively a picture of imminent and threatning danger, muſt needs alarm the moſt timorous, and excite them to a reſolution to defend their country, and all that was dear to them. Such images give life and vigor to a diſcourſe, and being artfully interwoven with proper arguments, influence the mind, and carry it away by an irreſiſtible force; ſo that the hearer is not barely left to conclude the certainty of the thing, but moved by it, as it were, from ocular demonſtration. The images therefore of the orator ought to be drawn from real things, or at leaſt ſuch as are probable; for if they are wholly fictitious and incredible, as many poetical images are, they may give pleaſure, but will not convince the mind, nor ſway the paſſions.

[1] *Lib.* xxix. *c.* 3.

ENUMERATION has ſome affinity with the former figure; by which, if the ſeveral parts have each ſomething grand in them, the whole, when brought together, and

LECT. XXXIX.

and diſpoſed in a juſt order, very much contributes to the ſublimity. I ſhall produce an example of this from an Engliſh writer, containing a deſcription of our globe, upon a ſurvey of it after the general conflagration, which he repreſents in this ſtrong light: *Such is the vanity and tranſient glory of this habitable world! By the force of one element breaking looſe upon the reſt, all the vanities of nature, all the works of art, all the labors of men, are reduced to nothing; all that we admired and loved before, as great and magnificent, is obliterated and vaniſhed, and another form and face of things, plain, ſimple, and every where the ſame, overſpreads the whole earth. Where are now the great empires of the world, and their great imperial cities? their pillars, trophies, and monuments of glory? Shew me where they ſtood, read the inſcription, tell me the victor's name. What remains, what impreſſions, what difference or diſtinction do you ſee in this maſs of fire? Rome itſelf, eternal Rome, the great city, the empreſs of the world, whoſe domination or ſuperſtition, antient or modern, make a great part of the hiſtory of the earth; what is become of her now? She laid her foundations deep, and her palaces were ſtrong and ſumptuous;* ſhe glorified

LECT. XXXIX.

tified herſelf, and lived deliciouſly, and ſaid in her heart, I ſit a queen, and ſhall ſee no ſorrow; *but her hour is come, ſhe is wiped away from the face of the earth, and buried in everlaſting oblivion. But it is not cities only, and the works of mens hands; the everlaſting hills, the mountains and rocks of the earth are melted, as wax before the ſun,* and their place is no where found. *Here ſtood the Alps, the load of the earth, that covered many countries, and reached their arms from the ocean to the Black ſea. This huge maſs of ſtone is ſoftened and diſſolved, as a tender cloud into rain. Here ſtood the African mountains, and Atlas with his top above the clouds. There was frozen Caucaſus, and Taurus, and Imaus, and the mountains of Aſia; and yonder, towards the north, ſtood the Riphean hills, clothed in ice and ſnow: all theſe are vaniſhed, dropped away, as the ſnow upon their heads*[1]. Theſe particulars conſidered ſeparately, are all truly great and noble, and every way ſuited to the nature of the ſubject; but as they are here diſpoſed, and riſe in order, they both enlarge the idea, and highten the image of that grand cataſtrophe.

[1] *Burnet. Theor.*

THE next figure I ſhall take notice of, is *ſimilitude*, which ſerves very much for beauty and

LECT. XXXIX.

and ornament; and when taken from great and ſublime objects, adds a grandeur and magnificence to the things illuſtrated by it. I need go nó farther for an example of this, than to the great critic, I have ſo often mentioned already; who has treated upon the ſublime, in a ſtile every way equal to the ſubject. He then comparing thoſe two great works of Homer, his *Iliad* and *Odyſſy*, thus deſcribes them: *Homer compoſed his Iliad, when his mind was in its full ſtrengh and vigor, the whole body of the poem is dramatic, and full of action; whereas the beſt part of the Odyſſy is taken up in narrations, which ſeem to be the genius of old age. So that one may compare him in this latter work to the ſeting ſun, which ſtill appears with the ſame magnificence, but has no longer the ſame heat and force.* And ſoon after, ſpeaking of the *Odyſſy*, he ſais: *That peice may be called the reflux of his genius, which like the great ocean ebbs, and deſerts its ſhores* [1]. What nobler idea could poſſibly have been given of that great poet, than by theſe two ſimilitudes of the ſun and the ocean? And elſewhere, comparing thoſe two great orators Demoſthenes and Cicero, he ſhews the like ſublimity of thought. *Demoſthenes*, ſais he, *is ſublime, in*

[1] *Sect.* 9.

LECT. XXXIX.

in that he is cloſe and conciſe; Cicero, in that he is diffuſed and extenſive. The former, by reaſon of the violence, rapidity, ſtrength, and fury, with which he rages and bears all before him, may be compared to a tempeſt and thunder; but the latter, like a great conflagration, devours and conſumes all he meets, with a fire that is never extinguiſhed, but wherever it advances, continually gathers new ſtrength [1].

[1] Sect. 12.

ANTITHESIS, or a ſentence conſiſting of oppoſite parts, has often the ſame effect, as in the following inſtance of Cicero, where his view is to repreſent Pompey as a moſt conſummate general. *Who*, ſais he, *ever was, or need be more knowing, than this man? Who from his childhood, and inſtruction at ſchool, went into the army of his father, and learned the military art, in a very great war againſt the feirceſt enemies: who while yet a boy, became a ſoldier under the greateſt general; and when firſt a youth, was himſelf commander of a very great army: who has oftener engaged with the enemy in battle, than any other perſon with his adverſary in private conteſts; has waged more wars, than others have read; and conquered more provinces, than others have wiſhed to govern: whoſe youth has been ſpent in acquiring*

LECT. XXXIX.

quiring the art of war, not by the precepts of others, but his own commands; not by defeats, but victories; not by campains, but triumphs. [1].

[1] *Pro Leg. Man. c.* 10.

APOSTROPHE is the laſt figure I ſhall mention of thoſe, which contribute to the ſublime. Among the articles charged againſt Demoſthenes, by his great adverſary and rival Aeſchines, one was, that he had adviſed the Athenians to engage in a war againſt king Philip, wherein they had received a very great defeat. When he comes to anſwer that part of the charge, he does not ſay, as he might: *You have not been miſled, my fellow citizens, in expoſing your lives for the liberties and ſafety of Greece; you are not without the moſt illuſtrious examples of ſuch conduct. For who can ſay thoſe great men were miſled, who fought for the ſame cauſe in the plains of Marathon?* But inſtead of expreſſing himſelf thus, he gives the matter quite a different turn, and in a ſort of rapture, appealing to thoſe brave defenders of their country, ſais: *No, my fellow citizens, you have not done wrong, you have not; I proteſt by the ghoſts of thoſe great men, who fought for the ſame cauſe in the plains of Marathon.* By this appeal to thoſe antient

tient worthies, whoſe memories were in the higheſt eſteem at Athens, that it was the cauſe, and not the ſucceſs, which rendered their actions ſo glorious, he artfully corroborates his aſſertion, in a way, which he knew muſt have the greateſt weight with his audience. LECT. XXXIX.

As the proper ſubjects of this character are either divine things, or ſuch as are in the higheſt eſteem and regard among mankind, which often require laudatory diſcourſes or panegyric; theſe naturally admit of all the ornaments and aſſiſtance of eloquence, which however muſt be uſed with diſcretion. For when the mind is wrapt up in thought, and ſtretched to the utmoſt of its powers in the purſuit of ſome noble and ſublime idea, it cannot attend to all the leſſer niceties and finery of language; but from its own vigor, and lively conception of things, will be led to expreſs them in terms the moſt emphatical, and beſt ſuited to their nature. In ſuch caſes therefore, the ſublimity muſt appear rather from the elevation of the thought, attended with a ſimplicity of expreſſion, than from the ornaments and dreſs of the language. Theſe things ſeem more natural, when the mind is relaxed,

LECT. XXXIX.

and employed upon lower objects. The upon the whole, grandeur and majesty of expression is the proper mark of this character, with relation to the language, as beauty and splendor is of the middle stile.

LEC-

LECTURE XL.

Of Wit and Humour.

LECT. XL.

IN ſome former diſcourſes I have treated upon the ſeveral ſorts of ſtile, and endeavoured to explain both the nature of them, and thoſe properties, by which they are principally diſtinguiſhed from each other. But there is one property yet remaining, which in ſome meaſure belongs to every character of ſtile, and that is *Wit*. This, if rightly managed, not only enlivens a diſcourſe, and renders it agreable; but ſometimes proves of great ſervice to an orator. As Cicero therefore, and other celebrated writers, have conſidered it in their treatiſes upon this art; I propoſe to follow them in it, and to make it the ſubject of my preſent diſcourſe. And firſt I ſhall endeavour to ſhew the nature of *wit* in general, then the different kinds of it, thirdly its uſe to an orator, and in the laſt place how it ought to be conducted.

MR. Locke's account of *wit* has been generally approved, as very juſt and accurate, who ſais, that: *It lies moſt in the aſſemblage of ideas, and puting thoſe together*

LECT. XL.

with quickneſs and variety, wherein can be found any reſemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleaſant pictures and agreable viſions in the fancy. Which therefore is ſo agreable to all people, becauſe its beauty appears at firſt, and there is required no labor of thought to examine what truth or reaſon there is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, reſts ſatisfied with the agreableneſs of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy [1]. This action of the mind, as the ſame great philoſopher obſerves, is directly contrary to judgement: *Which,* as he deſcribes it, *lies in ſeparating carefully one from another ideas, wherein can be found the leaſt difference, thereby to avoid being miſled by ſimilitude and by affinity, to take one thing for another* [2]. And from hence he accounts for the reaſon of that common obſervation, that men, who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories, have not always the cleareſt judgement, or deepeſt reaſon. Nor is this to be wondered at, if we conſider the different nature of theſe acts of the mind. For as wit conſiſts in a readineſs and vivacity of thought, and is the effect of a lively and briſk fancy; ſo judgement depends upon a clear diſcerning faculty, and deep penetration. Now as the former

[1] *Hum. Underſt. B.* ii. *c.* 11. §. 2.

[2] *Ubi ſupra.*

former is quick and active, ſo it is often unſteady, and cannot fix long enough upon a thing to examine it throughly; and therefore perſons of this turn, are many times apt to be too haſty and raſh in their concluſions; whereas judgement corrects the uneven ſallies of fancy, and determines nothing but upon mature deliberation, and in proportion to the evidence. But when Mr. Locke ſais, that *wit lies much in an aſſemblage of ſuch ideas, wherein may be found ſome reſemblance or congruity*; this is not to be ſo underſtood, as if it was wholly confined to ſuch images. For wit often ariſes from contrary ideas, which ſtrike the fancy by being joined in an unexpected manner. And another very ingenious writer has obſerved upon Mr. Locke's deſcription of wit: *That every reſemblance of ideas is not that, which we call wit; unleſs it be ſuch an one, that gives delight and ſurprize. Theſe two properties,* he ſais, *ſeem eſſential to wit, more particularly the latter of them. In order therefore that the reſemblance in the ideas be wit, it is neceſſary they ſhould not lie too near one another in the nature of things; for where the likeneſs is obvious, it gives no ſurprize*[1]. It is the novelty therefore, according to this writer, more than the beauty

LECT. XL.

[1] *Spect. Vol.* i. *N.* 62.

LECT. XL.

of an expreſſion, which denominates it *wit*. So that a fine metaphor, elegant turn, or pleaſant alluſion, which at firſt was thought very witty, when once it becomes common, loſes that name, however beautiful in itſelf. But the foundation of all true *wit* lies in the juſtneſs of the thought. For tho every juſt thought is not *wit*, yet the nearer relation the ideas have to the nature of things, the *wit* is the brighter and more genuine. Things may pleaſe, and cauſe laughter for their oddneſs; but ſo far as they diſagree with nature, ſo much they come ſhort of real *wit*. From this breif account of the nature of *wit*, it is eaſy to perceive, what good reaſon Cicero had for ſaying, *Wit is a thing not to be learnt* [1]. It is the offspring of nature, and proper effect of a bright and lively fancy. Hence we often find ruſtics, without any advantages from education, very witty in their way. They are as ready with their ſimiles and alluſions to things, which they know, and as quick in their repartees, as the moſt polite perſons. So that what art has to do in this matter, is not to give the faculty, but to direct the uſe of it by ſuch obſervations, as may be of ſervice in its application.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 54.

As

LECT. XL.

As to the diviſion of *wit*, which is the ſecond thing I propoſed to conſider, Cicero reduces it to two kinds, which he calls *cavillatio* and *dicacitas*[i]. The former of theſe, which is confined within no certain limits, may, I think, in our language, be called *continued wit* or *humour*; and the latter, which uſually lies in a ſingle ſentence or word, may be termed *conciſe wit* or *jeſting*.

[i] *Ibid.*

By *humour* then, or *continued wit*, we may underſtand in general, a certain ſpritelineſs and vivacity of thought, runing thro a diſcourſe, and ſhewing itſelf in agreable images, beautiful turns, and a facetious manner of expreſſion, ſuited to the ſubject, and affecting the hearers with pleaſure and delight; tho not commonly to that degree, as to excite laughter, or any great emotion of the paſſions. But there is indeed one ſpecies of this, which is more eſpecially calculated to promote mirth, and conſiſts cheifly in narrative. For, as an ingenious author has obſerved: *Some perſons have ſuch a peculiar caſt of mind, that they ſee things in another light, than thoſe of graver diſpoſitions. Men of a lively imagination, and facetious temper, will repreſent things to their hearers in the ſame manner,*

LECT. XL.

as they themſelves were affected with them. And whereas ſerious ſpirits might perhaps have been diſguſted at the ſight of ſome odd occurrences of life, or at leaſt ſlighted and diſregarded them; yet a repreſentation of the ſame occurrences ſhall pleaſe them, when the diſagreable parts of the images are concealed, and thoſe only, which are pleaſing, exhibited to the fancy [1]. The manners and diſpoſitions of perſons are often thus imitated. And this is done ſometimes only in words, where, if the perſon deſcribed be known to the hearers, any little circumſtance peculiar to him, when aptly choſen, will ſet his image before them. But at other times, not only words, but a ſuitable action is requiſite to perfect the ridicule; which is more properly the buſineſs of the ſtage.

[1] *Guardian. Vol. i. N. 42.*

JESTING or *conciſe wit*, as diſtinguiſhed from the former, lies either in the thought, or the language, or both.

THAT may be ſaid to lie in the thought, which does not depend upon any particular words, or turn of the expreſſion. Of this kind is that of Cicero, in his *accuſation of* Verres, where having repreſented his avarice in plundering the temples of the Sicilians, during his government among them, he adds: *Therefore the preiſts, who are*

LECT. XL.

are wont to attend ſtrangers, and ſhew them their curioſities, now alter their tone; and inſtead of telling them what ſtands in each place, can only tell them what did ſtand there [1]. Here the *wit* does not depend on the words, but lies wholly in the ſenſe, which contains a facetious reflection on the injuſtice and avarice of Verres. This, which follows, is of the ſame nature. A Roman gentleman came to deſire a favor of the emperor Auguſtus, and told him, that he did not aſk it ſo much for the advantage of the thing itſelf, as for the honor it would do him, to be thought ſo much in his good graces. Why then ſais Auguſtus: *Do you give out, that you obtained it; and I will not contradict it* [2]. So when a conſul happened to die upon the laſt day of his office, and another perſon obtained of Caeſar the honor to ſucceed him for the few hours that remained, Cicero very wittily called this latter: *A moſt vigilant conſul, who never ſlept during the whole time of his office* [3].

[1] *In Verr. Lib.* iv. *c.* 59.

[2] Macrob. *Saturn. Lib.* ii. *c.* 4.

[3] *Ibid. cap.* 3.

BUT the greateſt fund of jeſts lies in the language, that is, in tropes or verbal figures, which make the ſecond kind of this conciſe wit.

I SHALL

LECT. XL.

I SHALL begin with tropes. It was ſaid by Cicero, concerning Caelius an orator in his time, who was better at bringing a charge, than defending it, that: *He was ready enough with his right hand, but very awkward with his left* [1]. The joke lies in the metaphorical ſenſe of the words, *right* and *left hand*; being an alluſion to ſoldiers, who uſed to attack their enemies with their ſwords in their right hand, and defend themſelves with their ſheild in their left. When Verres was accuſed by Cicero, in order to engage Hortenſius in his defence, who was then a celebrated orator, he preſented him with a very fine image of a ſphinx, part of the unjuſt plunder he had taken from the Sicilians. Cicero therefore having ſaid ſomething in his charge, which Hortenſius thought obſcure, or at leaſt pretended ſo, Hortenſius told him, he was not acquainted with the art of ſolving riddles. Upon which Cicero very ſmartly replied: *That is very ſtrange, ſince you have a ſphinx at home* [2]. The ſtory of the ſphinx at Thebes is well known, whoſe riddle was explained by Oedipus. Cicero's joke therefore turned upon the double ſenſe of the word ſphinx, the image of that monſter being by a meto-

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 3. *pag.* 551.

[2] *Ibid.*

LECT. XL.

nymy put for the creature herſelf. Ironies often carry in them ſomething very ſevere and pungent. Antony the orator had been very ſtrict in his cenſorſhip, and imployed himſelf wholly in the vigorous execution of that office, for the reforming of manners, to the diſguſt of ſome, who were deſirous of greater liberties, than he would allow them. But it happened, that before the year was expired, he had a charge brought againſt himſelf for acting illegally; upon which a freind of his, who was before diſpleaſed with his conduct, ſais to him: *Now, I hope, you will have an opportunity to mind your own buſineſs*[1]. Intimating, that he thought he had before been too buſy in concerning himſelf with the affairs of other perſons.

[1] Cic. *De Orat. Lib.* ii. c. 68.

THOSE which relate to verbal figures, principally turn upon a double ſenſe of the ſame word, or a ſimilitude of ſound in different words. When Hannibal was at the court of king Antiochus, he ordered the army, which he had prepared againſt the Romans, to be drawn out before him, dreſſed in very gay and coſtly habits. Then he aſked Hannibal, whether he did not think they were enough for the Romans. Who immediately replied: *Yes ſurely*

LECT. XL.

surely they are enough for them, were they never ſo covetous [1]. The king's meaning in the queſtion was, whether his forces were not enough to beat the Romans. But Hannibal's ſenſe in his anſwer was, that he thought they were enough to ſatisfy them with booty, when beaten by them, as he rightly judged they would be. A ſervant in Terence coming up to another, whom he finds muſing, aſks him: *What are you upon?* To whom the other anſwers: *Upon my legs* [2]. The joke conſiſts in the double meaning of the words, which in the queſtion refer to the mind, and in the anſwer to the body. This figure is called *antanaclaſis*. A certain deformed orator once pleading before Auguſtus, in the proceſs of his diſcourſe had frequently this expreſſion: *If you find I am wrong, pray ſet me right*. Which occaſioned the emperor to ſay jocoſely: *I can mind you, but I cannot mend you* [3]. The ſimilitude of the ſound makes the jeſt here, which is termed *paronomaſia*.

[1] Macrob. *Saturn. Lib.* ii. *c.* 2.

[2] *Eun. Act.* ii. *Sc.* 2. *v.* 40.

[3] Macrob. *Saturn. Lib.* ii. *c.* 4.

THE third kind of jokes, which lie both in the ſenſe and language, ariſe from figures of ſentences, where the figure itſelf conſiſts in the ſenſe, but the *wit* turns upon the choice of the words. After the battle of

of Mutina, in which Mark Antony was defeated, one aſked a freind of his, how he did; who replied: *Like the dogs in Egypt, he drinks and runs*[1]. It is ſaid of the Egyptian dogs, that they never ſtand ſtill to drink at the river Nile, but always keep moving on for fear of the crocodiles. This ſimile therefore was wittily enough applied to Antony, who was ſo exceſſively given to drinking, that even after this defeat, while he was flying for his life, he could not refrain from his old cuſtom. When Auguſtus was informed of the cruelty of king Herod in killing his ſon, his anſwer was: *I find it is better to be Herod's ſwine, than his ſon*[2]. The compariſon here is no leſs juſt, than witty; and is founded upon the Jewiſh cuſtom of not eating ſwine's fleſh, for which reaſon they had no occaſion to kill hogs. One Mutius, a ſour ill tempered man, appearing melancholy and penſive, a certain perſon, who perceived it, aſked one of his acquaintance, what he ſuppoſed could be the reaſon of it. Who replied: *He has either met with ſome ill fortune himſelf, or ſome good fortune has happened to one of his neighbours*[3]. This oppoſition gives us the true picture of ill nature, which is equally diſturbed either way.

LECT. XL.

[1] *Ibid.* c. 2.

[2] *Ubi ſupra.*

[3] *Ibid.* c. 2.

LECT. XL.

Gradation is ſometimes applied to the like purpoſe. A witneſs having in a cauſe ſaid ſomething, which ſeemed to bear hard upon the perſon, whom Craſſus defended, he ſais to the witneſs: *Perhaps the perſon, from whom you ſay you heard this, was angry when he ſpoke it.* The witneſs making no reply, he adds: *perhaps you did not take him right.* The witneſs ſtill continuing ſilent, he adds again: *perhaps you did not hear it at all*[1]. This unexpected turn at laſt confounded the man, and the gradual manner of the attack gave it the greater weight. Conceſſion, or the appearance of it, is in ſome caſes pleaſant and witty. A perſon at Rome, whoſe family had not the beſt of characters, once telling Laelius, a man of noble extraction, that *His conduct was unworthy of his anceſtors: He immediately retorts upon him, That is not your caſe*[2]. Theſe inſtances may ſuffice to ſhew the nature of this ſort of *wit*, and from whence it takes its riſe.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 70.

[2] *Ibid. c.* 71.

THE next thing I propoſed to conſider, was the uſe of *wit* to an orator. And as to the former kind, every one, I preſume, will acknowledge, that where the nature and circumſtances of a diſcourſe render it proper, a vivacity of thought, attended with

a chearful and facetious manner of expreſ- LECT. XL.
ſion, muſt be generally very grateful and pleaſant. Nor is the moderate and prudent uſe of the latter, on many occaſions, leſs ſerviceable. It diverts the hearers, unbends and relaxes their minds, and diſcovers a quickneſs of thought, and ready turn of fancy in the ſpeaker, which is often of great advantage, eſpecially in popular harangues. It ſometimes does more ſervice than a ſolid argument; as it is more pungent, its force is ſooner felt; and all perſons are not alike diſpoſed to attend to cool reaſoning, nor equally affected with it. A jeſt or witty turn has often ſtruck thoſe, and prevailed with them, who have continued unmoved at good ſenſe, delivered in a ſerious manner. Beſides, it many times confounds an adverſary, throws him from his guard, and prevents his reflection, by the ſuddeneſs of the attack, and where it was leaſt expected. Macrobius tells us, that Cicero gained ſeveral cauſes by means of his jeſts [1].

[1] *Saturn. Lib.* ii. *c.* 1.

BUT *wit*, eſpecially this latter ſort, is a very tickliſh weapon, and often requires great prudence and caution for the right management of it, which is what now remains to be conſidered. Thoſe who are beſt

LECT. XL.

beſt furniſhed with it, are apt ſometimes to be too laviſh of it, and ſquander it away at the expence of their diſcretion or intereſt. Unguarded and ill timed *wit*, has often been attended with very bad effects. Many men have loſt their freind for the ſake of a jeſt; and ſome their lives. As this is not commonly the effect of premeditation and ſtudy, but a ſudden ſtart of thought; when once it preſents itſelf to the mind, it is difficult to ſuppreſs it. The agreableneſs of the image, and the deſire, which moſt perſons have, to ſay what is new and diverting, does not give them time to weigh all circumſtances, and conſider its expediency. An orator therefore ſhould be always careful of this, and before he gives himſelf a looſe to be witty, duly conſider all thoſe circumſtances, which may render what he ſais more or leſs ſeaſonable and proper. To jeſt upon a ſerious occaſion is as ridiculous, as to affect to be grave and ſerious upon trifles. Regard ſhould likewiſe be had to the place, and the character of the perſons preſent. *Wit* carries in it an air of freedom and familiarity, which does not ſuit all aſſemblies. Superiors, and thoſe in authority, are to be treated with deference and reſpect.

And

And ſome perſons are of that auſtere temper, as to have no reliſh for any thing pleaſant and facetious; much leſs can they bear with jokes and rallery. Beſides, there are ſome ſubjects, which ſcarce ſuit with the embelliſhments of wit. It is the obſervation of a judicious writer, that *The ſimilitudes in heroic poets, who endeavour rather to fill the mind with great conceptions, than to divert it with ſuch as are new and ſurprizing, have ſeldom any thing in them, that can be called wit*[1]. And the caſe is much the ſame in oratory. The more ſolemn and important the ſubject is, the leſs room it leaves for the ſpeaker to appear witty. While the mind is imployed upon ſolid and weighty affairs, it cannot well attend to the leſſer beauties of wit and humour; and if it could, they would be wholly unſeaſonable. The ſublime ſtile therefore in general, admits the feweſt ornaments of this kind. The region of wit has a lower ſituation, and lies among common and well known ideas. In order to be witty and humorous, the mind muſt not be upon the ſtretch, but in an eaſy poſture; and fancy at leiſure to indulge itſelf with delightful images, ariſing from an agreable combination of ſuch ideas, as at that time

[1] *Spect. Vol.* i. *N.* 62.

LECT. XL.

LECT. XL.

preſent themſelves to the imagination. The beſt ſpeakers therefore do not affect this upon grave and important matters, unleſs perhaps occaſionally, to relax the minds of their hearers, and keep up their attention, or to expoſe an adverſary, or eſcape a difficulty, with which they themſelves are preſſed. A great part of the ſubject of conciſe wit, eſpecially in oratory, as Cicero has obſerved [z], turns upon the leſſer weakneſſes and blemiſhes of mankind. As jeſting upon theſe does not affect perſons lives, fortunes, or reputation, on ſome occaſions it may not only be allowable, but perhaps prove the moſt effectual method of cure. But to ridicule and inſult perſons under any heavy calamity, or misfortune of life, is cruel and inhumane. As the remedy therefore ought always to be ſuited to the nature of the diſeaſe, ridicule ſhould be confined within its proper bounds. Beſides, as this is not a ſtate of perfection, and blemiſhes are ſometimes found in the brighteſt characters; a ſkilful and prudent orator will carry this matter no farther, than may anſwer his preſent purpoſe. Moreover, great care is neceſſary in directing this weapon, leſt being thrown at rovers, as we ſay, it hit thoſe,

[z] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 58.

LECT. XL.

thoſe, againſt whom it was not deſigned. Cicero tells us, that in a cauſe at Rome, a witneſs being produced, who was a very ſhort man, one of the counſel on the other ſide deſired the judge, he might have leave to aſk him a queſtion. The judge bid him be ſhort. Upon which he replied: *He would ſuit his queſtion to the man*[1]. This might have paſſed for wit, but the judge happening to be a leſs man than the witneſs, the jeſt fell upon him; which raiſed a laughter among the ſpectators, but cauſed the diſpleaſure of the court. For the ſame reaſon ſuch jokes ſhould be avoided, as may ſeem to reflect on bodies of men, or any particular imployment, or manner of life, where all will think themſelves concerned. The like may be ſaid of low and vulgar jeſts, which leſſen the ſpeaker's authority, and bring him into contempt. To theſe we may add ſtale jeſts, and ſuch as appear premeditated. Thoſe coined upon the ſpot, from preſent incidents, pleaſe moſt, as they are the beſt proofs of a ready thought. For which reaſon, we find perſons generally moſt delighted with repartees; becauſe they require the quickeſt turn, and give leaſt time for thinking. It is an handſom and genteel way of rallery, when perſons charge

[1] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 60.

LECT. XL. themſelves with thoſe things, which they diſapprove in others. This is the ſofteſt manner of reproof; ſince as all men naturally love themſelves, and are deſirous to conceal their failings; others can have leſs reaſon to be diſpleaſed, while they appear to ſpeak no worſe of them, than they do of themſelves. To theſe reflections I ſhall only add one obſervation of Cicero, who ſais, that *Wit generally ſucceeds beſt, when delivered with a compoſed and ſerious air* [1]. For as it affects us moſt, when leaſt expected, by taking us at a ſurprize; any poſition of the features, that gives us notice of it, and prepares us for it, muſt in proportion abate its efficacy. Beſides, levity as little ſuits the countenance of an orator, as quibble does his language, or mimicry his action.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 71.

LEC-

LECTURE XLI.

Of Epiſtles and Dialogues, and their Stile.

THE ſubject of elocution being of that importance, and making ſo conſiderable a part, in the art of oratory; I have endeavoured not only to ſhew the nature of it in general, but likewiſe to deſcribe thoſe properties, by which the ſeveral characters of ſtile are more peculiarly diſtinguiſhed from each other. And that nothing may be wanting to ſet this matter in the plaineſt light, I ſhall now procede to exemplify thoſe characters by particular inſtances under each kind of ſtile; and ſhall begin with *epiſtles* and *dialogues*, which are proper to the low ſtile. LECT. XLI.

AND as to *epiſtles*, this will eaſily appear, by conſidering the nature and deſign of them. Now an epiſtle is nothing elſe, but the expreſſing that by writing to an abſent perſon, which we ſhould think proper to ſay to him if preſent. And therefore ſtrictly ſpeaking, the matter of it is the ſame with that of converſation, nor ſhould it differ in the manner of expreſſion. And whoever ſets himſelf about writing an

LECT. XLI.

epiſtle, ſhould conſider it in this view. Now in our uſual diſcourſe, all pomp and ſtudy of language is not only unneceſſary, but very improper. The moſt plain and eaſy ways of conveying our thoughts, muſt certainly be beſt, as being moſt natural. Purity in the choice of words, and juſtneſs of conſtruction, joined with perſpicuity, are the cheif properties of this ſtile. Accordingly Cicero ſais: *In writing letters we make uſe of common words and expreſſions* [1]. And Seneca more fully: *I would have my letters to be like my diſcourſes, when we either ſit or walk together, unſtudied and eaſy* [2]. And what prudent man, in his common diſcourſe, aims at bright and ſtrong figures, beautiful turns of language, or laboured periods? Nor is it always requiſite to attend to exact order and method. He that is maſter of what he writes, will naturally enough expreſs his thoughts without perplexity and confuſion; and more than this is ſeldom neceſſary, eſpecially in familiar letters.

[1] *Ad Fam. Lib.* ix. *Ep.* 21.

[2] *Ep.* 75. *ad Lucil.*

INDEED, as the ſubjects of epiſtles are exceding various, they will neceſſarily require ſome variety in the manner of expreſſion. If the ſubject be ſomething weighty and momentous, the language ſhould

ſhould be ſtrong and ſolemn; in things of a lower nature, more free and eaſy; and upon lighter matters, jocoſe and pleaſant. In exhortations it ought to be lively and vigorous, in conſolations kind and compaſſionate, and in adviſing grave and ſerious. In narratives it ſhould be clear and diſtinct, in requeſts modeſt, in commendations freindly, in proſperity chearful, and mournful in adverſity. In a word, the ſtile ought to be accommodated to the particular nature of the thing, about which it is converſant. But ſtill nothing more is requiſite, than what would happen in diſcourſing upon the ſame variety of ſubjects. LECT. XLI.

BESIDES, the different character of the perſon, to whom the letter is writen, requires a like difference in the modes of expreſſion. We do not uſe the ſame language to private perſons, and thoſe in a public ſtation; to ſuperiors, inferiors and equals. Nor do we expreſs ourſelves alike to old men and young, to the grave and facetious, to courtiers and philoſophers, to our freinds and ſtrangers. Superiors are to be addreſſed to with reſpect, inferiors with courteſy, and equals with civility; and every one's character, ſtation, and cir-

LECT. XLI. cumſtances in life, with the relation we ſtand in to him, occaſions ſome variety in this reſpect. But when freinds and acquaintance correſpond by letters, it carries them into all the freedom and good humour of converſation; and the nearer it reſembles that the better, ſince it is deſigned to ſupply the room of it. For when freinds cannot enjoy each others company, the next ſatisfaction is to converſe with each other by letters. Indeed, ſometimes greater freedom is uſed in epiſtles, than the ſame perſons would have taken in diſcourſing together; becauſe, as Cicero ſais, *A letter does not bluſh* [1]. But ſtill nothing ought to be ſaid in a letter, which, conſidered in itſelf, would not have been fit to ſay in diſcourſe; tho modeſty perhaps, or ſome other particular reaſon, might have prevented it. And thus it frequently happens in requeſts, reproofs, and other circumſtances of life. A man can aſk that by writing, which he could not do by words, if preſent; or blame what he thinks amiſs in his freind with greater liberty when abſent, than if they were together. From hence it is eaſy to judge of the fitneſs of any expreſſion to ſtand in an epiſtle, only by conſidering, whether the ſame way of

[1] *Ad Fam. Lib.* v. *ep.* 12.

of ſpeaking would be proper in talking with the ſame perſon. Indeed, this difference may be allowed, that as perſons have more time to think, when they write, than when they ſpeak; a greater accuracy of language may ſometimes be expected in one, than the other. However, this makes no odds as to the kind of ſtile; for every one would chooſe to ſpeak as correctly, as he writes, if he could. And therefore all ſuch words and expreſſions, as are unbecoming in converſation, ſhould be avoided in letters; and a manly ſimplicity, free of all affectation; plain, but decent and agreable; ſhould run thro the whole. This is the uſual ſtile of Cicero's epiſtles, in which the plainneſs and ſimplicity of his diction, is accompanied with ſomething ſo pleaſant and ingaging, that he keeps up the attention of his reader, without ſuffering him to tire. On the other hand, Pliny's ſtile is ſuccinct, and witty; but generally ſo full of turns and quibbles upon the ſound of words, as apparently render it more ſtiff and affected, than agrees with converſation, or than a man of ſenſe would chooſe in diſcourſe, was it in his power. You may in ſome meaſure judge of Pliny's manner, by one ſhort letter to his freind, which

LECT. XLI.

runs thus: *How fare you? As I do in the country? pleaſantly? that is at leiſure? For which reaſon I do not care to write long letters, but to read them; the one as the effect of niceneſs, and the other of idleneſs. For nothing is more idle than your nice folks, or curious than your idle ones. Farewell* [r].

[r] *Lib.* ix. *ep.* 32.

Every ſentence here conſiſts of an antitheſis, and a jingle of words, very different from the ſtile of converſation, and plainly the effect of ſtudy. But this was owing to the age in which he lived, at which time the Roman eloquence was ſunk into puns, and an affectation of wit; for he was otherwiſe a man of fine ſenſe, and great learning.

As to the form or compoſition of epiſtles, they uſually conſiſt of a proper compellation, with a ſhort preface to introduce the ſubject of the diſcourſe, which when finiſhed, is followed by a breif and decent concluſion. This is ſo plain and obvious, that nothing more need be ſaid concerning it, and therefore I ſhall procede to conſider the ſtile proper for dialogues.

Now by a *dialogue* is here meant a converſation, real or feigned, between two or more perſons, repreſented in writing. So that, as an antient writer has obſerved, *An epiſtle*

epiſtle is, as it were, one part of a dialogue[1]. And as the end of ſpeech is converſation, no kind of writing can be more natural, than dialogue, which repreſents this. And accordingly we find it was introduced very early, for there are ſeveral inſtances of it in the Moſaic hiſtory. The antient Greek writers alſo fell very much into it, eſpecially the philoſophers, as the moſt convenient and agreable method of communicating their ſentiments and inſtructions to mankind. And indeed it ſeems to be attended with very conſiderable advantages, if well and judiciouſly managed. For it is capable to make the drieſt ſubjects entertaining and pleaſant, by its variety, and the different characters of the ſpeakers. Beſides, things may be canvaſed more minutely, and many leſſer matters, which ſerve to clear up a ſubject, may be introduced with a better grace by queſtions and anſwers, objections and replies, than can be conveniently done in a continued diſcourſe. There is likewiſe a further advantage in this way of writing, that the author is at liberty to chooſe his ſpeakers. And therefore, as Cicero has well obſerved, when we imagine, that we hear perſons of an eſtabliſhed reputation for wiſ-

LECT. XLI.

[1] Demetr. Phal. ap Voſſ. *Inſt. Orat. Lib.* vi. c. 5. §. 4.

LECT. XLI.

dom and knowledge talking together, it necessarily adds a weight and authority to the discourse [1], and more closely ingages the attention. The subject matter of it is very extensive. For whatever is a proper argument of discourse, public or private, serious or jocose; whatever is fit for wise and ingenious men to talk upon, either for improvement or diversion; is suitable for a dialogue.

[1] *De Amic.* c. 1.

FROM this general account of the nature of dialogue, it is easy to perceive, what kind of stile best suits it. Its affinity with epistles, shews there ought to be no great difference between them in this respect. Indeed, some have been of opinion, that it ought rather to sink below that of an epistle, because dialogues should in all respects represent the freedom of conversation; whereas epistles ought sometimes to be composed with care and accuracy, especially when writen to superiors [2]. But there seems to be little weight in this argument, since the design of an epistle is to say the same things, and in the same manner, as the writer judges would be most fit and proper for him to speak, if present. And the very same thing is designed in a dialogue, with respect to the several persons

[2] *Morh. Coll. ep. p.* 54.

LECT. XLI.

ſons concerned in it. Upon the whole therefore, the like plain, eaſy, and ſimple ſtile, ſuited to the nature of the ſubject, and the particular characters of the perſons concerned, ſeems to agree to both.

BUT as greater ſkill is required in writing dialogues, than letters; I ſhall give a more particular account of the principal things neceſſary to be regarded in their compoſition, and illuſtrate them chiefly from Cicero's excellent *Dialogues concerning an orator*. A dialogue then conſiſts of two parts, an *introduction*, and *the body of the diſcourſe*.

THE *introduction* acquaints us with the place, time, perſons, and occaſion of the converſation.

THUS Cicero places the ſcene of his dialogues at Craſſus's country ſeat, a very proper receſs, both for ſuch a debate, and the parties ingaged in it.

AND as they were perſons of the firſt rank, and imployed in the greateſt affairs of ſtate, and the diſcourſe held them for two days; he repreſents it to have happened at the time of a feſtival, when there was no buſineſs done at Rome, which gave them an opportunity to be abſent.

AND

LECT. XLI.

AND becauſe the greateſt regard is to be had in the choice of the perſons, who ought to be ſuch, as are well acquainted with the ſubject, upon which they diſcourſe; in theſe dialogues of Cicero, the two principal diſputants are Craſſus and Antony, the greateſt orators of that age, and therefore the moſt proper perſons to diſpute upon the qualifications neceſſary for their art. One would think it ſcarce neceſſary to obſerve, that the conference ſhould be held by perſons, who lived at the ſame time, and ſo were capable to converſe together. But yet ſome good writers have run into the impropriety of feigning dialogues between perſons, who lived at diſtant times. Plato took this method, in which he has been followed by Macrobius [1]. But others, who have been willing to bring perſons to diſcourſe together, who lived in different ages, without ſuch inconſiſtency, have wrote dialogues of the dead. Lucian has made himſelf moſt remarkable this way. As to the number of perſons in a dialogue, they may be more or leſs. So many, as can conveniently carry on a converſation without diſorder or confuſion, may be admited. Some of Cicero's dialogues have only two, others three

[1] Vid. *Saturn. Lib.* i. *c.* 1.

or

or more, and thoſe concerning an orator ſeven. And it is convenient they ſhould all, in ſome reſpects, be perſons of different characters and abilities, which contributes both to the variety and beauty of the diſcourſe, like the different attitude of figures in a picture. Thus in Cicero's dialogues laſt mentioned, Craſſus excelled in art, Antony principally for the force of his genius, Catulus for the purity of his ſtile, Scevola for his ſkill in the law, Caeſar for wit and humour; and tho Sulpitius and Cotta, who were young men, were both excellent orators, yet they differed in their manner. But there ſhould be always one cheif perſon, who is to have the main part of the converſation; like the hero in an epic poem, or a tragedy, who excells the reſt in action; or the principal figure in a picture, which is moſt conſpicuous. In Plato's dialogues this is Socrates, and Craſſus in thoſe of Cicero above mentioned. LECT. XLI.

IT is uſual likewiſe in the introduction, to acquaint us with the occaſion of the diſcourſe. Indeed this is not always mentioned, as in Cicero's *Dialogue of the parts of oratory*, where the ſon begins immediately with deſiring his father to inſtruct him in the art. But it is generally taken notice

SECT. XLI. notice of, and moſt commonly repreſented as accidental. And the reaſon of that may be perhaps, that ſuch diſcourſes appear moſt natural; and may likewiſe afford ſome kind of apology for the writer in managing his different characters, ſince the greateſt men may be ſuppoſed not always to ſpeak with the utmoſt exactneſs in an accidental converſation. Thus Cicero in his dialogues concerning an orator, makes Craſſus occaſionally fall upon the ſubject of oratory, to divert the company from the melancholy thoughts of what they had been diſcourſing of before, with relation to the public diſorders, and the dangers, which threatened their country. But the introduction ought not to be too long and tedious. Mr. Addiſon complains of this fault in ſome authors of this kind. *For tho*, as he ſais, *ſome of the fineſt treatiſes of the moſt polite Latin and Greek writers are in dialogue, as many very valuable peices of French, Italian, and Engliſh appear in the ſame dreſs; yet in ſome of them there is ſo much time taken up in ceremony, that before they enter on their ſubject, the dialogue is half over* [1].

[1] *Dial.* ii. *of Med. in the begin.*

I COME now to the body of the diſcourſe, in which ſome things relating to the

the perſons, and others to the ſubject, are proper to be remarked. LECT. XLI.

AND as to the perſons, the principal thing to be attended to, is to keep up a juſtneſs of character thro the whole. And the diſtinct characters ought to be ſo perfectly obſerved, that from the very words themſelves it may be always known, who is the ſpeaker. This makes dialogue more difficult than ſingle deſcription, by reaſon of the number and variety of characters, which are to be drawn at the ſame time, and each of them managed with the greateſt propriety. The principal ſpeaker ſhould appear to be a perſon of great ſenſe and wiſdom, and beſt acquainted with the ſubject. No queſtion ought to be aſked him, or objection ſtarted to what he ſais, but what he ſhould fairly anſwer. And what is ſaid by the reſt ſhould principally tend to promote his diſcourſe, and carry it thro in the moſt artful and agreable manner. Where the argument is attended with difficulties, one other perſon or more may be introduced of equal reputation, or near it, but of different ſentiments, to oppoſe him, and maintain the contrary ſide of the queſtion. This gives opportunity for a thorough examination of the point on both

LECT. XLI.

ſides, and anſwering all objections. But if the combatants are not pretty equally matched, and maſters of the ſubject, they will treat it but ſuperficially. And thro the whole debate there ought not to be the leaſt wrangling, peeviſhneſs, or obſtinacy; nothing but the appearance of good humour and good breeding, the gentleman and the freind, with a readineſs to ſubmit to conviction, and the force of truth, as the evidence ſhall appear on one ſide or the other. In Cicero, theſe two characters are Craſſus and Antony. And from them Mr. Addiſon ſeems to have taken his Philander and Cynthio, in his *Dialogues upon the uſefulneſs of antient medals*, which are formed pretty much on Cicero's plan. Where younger perſons are preſent, or ſuch, who are not equally acquainted with the ſubject; they ſhould be rather upon the inquiry, than diſpute. And the queſtions they aſk, ſhould neither be long, nor too frequent, that they may not too much interrupt the debate, or appear over talkative before wiſer and more experienced perſons. Sulpitius and Cotta ſuſtain this character in Cicero, and Eugenius in Mr. Addiſon. And it is very convenient there ſhould be one perſon of a witty and jocoſe humour,

humour, to enliven the diſcourſe at proper ſeaſons; and make it the more entertaining, eſpecially when the dialogue is drawn out to any conſiderable length. Caeſar has this part in Cicero. And in Mr. Addiſon Cynthio is a perſon of this turn, tho at the ſame time he is a principal diſputant, and oppoſes Philander in a merry way. Mr. Addiſon's ſubject admitted of this, but the ſeriouſneſs and gravity of Cicero's argument required a different ſpeaker for the jocoſe part. Many perſons ought not to ſpeak immediately one after another. Horace's rule for plays is: LECT. XLI.

To croud the ſtage is odious and abſurd.
Let no fourth actor ſtrive to ſpeak a word[1]. [1] *Art. Poet. verſ.* 192.

Tho Scaliger and others think a fourth perſon may ſometimes be permitted to ſpeak in the ſame ſcene without confuſion. However, if this is not commonly to be allowed upon the ſtage, where the actors are preſent, and may be diſtinguiſhed by their voice and habit; much leſs in a dialogue, where you have only their names to diſtinguiſh them.

WITH regard to the ſubject, all the arguments ſhould appear probable at leaſt, and nothing be advanced, which may ſeem

LECT. XLI.

weak or trivial. There ought alſo to be an union in dialogue, that the diſcourſe may not ramble, but keep up to the main deſign. Indeed, ſhort and pleaſant digreſſions are ſometimes allowable for the eaſe and entertainment of the reader. But every thing ſhould be ſo managed, that he may ſtill be able to carry on the thread of the diſcourſe in his mind, and keep the main argument in view, till the whole is finiſhed. The writers of dialogue have not confined their diſcourſes to any certain ſpace of time; but either concluded them with the day; or broke off, when their ſpeakers have been tired, and reaſſumed them again the next day. Thus Cicero allows two days for his three dialogues concerning an orator; but Mr. Addiſon extends his to three days, allowing a day for each. Nor has the ſame method always been obſerved in compoſing dialogues. For ſometimes the writer, by way of narrative, relates a diſcourſe, which paſſed between other perſons. Such are the dialogues of Cicero and Mr. Addiſon laſt mentioned, and many others both of the antients and moderns. But at other times the ſpeakers are introduced in perſon, as talking to each other. This, as Cicero obſerves,

LECT. XLI.

obſerves, prevents the frequent repetition of thoſe words, *he ſaid*, and *he replied*[1]; and by placing the hearer, as it were, in the converſation, gives him a more lively repreſentation of the diſcourſe, which makes it the more affecting. And therefore Cicero, who wrote his *Dialogue of old age* in this manner, in which Cato, who was then in years, largely recounts the ſatisfactions of life, which may be injoyed in old age, tells his freind Atticus, he was himſelf ſo affected with that diſcourſe, that when he reviewed it ſometimes, he fancied they were not his own words, but Cato's[2]. There are ſome other dialogues of Cicero, writen in the ſame way; as that of *freindſhip*, and *of the parts of oratory*. And both Plato and Lucian generally chooſe this method.

[1] *De Amic.* c. 1.

[2] *Ibid.* c. 1.

FROM the account here given concerning the nature and deſign of epiſtles and dialogues, I preſume it will appear, that the low ſtile is the proper character, in which they ought generally to be writen. So that if at any time it be neceſſary to carry it higher, this muſt ariſe from the nature of the ſubject, or the circumſtances of the perſons in ſome particular caſes.

LECTURE XLII.

Of Hiſtory, and its Stile.

LECT. XLII. HAVING deſcribed the ſeveral forms or characters of ſtile, into which it is uſually diſtinguiſhed by rhetoricians, I propoſed to illuſtrate that diſtinction by particular inſtances, and began with epiſtles and dialogues; which from the nature and deſign of ſuch writings appear to ſuit beſt with the low ſtile, as was ſhewn in my laſt diſcourſe. I now procede to a ſubject, which principally requires the middle ſtile, and that is *hiſtory*; which I ſhall treat in the ſame method, and endeavour to explain the nature, properties, and ſeveral kinds of hiſtory, from whence it will appear what ſtile is moſt ſuitable in its compoſition. And if the copiouſneſs and variety of the ſubject did not neceſſarily oblige me to be much larger upon it, than upon either of the former; yet its uſefulneſs and affinity with oratory would be a ſufficient apology. For if hiſtory be not properly a part of an orator's province, it has ſo near a relation to it, that in the opinion of Cicero, an orator is beſt quali-

LECT. XLII.

fied to write a good hiſtory [1]. And had not the iniquity of the times prevented him, there is the higheſt reaſon to believe, he had himſelf given a proof of it [2]. For he had formed ſuch a deſign, as the laſt work of his life, at the time he was taken off by Antony.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 12, 15.

[2] Polit. *praef. in Suet.* Plut. *in vit. Cic.*

THE ſubject of hiſtory in general is either things or facts, and in this large ſenſe of the word, it may be divided into two ſorts, *natural* and *civil*. Thus Theophraſtus calls his work, in which he has treated of the nature and properties of plants, *An hiſtory of plants*. And we have a treatiſe of Ariſtotle, intitled, *An hiſtory of animals*. And Pliny's *Natural Hiſtory* is a book very well known. But as this kind of hiſtory requires little or no art, either in its compoſition or ſtile, it is ſufficient juſt to mention it.

IT is the other ſort I propoſe to conſider, namely, *civil hiſtory*, which is what we uſually mean by hiſtory in the common ſenſe of the word. And according to this acceptation of it, hiſtory is a narrative of ſuch facts, as are fit to be tranſmitted to poſterity, for the uſe of mankind, and the better conduct of human life. The proper buſineſs of hiſtory then

LECT. XLII.

is to relate facts, and especially human actions; but not so, as to exclude any remarkable events of nature or providence. And therefore historians take care to preserve and transmit to posterity the remembrance not only of such transactions, as plainly shew the interposition of providence in the government of human affairs; but likewise of such surprizing events, as are the immediate effect of a divine power. Indeed, some of the best pagan historians seem to have been over credulous in their accounts of miracles, many of which are ridiculous in themselves, and others not sufficiently attested. But this is no just exception against the reality of others, or the historian's recording such, as appear to be so. And what more noble end can any writer have in view, than what is proposed by the historian? To perpetuate the memory of great and generous actions, is the just reward of virtue; and has a natural tendency to excite others to an imitation of them, from a prospect of having the like honors paid to themselves by posterity. It is well known, how much the generality of mankind are influenced by examples, more than by precepts. So that in this respect, the historian has the advantage

tage of the philoſopher. Nor is it of leſs ſervice to repreſent vitious actions in their juſt and proper colors, in order to deter others from the like practices. It is natural to vice to love darkneſs, and chooſe concealment. And the fear of diſcovery is many times the ſtrongeſt reſtraint againſt the commiſſion of it. Nay, often where power, or an exalted ſtation in life, ſets perſons above regard to the ſentiments of thoſe, among whom they converſe; yet a view to poſterity, and fear of a laſting ſtain upon their character, will ſway them in ſome degree. And therefore it is not without good reaſon, that Cicero calls hiſtory *the miſtreſs of life* [1]; as it teaches us both what we ought to purſue, and what to avoid. Beſides, it is from the aſſiſtance of hiſtory, that mankind is acquainted with the inventions of former ages, and inabled to improve upon them. Without this we ſhould be wholly ignorant of what had paſſed in the world before us, and conſequently loſe the benefit of many advantages in life, which we now injoy. This kind of writing undoubtedly began very early in the world. Whether it was in uſe before the flood is uncertain. But the length of mens lives in thoſe firſt ages, which

LECT. XLII.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 9.

SECT. XLII. which gave them ſo great an advantage of conveying down facts from one to another by tradition, ſeems to have rendered it leſs neceſſary. The moſt antient hiſtory extant is that of Moſes. And next to him the Egyptians appear to have been very early inquirers into antiquity, but no hiſtory of their writing is now remaining. After them came the Grecians, tho ſome of their own writers acknowledge, they had no hiſtory among them, that could be depended upon, till the Olympiads [1], which, according to Sir Iſaac Newton's account, was 128 years after the taking of Troy, and but 149 before the building of Rome [2]. And therefore ſome antient writers have called the ages preceding that period by the name of *fabulous ages*, becauſe the accounts we have of them are rather the fictions of poets, than any true hiſtory [3]. The oldeſt Greek hiſtorian now left us is Herodotus, who by the ſame account lived about 157 years after Rome was built [4]. And as to the Romans, Livy himſelf confeſſes, there were ſcarce any certain memoirs of their affairs, till the city was taken by the Gauls [5], which was above an hundred years later than Herodotus, the accounts before having been preſerved chiefly by

[1] *Cenſorin. c.* 21.

[2] *A Short Chron. p.* 34, 38.

[3] *Cenſor. ubi ſupra.*

[4] *A Short Chron. p.* 32.

[5] *Lib.* vi. *c.* 1.

by tradition. And indeed, this is generally the misfortune of moſt nations, to have the hiſtory of their original and firſt ages neglected, till the memory of them has been in a great meaſure loſt, and paſt recovery. LECT. XLII.

CICERO has given us the whole art of compoſing hiſtory, in a very ſhort and comprehenſive manner. I ſhall firſt tranſcribe what he ſais, and then conſider the ſeveral parts of it in their proper order. *No one is ignorant*, ſais he, *that the firſt law in writing hiſtory is, not to dare to ſay any thing that is falſe; and the next, not to be afraid to ſpeak the truth: that on the one hand there be no ſuſpicion of affection, nor of prejudice on the other. Theſe foundations are what all are acquainted with. But the ſuperſtructure conſiſts partly in things, and partly in the ſtile or language. The former require an order of times, and deſcriptions of places. And becauſe in great and memorable events, we are deſirous to know firſt their cauſes, then the actions themſelves, and laſtly their conſequences; the hiſtorian ſhould take notice of the ſprings or motives, that occaſioned them; and in mentioning the facts themſelves, ſhould not only relate what was done or ſaid, but likewiſe in what manner;*

and

LECT. XLII.

and in treating upon their conſequences, ſhew if they were the effects of chance, wiſdom, or imprudence. Nor ſhould he only recite the actions of great and eminent perſons, but likewiſe deſcribe their characters. The ſtile ought to be fluent, ſmooth, and even, free from that harſhneſs and poinancy which is uſual at the bar [1]. Thus far Cicero. An hiſtory writen in this manner, and furniſhed with all theſe properties, muſt needs be very entertaining, as well as inſtructive. And perhaps few have come nearer this plan than Tacitus; tho his ſubject is attended with this unhappy circumſtance, or at leaſt unpleaſant one, as to afford us examples rather of what we ought to avoid, than what to imitate. But it is the buſineſs of the hiſtorian, as well as of the philoſopher, to repreſent both virtues and vices in their proper colors, the latter doing it by precepts, and the former by examples. Their manner is different, but the end and deſign of both is, or ſhould be, the ſame. And therefore hiſtory has not improperly been ſaid by ſome to be moral philoſophy, exemplified in the lives and actions of mankind [2].

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 15.

[2] Voſſ. *Ars Hiſt. c.* 5.

I SHALL reduce theſe ſeveral things mentioned by Cicero to three heads, matter,

LECT. XLII.

order, and ſtile; and treat upon each of them ſeparately. But as truth is the baſis and foundation of all hiſtory, it will be neceſſary to conſider that in the firſt place.

TRUTH is, as it were, the very life and ſoul of hiſtory, by which it is diſtinguiſhed from fable or romance. An hiſtorian therefore ought not only to be a man of probity, but void of all paſſion or bias. He muſt have the ſteadineſs of a philoſopher, joined with the vivacity of a poet or orator. Without the former, he will be inſenſibly ſwayed by ſome paſſion, to give a falſe coloring to the actions or characters he deſcribes, as favor or diſlike to parties or perſons affect his mind. Whereas he ought to be of no party, nor to have either freind or foe while writing; but to preſerve himſelf in a ſtate of the greateſt indifferency to all, that he may judge of things as they really are in their own nature, and not as connected with this or that perſon or party. And with this firm and ſedate temper, a lively imagination is requiſite, without which his deſcriptions will be flat and cold, nor will he be able to convey to his readers a juſt and adequate idea of great and generous actions. Nor is the aſſiſtance of a good judgement leſs neceſſary

LECT. XLII.

ceſſary than any of the former qualities, to direct him what is proper to be ſaid, and what to be omitted, and to treat every thing in a manner ſuitable to its importance. And ſince theſe are the qualifications neceſſary for an hiſtorian, it may perhaps ſeem the leſs ſtrange, that we have ſo few good hiſtories.

But hiſtorical truth conſiſts of two parts, one is, not to ſay any thing we know to be falſe. Tho it is not ſufficient to excuſe an hiſtorian in relating a falſehood, that he did not know it was ſo, when he wrote it; unleſs he firſt uſed all the means in his power to inform himſelf of the truth. For then undoubtedly, an invincible error is as pardonable in hiſtory, as in morality. But the generality of writers in this kind, content themſelves with taking their accounts from hearſays, or tranſcribing them from others; without duly weighing the evidence, on which they are founded, or giving themſelves the trouble of a ſtrict inquiry. Few will uſe the diligence neceſſary to inform themſelves of the certainty of what they undertake to relate. And as the want of this greatly abates the pleaſure of reading ſuch writers, while perſons read with diffidence; ſo nothing more recom-

recommends an hiſtorian, than ſuch induſtry. Thus we are informed of Thucydides, that when he wrote his hiſtory of the Peloponneſian war, he did not ſatisfy himſelf with the beſt accounts he could get from his countrymen the Athenians, fearing they might be partial in their own cauſe; but ſpared no expence to inform himſelf how the ſame facts were related by their enemies the Lacedemonians; that by comparing the relations of both parties, he might better judge of the truth [1]. And Polybius took greater pains than he, in order to write his hiſtory of the Roman affairs; for he travelled into Africa, Spain, Gaul, and other parts of that world, that by viewing the ſeveral ſcenes of action, and informing himſelf from the inhabitants, he might come at a greater certainty of the facts, and repreſent them in a juſter light [2]. But as an hiſtorian ought not to aſſert, what he knows to be falſe; ſo he ſhould likewiſe be cautious in relating things, which are doubtful; and acquaint his readers with the evidence he goes upon in ſuch facts, from whence they may be able to judge how far it is proper to credit them. So Herodotus tells us what things he ſaw himſelf in his travels, and what he heard

SECT. XLII.

[1] Marcellin. *in vit. Thucyd.* p. 3, 4.

[2] *Lib.* iii. *p.* 211.

LECT. XLII.

heard from the information of the Egyptian preists and others, with whom he converſed. And Curtius, in the life of Alexander, ſpeaking of the affairs of India, ingenuouſly confeſſes, that he wrote more, than he fully beleived. *For*, ſais he, *I neither dare to affirm poſitively, what I doubt of; nor can I think it proper to omit what I have been told*[1]. By ſuch a conduct the author ſecures his credit, whether the things prove really true or falſe; and gives room for further inquiry, without impoſing on his reader.

[1] *Lib.* ix. *c.* 1.

THE other branch of hiſtorical truth is, not to omit any thing that is true, and neceſſary to ſet the matter treated of in a clear and full light. In the actions of paſt ages, or diſtant countries, wherein the writer has no perſonal concern, he can have no great inducement to break in upon this rule. But where intereſt or party is ingaged, it requires no ſmall candor, as well as firmneſs of mind, conſtantly to adhere to it. Affection to ſome, averſion to others, fear of diſobliging freinds, or thoſe in power, will often interpoſe, and try his integrity. Beſides, an omiſſion is leſs obvious to cenſure, than a falſe aſſertion; for the one may be eaſily aſcribed to ignorance or forgetful-

getfulneſs; whereas the other will, if diſ- LECT. XLII.
covered, be commonly looked upon as de-
ſign. He therefore, who in ſuch circum-
ſtances, from a generous love to truth, is
ſuperior to all motives to betray or ſtifle
it, juſtly deſerves the character of a brave,
as well as honeſt man. What Polybius
ſais upon this head, is very well worth re-
marking, and therefore I ſhall tranſcribe
the paſſage. *A good man*, ſais he, *ought to love his freinds and his country, and to have a like diſpoſition with them, both towards their freinds and enemies. But when he takes upon him the character of an hiſtorian, they muſt all be forgot. He muſt often ſpeak well of his enemies, and commend them, when their actions deſerve it; and ſometimes blame, and even upbraid his greateſt freinds, when their conduct makes it neceſſary. Nor muſt he forbear ſometimes to reprove, and at other times to commend the ſame perſons; ſince all are liable to miſtake in their management; and there are ſcarce any perſons, who are always in the wrong. Therefore in hiſtory, all perſonal conſiderations ſhould be laid aſide, and regard had only to their actions*[1]. And Lucian gives much the ſame advice, when he ſais: *An hiſtorian ought to be above fear, and above corruption; one who*

[1] *Lib.* i. *p.* 13.

LECT. XLII.

is free, who loves liberty of ſpeech, and truth, and to give every thing its proper name, moved neither by hatred, nor friendſhip; ſparing none, not ſuffering himſelf to be ſwayed thro pity, exceſs of modeſty, or entreaty; juſt to all without partiality, indifferent to the ſentiments of other writers, maſter of himſelf, ſubject to no one's authority; not conſidering what will pleaſe this or that perſon, but relating things as he finds them [1].

[1] *De Hiſt. ſcrib. p.* 366.

WHAT a different view of mankind and their actions ſhould we have, were theſe rules obſerved by all hiſtorians? Integrity is undoubtedly the principal qualification of an hiſtorian; when we can depend upon this, other imperfections are more eaſily paſſed over. Suetonius is ſaid to have writen the lives of the firſt twelve Roman emperors with the ſame freedom, wherewith they themſelves lived. What better character can be given of a writer? The ſame ingenuous temper appears in the two Grecian hiſtorians above mentioned, Thucydides, and Polybius. The former of whom, tho baniſhed by his countrymen the Athenians, yet expreſſes no marks of reſentment in his hiſtory, either againſt them in general, or even againſt the cheif authors of

of it, when he has occaſion to mention them. And the latter does not forbear cenſuring, what he thought blameable in his neareſt relations and freinds. But it is often no eaſy matter to know, whether an hiſtorian ſpeaks truth or not, and keeps up to the ſeveral characters here mentioned. Tho I think upon the common principles of juſtice, due to all mankind, we ought to credit him, where no marks of partiality or prejudice appear in his writings. And ſometimes a judgement may in a good meaſure be formed of the veracity of an author, from his manner of expreſſing himſelf. A certain candor and frankneſs, that is always uniform and conſiſtent with itſelf, runs thro their writings, who have nothing in view but truth, which may be juſtly eſteemed as a very good evidence of their ſincerity. Whereas thoſe, who have partial deſigns to anſwer, are commonly more cloſe and covert; and if at other times they aſſume an air of openneſs and freedom, yet this is not conſtant and even, but ſoon followed again with the appearance of ſome bias and reſerve: for it is very difficult to act a part long together, without lying open to a diſcovery. And therefore tho craft and deſign is exceding

LECT. XLII.

LECT. XLII.

various, and, Proteus like, aſſumes very different ſhapes; there are certain characters, by which it may often be perceived and detected: ſome of which I ſhall juſt mention [1].

[1] See Sciopp. *De Hiſt. eſſ.* p. 163.

FIRST then, where things are uncertain by reaſon of their being reported various ways, it is partiality in an hiſtorian, to give into the moſt unfavorable account, where others are as well known, and equally credible. Again, it is a proof of the ſame bad temper, when the facts themſelves are certain and evident, but the deſign and motives of thoſe concerned in them are unknown and obſcure, to aſſign ſome ill principle, ſuch as avarice, ambition, malice, intereſt, or any other vitious habit as the cauſe of them. This conduct is not only unjuſt to the perſons, whoſe actions they relate; but hurtful to mankind in general, by endeavouring to deſtroy the principal motive to virtue, which ſprings from example. Others, who affect to be more covert, content themſelves with ſuſpicions and ſly inſinuations; and then endeavour to come off, by intimating their unwillingneſs to beleive them, tho they would have their readers do ſo. And to mention no more, there are others, who when they have

have loaded perſons with unjuſt calumnies and reflections, will allow them ſome ſlight commendations, to make what they have ſaid before look more credible, and themſelves leſs partial. But the honeſt and faithful hiſtorian contemns all ſuch low and mean arts; he conſiders things as they are in themſelves, and relates them as he finds them, without prejudice or affection. LECT. XLII.

I SHOULD now proceed to treat of the ſubject matter of hiſtory, but this muſt be reſerved to my next diſcourſe.

LECTURE XLIII.

Of the Subject, and different Kinds of Hiſtory.

LECT. XLIII.

IN treating upon hiſtory, I propoſed to conſider firſt the baſis or foundation of it, and then its ſuperſtructure. The baſis of all hiſtory is truth, by which it is diſtinguiſhed from fable or romance, as was ſhewn at large in my laſt diſcourſe. And therefore I ſhall now procede to the conſideration of thoſe things, which relate to the body of the work; and theſe are the ſubject matter, order, and ſtile.

I SHALL begin with the firſt of theſe, namely, the ſubject or argument of hiſtory. And this in general are facts, together with ſuch things, as are either connected with them, or may at leaſt be requiſite to ſet them in a juſt and proper light. But altho the principal deſign of hiſtory be to acquaint us with facts, yet all facts do not merit the regard of an hiſtorian; but ſuch only, as may be thought of uſe and ſervice for the conduct of human life. Nor is it allowable for him, like the poet, to form

the plan and ſcheme of his work, as he pleaſes. His buſineſs is to report things, as he finds them, without any coloring or diſguiſe, to make them more pleaſing and palatable to his reader, which would be to convert his hiſtory into a novel. Indeed, ſome hiſtories afford more pleaſure and entertainment than others, from the nature of the things, of which they conſiſt; and it may be eſteemed the happineſs of an hiſtorian to meet with ſuch a ſubject; but it is not his fault, if it be otherwiſe. Thus Herodotus begins his hiſtory with ſhewing, that the barbarians gave the firſt occaſion to the wars between them and the Greeks, and ends it with an account of the puniſhment, which after ſome ages they ſuffered from the Greeks on that account. Such a relation muſt not only be very agreable to his countrymen the Grecians, for whoſe ſakes it was writen; but likewiſe very inſtructive, by informing them of the juſtice of providence in puniſhing public injuries in this world, wherein ſocieties, as ſuch, are only capable of puniſhment. And therefore thoſe examples might be of uſe to caution them againſt the like practices. On the contrary, Thucydides begins his hiſtory with the unhappy ſtate of his coun-

LECT. XLIII.

LECT. XLIII.

trymen the Athenians, and in the courſe of it plainly intimates, that they were the cauſe of the calamitous war between them and the Lacedemonians. Whereas, had he been more inclined to pleaſe and gratify his countrymen, than to write the truth, he might have ſet things in ſuch a light, as to have made their enemies appear the aggreſſors. But he ſcorned to court applauſe at the expence of truth and juſtice, and has ſet a noble example of integrity to all future hiſtorians. But as all actions do not merit a place in hiſtory, it requires no ſmall judgement in an hiſtorian to ſelect ſuch only, as are proper. Cicero obſerves very juſtly, that hiſtory *is converſant in great and memorable actions* [1]. For this reaſon an hiſtorian ſhould always keep poſterity in view, and relate nothing, which may not upon ſome account or other be worth the notice of after ages. To deſcend to trivial and minute matters, ſuch as frequently occur in the common affairs of life, is below the dignity of hiſtory. Such writers ought rather to be deemed journaliſts than hiſtorians, who have no view or expectation that their works ſhould ſurvive them. But the ſkilful hiſtorian is fired with a more noble ambition. His

[1] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 15.

deſign

design is to acquaint ſucceeding ages with what remarkable occurrences happened in the world before them, to do juſtice to the memory of great and virtuous men, and at the ſame time to perpetuate his own. Pliny the younger has ſome fine reflections upon this head, in a letter to a freind. *You adviſe me,* ſais he, *to write an hiſtory, and not you only, for many others have done the ſame, and I am myſelf inclined to it. Not that I believe myſelf qualified for it, which would be raſh to think, till I have tried; but becauſe I eſteem it a generous action not to ſuffer thoſe to be forgoten, whoſe memory ought to be eternized; and to perpetuate the names of others, together with one's own. For there is nothing I am ſo deſirous or ambitious of, as to be remembred hereafter; which is a thing worthy of a man, eſpecially of one, who, conſcious of no guilt, has nothing to fear from poſterity. Therefore I am thinking day and night by what means, as Virgil ſais,*

my name
To raiſe aloft:

that would ſuffice me, for it is above my wiſh to add with him:

and wing my flight to fame.

But oh!

LECT. XLIII.

However,

LECT. XLIII.

However, this is enough, and what hiſtory alone ſeems to promiſe [1]. This was Pliny's opinion, with regard to the uſe and advantage of hiſtory; the ſubject of which, as I have ſaid, are generally matters of weight and importance. And therefore, when a prudent hiſtorian thinks it convevenient to take notice of things, in themſelves leſs conſiderable, he either does it with brevity, or for ſome apparent reaſon, or accounts for it by ſome juſt apology. So Dion Caſſius, when he has mentioned ſome things of leſſer moment in the life of Commodus (as indeed that emperor's life was cheifly filled up with cruelty and folly) makes this excuſe for himſelf. *I would not*, ſais he, *have it thought, that I deſcend below the gravity of hiſtory in writing theſe things. For as they were the actions of an emperor, and I was preſent, and ſaw them all, and both heard and converſed with him, I did not think it proper to omit them* [2]. He ſeems to think thoſe actions, when performed by an emperor, might be worth recording; which, if done by a perſon of inferior rank, would ſcarce have deſerved notice. Nor does he appear to have judged amis, if we conſider, what an influence the conduct and behaviour of princes, even in the

[1] *Lib.* v. *ep.* 8.

[2] *Lib.* lxxii. *p.* 825.

the common circumſtances of life, have upon all beneath them; which may ſometimes render them not unworthy the regard of an hiſtorian, as examples either for imitation, or caution. LECT. XLIII.

BUT altho facts in general are the proper ſubject of hiſtory, yet they may be differently conſidered with regard to the extent of them, as they relate either to particular perſons, or communities of men. And from this conſideration, hiſtory has been diſtinguiſhed into three ſorts; *biography*, *particular*, and *general hiſtory*. The lives of ſingle perſons is called *biography*. By *particular hiſtory* is meant that of particular ſtates, whether for a ſhorter or longer ſpace of time. And *general hiſtory* contains an account of ſeveral ſtates exiſting together, in the ſame period of time.

THE ſubject of *biography* are the lives either of public or private perſons; for many uſeful obſervations in the conduct of human life may be made from juſt accounts of thoſe, who have been eminent and beneficial to the world in either ſtation. Nay, the lives of vitious perſons are not without their uſe, as warnings to others, by obſerving the fatal conſequences, which ſooner or later generally follow ſuch practices.

LECT. XLIII.

tices. But for thoſe, who expoſed their lives, or otherwiſe imployed their time and labor, for the ſervice of their fellow creatures; it ſeems but a juſt debt, that their memories ſhould be perpetuated after them, and poſterity acquainted with their benefactors. The expectation of this was no ſmall incentive to virtue in the pagan world. And perhaps every one upon due reflection will be convinced, how natural this paſſion is to mankind in general. And it was for this reaſon, I preſume, that Virgil places not only his heroes, but alſo the inventors of uſeful arts and ſciences, and other perſons of diſtinguiſhed merit, in the elyſian feilds, where he thus deſcribes them:

Here patriots live, who for their countries good
In fighting feilds were prodigal of blood;
Preiſts of unblemiſh'd lives here make abode,
And poets worthy their inſpiring god;
And ſearching wits of more mechanic parts,
Who grac'd their age with new invented arts;
Thoſe who to worth their bounty did extend,
And thoſe who knew that bounty to commend:
The heads of theſe with holy fillets bound,
And all their temples were with garlands crown'd [1].

[1] *Aen. Lib.* vi. *v.* 661.

In

LECT. XLIII.

In the lives of public perſons, their public characters are principally, but not ſolely, to be regarded. The world is inquiſitive to know the conduct of princes and other great men, as well in private, as public. And both, as has been ſaid, may be of ſervice, conſidering the influence of their examples. But to be over inquiſitive in ſearching into the weakneſſes and infirmities of the greateſt or beſt of men, is, to ſay no more of it, but a needleſs curioſity. In the writers of this kind, Plutarch is juſtly allowed to excell.

BUT it has been a matter of diſpute among the learned, whether any one ought to write his own hiſtory. It may be pleaded in favor of this, that no one can be ſo much maſter of the ſubject, as the perſon himſelf. And beſides, there are many inſtances, both antient and modern, to juſtify ſuch a conduct. But on the other hand it muſt be owned, that there are many inconveniences which attend it, ſome of which are mentioned by Cicero. *If*, ſais he, *there is any thing commendable, perſons are obliged to ſpeak of themſelves with greater modeſty, and to omit what is blameable in others. Beſides, what is ſaid, is not ſo ſoon credited, and has leſs authority. And*

LECT. XLIII.

after all, many will not ſtick to cenſure it [1]. And Pliny ſais very well to the ſame purpoſe: *Thoſe who proclaim their own virtues, are thought not ſo much to proclaim them, becauſe they did them; as to have done them, that they might proclaim them. So that, which would have appeared great, if told by another, is loſt, when related by the party himſelf. For when men cannot deny the fact, they reflect upon the vanity of its author. Wherefore, if you do things not worth mentioning, the actions themſelves are blamed; and if the things you do are commendable, you are blamed for mentioning them* [2]. I believe theſe reflections will be generally allowed to be very juſt; and yet conſidering how natural it is for men to love themſelves, and to be inclined in their own favor; it ſeems to be a very difficult taſk for any one to write an impartial hiſtory of his own actions. There is ſcarce any treatiſe of this kind, that is more celebrated, than Caeſar's *Commentaries*. And yet Suetonius tells us, that, *Aſinius Pollio (who lived at that time) thought they were neither written with due care nor integrity: that Caeſar was often too credulous in his accounts, of what was done by other perſons; and miſrepreſented his own actions, either deſignedly,*

[1] *Ad Fam. Lib.* v. *Ep.* 12.

[2] *Lib.* viii. *Ep.* 1.

LECT. XLIII.

ſignedly, or thro forgetfulneſs: and therefore he ſuppoſes he would have reviſed and corrected them [1]. However, at ſome times it may doubtleſs be juſtifiable for a perſon to be his own hiſtorian. Plutarch mentions two caſes, wherein it is allowable for a man to commend himſelf, and be the publiſher of his own merits. Theſe are, *when the doing of it may be of conſiderable advantage, either to himſelf, or others* [2]. It is indeed leſs invidious for other perſons to undertake the province. And eſpecially for a perſon to talk or write of his own virtues, at a time when vice and a general corruption of manners prevails, let what he ſais be ever ſo true, it will be apt at leaſt to be taken as a reflection upon others. *Antiently*, ſais Tacitus, *many wrote their own lives, rather as a teſtimony of their conduct, than from pride.* Upon which he makes this judicious remark: *That the more virtue abounds, the ſooner the reports of it are credited* [3]. But the antient writers had a way of taking off the reader's attention from themſelves, in recording their own actions, and ſo rendering what they ſaid leſs invidious. And that was by ſpeaking of themſelves in the third perſon, and not in the firſt. Thus Caeſar never ſais, *I did*,

[1] *In vit. c.* 56.

[2] Plut. *Quemad. ſe quis citra invid. laudare poſſit.*

[3] *Vit. Agric. c.* 1.

or

LECT. XLIII.

or *I ſaid, this or that*; but always, *Caeſar did, or ſaid, ſo and ſo*. Why the moderns have not more choſen to follow them in this I know not, ſince it ſeems leſs exceptionable. But it is time to procede with my ſubject.

In a *continued hiſtory* of particular ſtates, ſome account may be given of their original, and founders; the nature of their ſoil, and ſituation; what advantages they have for their ſupport, or improvement, either within themſelves, by foreign traffic, or conqueſts; with the form of their government. Then notice ſhould be taken of the methods, by which they increaſed in wealth or power, till they gradually advanced to their higheſt pitch of grandeur; whether by their virtue, the goodneſs of their conſtitution, trade, induſtry, wars, or whatever other cauſe. After this the reaſons of their declenſion ſhould be ſhewn, what were the vices, that principally occaſioned it (for that is generally the caſe) whether avarice, ambition, luxury, diſcord, cruelty, or ſeveral of theſe in conjunction. And laſtly (where that has been their unhappy fate) how they received their final ruin and ſubverſion. Moſt of theſe things Livy had in view, when he wrote his hiſtory

ſtory of the Roman ſtate, as he acquaints his readers in the preface. *The accounts,* ſais he, *of what happened either before, or while the city was building, conſiſting rather of poetical fables, than any certain records of facts, I ſhall neither aſſert, nor confute them. Let antiquity be allowed to make the origin of their cities more venerable, by uniting things human and divine. But if any nation may be ſuffered to fetch their origin from the gods, ſuch is the military glory of the Romans, that when they repreſent Mars as the father of their founder, other nations may as eaſily acquieſce in this, as they do in their government. But I lay no great ſtreſs upon theſe things, and others of the like nature, whatever may be thought of them. What I am deſirous every one ſhould carefully attend to, are our lives, and manners; by what men, and what arts, civil and military, the empire was both acquired and inlarged; then let him obſerve, how our manners gradually declined with our diſcipline; afterwards grew worſe and worſe; and at length ſo far degenerated, that at preſent we can neither bear with our vices, nor ſuffer them to be remedied. This is the cheif benefit and advantage to be reaped from hiſtory, to fetch inſtructions from eminent examples of both kinds;* LECT. XLIII.

LECT. XLIII.

in order to imitate the one, which will be of uſe both to yourſelf and your country; and avoid the other, which are equally baſe in their riſe and event. Thus far Livy. And how well he has executed this deſign, muſt be acknowledged by all, who will be at the pains to peruſe his work.

BUT as a particular hiſtory conſiſts in a number of facts relating to the ſame ſtate, ſuitably connected and laid together, in a proper ſeries; ſo a *general hiſtory* is made up of ſeveral particular hiſtories, whoſe ſeparate tranſactions within the ſame period of time, or part of it, ſhould be ſo diſtinctly related, as to cauſe no confuſion. Such was the hiſtory of Diodorus Siculus, which contained an account of moſt of the eminent ſtates and kingdoms in the world, tho far the greateſt part of it is now unhappily loſt. Of the ſame nature is the hiſtory of Herodotus, tho not ſo extenſive, to whom we are eſpecially indebted for the Perſian affairs. And to this kind may likewiſe be refered Juſtin's hiſtory, tho it be only the epitome of a larger work writen by another hand. The rules proper for conducting ſuch hiſtories are much the ſame, as thoſe above mentioned concerning particular hiſtories, excepting what relates

to

to the order, of which I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter. LECT. XLIII.

BUT the hiſtories both of particular ſtates, and thoſe which are more general, frequently contain only the affairs of ſome ſhort period of time. Thus the hiſtory of the Peloponneſian war, writen by Thucydides, compriſes only what was done in the firſt twenty years of that war, which laſted ſeven years longer than his account reaches. Tho indeed the reaſon of that might be, becauſe Thucydides died before the war was finiſhed [1], otherwiſe he would very probably have continued his hiſtory to the concluſion of it. But the hiſtory of the war between the Romans and king Jugurtha in Africa, given us by Salluſt, as alſo Caeſar's hiſtories of his own Gallic and civil wars, are all confined within a much leſs number of years, than that of Thucydides. Nay, ſometimes one ſingle tranſaction is thought ſufficient to furniſh out an hiſtory. Such was the conſpiracy of Catiline to ſubvert the Roman ſtate, writen likewiſe by Salluſt. As to more general hiſtories, Xenophon's hiſtory of Greece may be eſteemed as ſuch, which in order of time ſucceedes that of Thucydides, and contains the affairs of forty eight years. And Polybius

[1] Marcellin. *in vit. Thucyd.* p. 7.

LECT. XIII.

called his *a general hiſtory*, which, tho it principally contained the Roman affairs, yet took in the moſt remarkable tranſactions of ſeveral other ſtates, for the ſpace of fifty three years; tho it has met with the ſame hard fate as that of Diodorus Siculus, ſo that only the firſt five books out of forty, of which it conſiſted at firſt, now remain intire [1]. And to mention no more, the celebrated hiſtory of Thuanus is another inſtance of this ſort, in which the principal tranſactions of Europe for about ſixty years, cheifly in the ſixteenth century, are deſcribed with that judgement and fidelity, and in a manner ſo accurate and beautiful, that he has been thought ſcarcely inferior to any of the antient hiſtorians. Now in ſuch hiſtories as theſe to go farther back, than is requiſite to ſet the ſubject in a juſt light, ſeems as improper, as it is unneceſſary.

[1] Voſſ. *De Hiſt. Graec. Lib.* i. *c.* 19.

THE ſeveral parts of the ſubject of hiſtory, will be conſidered in my next diſcourſe.

LEC-

LECTURE XLIV.

Of the ſeveral Parts of the Subject of Hiſtory.

LECT. XLIV.

THAT the principal deſign of hiſtory is to acquaint us with facts, the extent of which conſtitutes the different kinds of hiſtory, has been ſhewn in my laſt diſcourſe. But as there are ſeveral things, which are either neceſſarily connected with facts, or requiſite at leaſt to ſet them in a proper light, and render the account of them more ſerviceable to the reader; I ſhall now procede to conſider the general ſubject or argument of hiſtory in its ſeveral branches, which may be reduced to theſe four heads, *narration*, *reflection*, *ſpeeches*, and *digreſſions*.

BY *narration* I mean a deſcription of facts or actions, with ſuch things as are neceſſarily connected with them, namely; perſons, time, place, deſign, and event.

As to actions themſelves, it is the buſineſs of the hiſtorian to acquaint his readers with the manner, in which they were performed; what meaſures were concerted on all ſides, and how they were conducted,

LECT. XLIV.

whether with vigilance, courage, prudence, and caution, or the contrary, according to the nature of the action; as likewiſe, if any unforeſeen accidents fell out, by which the deſigned meaſures were either promoted, or broken. All actions may be refered to two ſorts, military and civil. And as war ariſes from injuſtice, and injuries received, on one ſide or the other, it is fit the reader ſhould be informed, who were the aggreſſors. For tho war is never to be deſired, yet it is ſometimes neceſſary. In the deſcription of battles, regard ſhould be had equally to both parties, the number of forces, conduct of the generals, in what manner they engaged, what turns and changes happened in the engagement either from accidents, courage, or ſtratagem, and how it iſſued. The like circumſtances ſhould all be obſerved in ſeiges, and other actions. But the moſt agreable ſcene of hiſtory ariſes from a ſtate of peace. Here the writer acquaints us with the conſtitution of ſtates, the nature of their laws, the manners and cuſtoms of the inhabitants, the advantages of concord and unanimity, with the diſadvantages of contention and diſcord, the invention of arts and ſciences, in what manner they were improved and culti-

cultivated, and by whom; with many other things both pleaſant and profitable in the conduct of life. LECT. XLIV.

As to perſons, the characters of all thoſe ſhould be deſcribed, who act any conſiderable part in an hiſtory. This excites the curioſity of the reader, and makes him more attentive to what is ſaid of them; as every one is more inquiſitive to hear, what relates to others, in proportion to his knowledge of them. And it will likewiſe be of uſe to obſerve, how their actions agree with their characters, and what were the effects of their different qualifications and abilities.

THE circumſtances of time and place are carefully to be regarded by an hiſtorian, without which his accounts of facts will be frequently very lame and imperfect. And therefore chronology and geography ſeem not improperly to have been called *the two eyes of hiſtory*. Beſides, they very much aſſiſt the memory. For it is much eaſier to remember any thing ſaid to be done at ſuch a time, and in ſuch a place, than if only related in general. Nay, the remembrance of theſe often recalls thoſe things to mind, which otherwiſe had been obliterated. By time I intend

LECT. XLIV.

not only the year of any particular aera or period; but likewiſe the ſeaſon, as ſummer or winter; and the age of particular perſons. For it is oftentimes from hence, that we are principally enabled to make a juſt eſtimate of facts. Thus Cicero commends Pompey for undertaking and finiſhing the piratic war at a ſeaſon of the year, when other generals would not have thought it ſafe to venture out at ſea [1]. This double danger, as well from the weather as the enemy, conſidering the neceſſity of the caſe, hightens the glory of the action; ſince to have done the ſame thing in ſummer, would not have been an equal proof of the courage and intrepidity of the general. And there is nothing more ſurprizing in the conqueſts of Alexander, than that he ſhould ſubdue ſo large a part of the world, by that time he was little more than thirty years old; an age at which few other generals have been much diſtinguiſhed, Had we not known this, a conſiderable part of his character had been loſt.

[1] *Pro Leg. Man. c. 12.*

THE like advantages ariſe from the other circumſtances of place. And therefore in marches, battles, and other military actions, the hiſtorian ſhould take notice of the nature of the country, the paſſes, rivers,

vers, diſtances of places, ſituation of the armies, and ſtrength of the towns either by nature or art; from which the reader may the better form a judgement of the difficulties and greatneſs of any enterprize. Caeſar is generally very particular in theſe things, and ſeems to have thought it highly requiſite, in order to give his readers a juſt idea of his actions. The deſcriptions of countries, cities, and rivers, are likewiſe both uſeful and pleaſant, and help us to judge of the probability of what is related concerning the temper and genius of the inhabitants, their arts, trafic, wealth, power, or whatever elſe is remarkable among them. LECT. XLIV.

BUT an accurate hiſtorian goes yet further, and conſiders the cauſes of actions, and what were the deſigns and views of thoſe perſons, who were principally concerned in them. Some, as Polybius has well obſerved, are apt to confound the beginings of actions with their ſprings and cauſes, which ought to be carefully ſeparated. For the cauſes are often very remote, and to be looked for at a conſiderable diſtance from the actions themſelves. Thus, as he tells us, ſome have repreſented Hannibal's beſeiging Saguntum in Spain,

LECT. XLIV.

Spain, and paſſing the Ebro, contrary to a former agreement between the Romans and Carthaginians, as cauſes of the ſecond Punic war. But theſe were only the beginings of it. The true cauſes were the jealouſies and fears of the Carthaginians from the growing power of the Romans, and Hannibal's inveterate hatred to them, with which he had been impreſſed from his infancy. For his father, whom he ſucceded in the command of the Carthaginian army, had obliged him, when but nine years old, to take a moſt ſolemn oath upon an altar, never to be reconciled to the Romans. And therefore he was no ſooner at the head of the army, than he took the firſt opportunity to break with them. Again, the true ſprings and cauſes of actions are to be diſtinguiſhed from ſuch, as are only feigned and pretended. For generally the worſe deſigns men have in view, the more ſolicitous they are to cover them under ſpecious pretences. It is the hiſtorian's buſineſs therefore to lay open, and expoſe to view, theſe arts of politicians. So, as the ſame judicious hiſtorian remarks, we are not to imagine Alexander's carrying over his army into Aſia to have been the cauſe of the war between him and the Per-

Perſians. That had its being long before. The Grecians had formerly two armies in Aſia, one under Xenophon, and the other commanded by Ageſilaus. Now the Aſiatics did not venture to oppoſe or moleſt either of theſe armies in their march. This made king Philip, Alexander's father, who was an ambitious prince, and aſpired after univerſal monarchy, think it might be a practicable thing to make a conqueſt of Aſia. Accordingly he kept it in his view, and made preparations for it; but did not live to execute it. That was left for his ſon. But as king Philip could not have done this, without firſt bringing the other ſtates of Greece into it, his pretence to them was only to avenge the injuries, they had all ſuffered from the Perſians; tho the real deſign was an univerſal government, both over them and the Perſians, as appeared afterwards by the event [1]. But in order to our being well aſſured of a perſon's real deſigns, and to make the accounts of them more credible, it is proper we ſhould be acquainted with his diſpoſition, manners, way of life, virtues, or vices; that by comparing his actions with theſe, we may ſee how far they agree and ſuit each other. For this reaſon Salluſt is ſo particular in his

LECT. XLIV.

[1] Polyb. *Lib.* iii. *p.* 162, *&c.*

LECT. XLIV.

his deſcription of Catiline, and Livy of Hannibal; by which it appears credible, that the one was capable of entering into ſuch a conſpiracy againſt his country, and the other of performing ſuch great things, as are related concerning him. But if the cauſes of actions lie in the dark and unknown, a prudent hiſtorian will not trouble himſelf, or his readers, with vain and trifling conjectures, unleſs ſomething very probable offers itſelf.

LASTLY, an hiſtorian ſhould relate the iſſue and event of the actions, he deſcribes. This is undoubtedly the moſt uſeful part of hiſtory; ſince the greateſt advantage ariſing from it is to teach us experience, from what has happened in the world before us. When we learn from the examples of others the happy effects of wiſdom, prudence, integrity, and other virtues, it naturally excites us to an imitation of them, and to purſue the ſame meaſures in our own conduct. And on the contrary, by perceiving the unhappy conſequences, which have followed from violence, deceit, raſhneſs, or the like vices, we are detered from ſuch practices. But ſince the wiſeſt and moſt prudent meaſures do not always meet with the deſired ſucceſs,

LECT. XLIV.

ceſs, and many croſs accidents may happen to fruſtrate the beſt concerted deſigns; when we meet with inſtances of this nature, it prepares us for the like events, and keeps us from too great a confidence in our own ſchemes. However, as this is not commonly the caſe, but in the ordinary courſe of human affairs like cauſes uſually produce like effects; the numerous examples of the happy conſequences of virtue, and wiſdom, recorded in hiſtory, are ſufficient to determine us in the choice of our meaſures, and to incourage us to hope for an anſwerable ſucceſs, tho we cannot be certain, we ſhall in no inſtance meet with a diſappointment. And therefore Polybius very juſtly obſerves, that, *He, who takes from hiſtory the cauſes, manner, and end of actions, and omits to take notice, whether the event was anſwerable to the means made uſe of, leaves nothing in it but a bare amuſement, without any benefit or inſtruction* [1]. These then are the ſeveral things neceſſary to be attended to in hiſtorical narrations, but the proper diſpoſition of them muſt be left to the ſkill and prudence of the writer.

[1] *Lib.* iii. *p.* 186.

I NOW procede to the ſecond thing above mentioned, relating to the ſubject of hiſtory,

LECT. XLIV.

ſtory, and that is the *reflections*, which the writer makes upon the facts related by him. But ſome have condemned this, as having a tendency to bias the reader, who ſhould be left to draw ſuch concluſions from the accounts of facts, as he ſees proper. But ſince all readers are not capable of doing this for themſelves, what diſadvantage is it for the author to ſuggeſt to them ſuch obſervations, as may aſſiſt them to make the beſt uſe of what they read? And if the philoſopher is allowed to draw ſuch inferences from his precepts, as he thinks juſt and proper; why has not the hiſtorian an equal right to make reflections upon the facts he relates? The reader is equally at liberty to judge for himſelf in both caſes, without danger of being prejudiced. And therefore we find, that the beſt hiſtorians have allowed themſelves this liberty. It would be eaſy to prove this by a large number of inſtances, but I ſhall content myſelf with one or two. When Salluſt has given a very diſtinct account of the deſigns of Catiline, and of the whole ſcheme of the conſpiracy, he concludes it with this reflection: *All that time the empire of the Romans ſeems to me to have been in a very unhappy ſtate. For when*

LECT. XLIV.

when they had extended their conqueſts thro the whole world from eaſt to weſt, and enjoyed both peace and plenty, which mankind eſteem their greateſt happineſs; ſome perſons were obſtinately bent upon their own ruin, and that of their country. For notwithſtanding two decrees were publiſhed by the ſenate, not one out of ſo great a multitude was prevailed with, by the rewards that were offered, either to diſcover the conſpiracy, or to leave the army of Catiline. So deſperate a diſeaſe, and as it were infection, had ſeized the minds of moſt people [1]. And it is a very handſom obſervation, that Livy makes upon the ill conduct of Hannibal in quartering his army in Capua after the battle of Cannae; by which means they loſt their martial vigor thro luxury and eaſe. *Thoſe*, ſais he, *who are ſkilled in military affairs, reckon this a greater fault in the general, than his not marching his army immediately to Rome, after his victory at Cannae; for ſuch a delay might have ſeemed only to defer the victory, but this ill ſtep deprived him of the power to gain it* [2]. The modeſty of the hiſtorian in this paſſage is worth remarking, in that he does not repreſent this as his own private opinion, and by that means undertake to cenſure the conduct of ſo great

[1] *Bell. Catil. c.* 37.

[2] *Lib.* xxiii. *c.* 18.

LECT. XLIV.

great a general, as Hannibal was; but as the ſenſe of thoſe, who were ſkilled in ſuch affairs. However, an hiſtorian ſhould be breif in his remarks, and conſider, that altho he does not excede his province, by applauding virtue, expreſſing a juſt indignation againſt vice, and interpoſing his judgement upon the nature and conſequences of the facts, he relates; yet there ought to be a difference between his reflections, and the encomiums or declamations of an orator.

THE third head relating to the ſubject of hiſtory are *ſpeeches*, which upon various occaſions hiſtorians inſert in their writings. And theſe are of two ſorts, oblique and direct. The former are ſuch, as the hiſtorian recites in his own perſon, and not in that of the ſpeaker. Of this kind is that of Hannibal in Juſtin; by which he endeavours to perſuade king Antiochus to carry the ſeat of the war againſt the Romans into Italy. It runs thus: *Having deſired liberty to ſpeak, he ſaid, none of the preſent counſels and deſigns pleaſed him; nor did he approve of Greece for the ſeat of the war, which might be managed in Italy to greater advantage; becauſe it was impoſſible to conquer the Romans but by their own*

LECT. XLIV.

own arms, or to ſubdue Italy, but by its own forces; ſince both the nature of thoſe men, and of that war, was different from all others. In other wars it was of great importance to gain an advantage of place or time, to ravage the countries, and plunder the towns; but tho you gain ſome advantages over the Romans, or defeat them, you muſt ſtill fight with them when beaten. Wherefore ſhould any one ingage with them in Italy, it was poſſible for him to conquer them by their own power, ſtrength, and arms, as he himſelf had done. But ſhould he attempt it out of Italy, the ſource of their power, he would be as much deceived, as if he indeavoured to alter the courſe of a river, not at the fountain head, but where its ſtreams were largeſt and deepeſt. This was his judgement in private, and what he had offered as his advice, and now repeated in the preſence of his freinds; that all might know, in what manner a war ought to be carried on againſt the Romans, who were invincible abroad, but might be conquered at home. For they might ſooner be driven out of their city than their empire, and from Italy than their provinces; having been taken by the Gauls, and almoſt ſubdued by himſelf. That he was never defeated, till he withdrew out of their country;

LECT. XLIV.

but upon his return to Carthage, the fortune of the war was changed with the place [1]. He ſeems to intimate by this ſpeech, that the Romans were like ſome feirce and impetuous animals, which are no otherwiſe to be ſubdued, than by wounding them in ſome vital part. In ſpeeches related after this manner, we are not neceſſarily to ſuppoſe the hiſtorian gives us the very words, in which they were at firſt delivered, but only the ſenſe. But in direct ſpeeches, the perſon himſelf is introduced as addreſſing his audience, and therefore the words, as well as the ſenſe, are to be ſuited to his character. Such is the ſpeech of Eumenes, one of Alexander's captains and ſucceſſors, made to his ſoldiers, when they had traiterouſly bound him in chains, in order to deliver him up to his enemy Antigonus, as we have it in the ſame writer. *You ſee, ſoldiers,* ſais he, *the habit and ornaments of your general, which have not been put upon me by my enemies, that would afford me ſome comfort; it is by you that of a conqueror I am become conquered, and of a general a captive; tho you have ſworn to be faithful to me four times within the ſpace of a year. But I omit that, ſince reflections do not become perſons in calamity. One thing*

[1] *Lib* xxxi. *c.* 5.

I intreat, that if Antigonus muſt have my life, you would let me die among you. For it no way concerns him, how, or where I ſuffer, and I ſhall eſcape an ignominious death. If you grant me this, I free you from your oath, with which you have been ſo often ingaged to me. Or if ſhame reſtrains you from offering violence to me at my requeſt, give me a ſword, and ſuffer your general to do that for you without the obligation of an oath, which you have ſworn to do for your general[1].

LECT. XLIV.

[1] *Lib.* xiv. c. 4.

BUT this likewiſe is a matter, in which critics have been divided in their ſentiments; whether any, or what kind of ſpeeches ought to be allowed in hiſtory. Some have thought, all ſpeeches ſhould be excluded. And the reaſon given for that opinion is this; that it breaks the thread of the diſcourſe, and interrupts the reader, when he is deſirous to come to the end of an action, and know how it iſſued. This is true indeed, where ſpeeches are either very long, or too frequent; but otherwiſe they are not only entertaining, but likewiſe inſtructive. For it is of ſervice to know the ſprings and reaſons of actions, and theſe are frequently opened and explained in the ſpeeches of thoſe, by whom they were performed. Others therefore have not been

LECT. XLIV.

againſt all ſpeeches in general, but only direct ones. And this was the opinion of Trogus Pompeius, as Juſtin informs us [1]; tho he did not think fit to follow him in that opinion, when he abridged him, as we have ſeen already by the ſpeech of king Eumenes. The reaſon offered againſt direct ſpeeches is, becauſe they are not true; and truth is the foundation of all hiſtory, from which it never ought to depart. Such ſpeeches therefore are ſaid to weaken the credit of the writer; ſince he, who will tell us, that another perſon ſpoke ſuch things, which he does not know that he ever did ſpeak; and in ſuch language, as he could not uſe; may take the ſame liberty in repreſenting his actions. Thus for example, when Livy gives us the ſpeeches of Romulus, the Sabin women, Brutus, and others, in the firſt ages of the Roman ſtate, both the things themſelves are imaginary, and the language wholly diſagreable to the times, in which thoſe perſons lived. Accordingly we find, that when ſeveral hiſtorians relate ſome particular ſpeech of the ſame perſon, they widely differ both in the ſubject matter, and expreſſions. So the ſpeech of Veturia, by which ſhe diſſuaded her ſon Coriolanus from

[1] *Lib.* xxxviii. c. 3.

LECT. XLIV.

from beſieging Rome, when he came againſt it with an army of Volcians, to avenge the injuries he had received, is very differently related by Livy [1], Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus [2], and Plutarch [3]. Such fictitious ſpeeches therefore are judged more fit for poets, who are allowed a greater liberty to indulge their fancy, than hiſtorians. And if any direct ſpeeches are to be inſerted, they ſhould be ſuch only, as were really ſpoken by the perſons, to whom they are aſcribed, where any ſuch have been preſerved. Theſe have been the ſentiments of ſome critics, both antient and modern [4]. However, there is ſcarce an antient hiſtorian now extant, either Greek or Latin, who has not ſome ſpeeches, more or leſs, in his works, and thoſe not only oblique, but alſo direct. They ſeem to have thought it a neceſſary ornament to their writings; and even where the true ſpeeches might be come at, have choſen rather to give them in their own words, in order, as I ſuppoſe, to preſerve an equality in the ſtile. Since therefore the beſt and moſt faithful hiſtorians have generally taken this liberty, we are to diſtinguiſh between their accounts of facts, and their ſpeeches. In the former, where nothing

[1] *Lib.* ii. *c.* 40.
[2] *Ant. Rom. Lib.* viii. *c.* 46.
[3] *In Coriolano.*
[4] See Voſſ. *Ars Hiſt. c.* 20.

LECT. XLIV.

appears to the contrary, we are to ſuppoſe they adhere to truth, according to the beſt information they could get; but in the latter, that their view is only to acquaint us with the cauſes and ſprings of actions, which they choſe to do in the form of ſpeeches, as a method moſt ornamental to the work, and entertaining to the reader. Tho the beſt hiſtorians are cautious of inſerting ſpeeches, but where they are very proper, and upon ſome ſolemn and weighty occaſions. Thucydides is ſaid to have been the firſt, who brought complete and finiſhed ſpeeches into hiſtory, thoſe of Herodotus being but ſhort and imperfect [1]. And tho Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, in his cenſure upon Thucydides, ſeems then to have diſliked that part of his conduct; yet he afterwards thought fit to imitate it, in his *Antiquities of Rome*, where we find many, not only oblique, but alſo direct ſpeeches [2].

[1] Marcellin. *in vit. Thucyd. p.* 6.

[2] *De Thuc. Hiſt. judic. Oper. Vol.* ii. *p.* 233.

WHAT has been ſaid of ſpeeches, may likewiſe be underſtood of letters, which we ſometimes meet with in hiſtories; as that of Alexander to Darius in Q. Curtius [3], thoſe of Tiberius and Druſus in Tacitus [4], and many others. Some letters are wholly fictitious, and in others perhaps the hiſtorian repreſents the ſubſtance of what was really

[3] *Lib.* iv. *c.* 1.

[4] *Ann. Lib.* i. 73. iii. 53, 59.

really ſaid, but gives it his own dreſs. Thus we find, that ſhort letter of Lentulus to Catiline, at the time of his conſpiracy, differently related by Cicero and Salluſt. The reaſon of which ſeems to be this; that as Cicero recited it publicly to the people of Rome, in his third oration againſt Catiline [1], it is reaſonable to imagine, he did it in the very words of the letter, which he had by him; whereas Salluſt, as an hiſtorian, might think it ſufficient to give the ſenſe of it in his own words [2]. LECT. XLIV.

[1] *Cap.* v.

[2] *Bell. Catil. c.* 44.

THE laſt thing mentioned above, relating to the ſubject of hiſtory, was *digreſſions*, which if rightly managed, afford the reader both delight and profit. Tho digreſſions, like ſpeeches, ſhould neither be too long nor frequent; leſt they interrupt the courſe of the hiſtory, and divert the reader from the main deſign of the work. But now and then to introduce a beautiful deſcription, or ſome remarkable incident, which may give light to the ſubject, is ſo far from an interruption, that it is rather a releif to the reader, and excites him to go on with greater pleaſure and attention. But having formerly had occaſion to ſpeak more largely upon this head, as it reſpects orations; and both the nature and reaſon

LECT. XLIV.

of digreſſions being much the ſame, as uſed either by the orator or hiſtorian, I need ſay no more of them at preſent.

WHAT further remains to be ſpoken in relation to hiſtory, I ſhall finiſh in my next diſcourſe.

LEC-

LECTURE XLV.

Of the Order and Stile of Hiſtory.

IN compoſing an hiſtory; three things are to be regarded, the ſubject matter, order, and ſtile. The firſt of theſe contains under it four parts, *narration*, *reflections*, *ſpeeches*, and *digreſſions*; as was ſhewn in my laſt diſcourſe, in which I endeavoured to explain both the nature and uſe of each of them. What now remains to be conſidered, is the *order* and *ſtile* proper for hiſtory. And of both theſe I propoſe to treat in my preſent diſcourſe. LECT. XLV.

As to the former, ſince moſt hiſtories conſiſt of an introduction, and the body of the work, in each of which ſome order is requiſite; I ſhall ſpeak to them ſeparately.

THE deſign of the introduction is the ſame here, as in orations. For the hiſtorian propoſes three things by his introduction, which may be called its parts; to give his reader ſome general view of the ſubject, to ingage his attention, and to poſſeſs him with a candid opinion of himſelf and his performance. Some have thought this

LECT. XLV.

this laſt unneceſſary for an hiſtorian [1]. But if we conſider how differently mankind are apt to judge of the ſame perſons, and actions; it ſeems as requiſite for an hiſtorian to be well eſteemed, as an orator. And therefore we find, ſome of the beſt hiſtorians have not omitted this part. Livy's introduction has been very much applauded by the learned, as a maſter peice in its kind. It begins with an account of his deſign. *Whether*, ſais he, *it may anſwer any valuable end for me to write the hiſtory of the Roman affairs from the begining of the city, I neither am certain, nor, if I was, ſhould I venture to declare it.* Soon after he endeavours to prepare the readers attention, by repreſenting the grandeur and uſefulneſs of the ſubject in the following words: *Either I am prejudiced in favor of my ſubject, or there never was any ſtate greater, more virtuous, and fruitful of good examples; or in which avarice and luxury had a later admittance; or poverty and thriftineſs were either more highly, or longer eſteemed; they always coveting leſs, the leſs they enjoyed.* And then he preſently procedes to ingratiate himſelf with his readers, and gain their favorable opinion. *Altho*, ſais he, *my name is obſcure in ſo great a number of*

[1] Lucian. *De Hiſt. ſcribend.* p. 370.

of writers, yet it is a comfort, that they cloud it by their fame and character. But I ſhall gain this advantage by my labor, that I ſhall be diverted for a time from the proſpect of thoſe evils, which the age has ſeen for ſo many years; while my mind is wholly intent upon former times, free from all that care, which gives the writer an uneaſineſs, tho it cannot bias him againſt the truth. In this paſſage we ſee, he endeavours to gain the good eſteem of his readers from two very powerful motives; modeſty, and a ſtrict regard to truth. It may ſcarce ſeem neceſſary to obſerve, that thoſe introductions are eſteemed the beſt, which are moſt natural; that is, ſuch as are taken from the ſubject matter of the hiſtory itſelf, and cloſely connected with it. Such are thoſe of Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy, Tacitus, and others. And therefore Salluſt is greatly blamed by Quintilian on the account of his introductions, which are ſo general, that they might ſuit other hiſtories as well as thoſe, to which they are prefixed [1]. Introductions ſhould likewiſe be proportioned to the length of the work. We meet with ſome few hiſtories, in which the writers immediately enter upon their ſubject, without any introduction; as Xenophon in his *Expedition*

LECT. XLV.

[1] *Inſt orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 8.

LECT. XLV.

Expedition of the younger Cyrus, and Caeſar in his *Commentaries of the Gallic and Civil wars*. But the latter does not profeſs to write a juſt hiſtory, and therefore left himſelf more at liberty, as well in this reſpect, as in ſome others.

BUT order is principally to be regarded in the body of the work. And this may be managed two ways; either by attending to the time in a chronological ſeries, or the different nature and circumſtances of the things contained in the hiſtory. However, as theſe two methods do not equally ſuit all ſubjects, I ſhall a little conſider, to what kind of hiſtories each of them ſeems more properly adapted. All hiſtory then, as I have obſerved already, may be reduced to three ſorts; *biography*, the *hiſtory of particular ſtates*, and the *general hiſtory of ſeveral ſtates* exiſting at the ſame time.

IN *biography*, or the lives of particular perſons, moſt writers follow the order of time, tho ſome reduce them to certain general heads, as their virtues and vices, or their public and private character. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have taken the former method, and Sueton̄ius the latter.

As

LECT. XLV.

As to the *hiſtory of particular ſtates*, the order of time is generally beſt, as being moſt natural and eaſy. And therefore it has uſually been obſerved by the beſt hiſtorians, as Thucydides, Livy, and others. Tacitus indeed wrote two diſtinct works, one of which he called *Annals*, and the other *Hiſtories*. And, as in both he has kept to the order of time, critics [1] have been at a loſs to aſſign any other reaſon for theſe different titles, unleſs that in the former work he confines himſelf more cloſely to the facts themſelves, and does not treat ſo largely upon the cauſes, manner, or event of them, as he has done in the latter. And even in the circumſtances of facts, (as was hinted in my laſt diſcourſe) there is a certain order proper to be obſerved, for rendering the account more plain and intelligible. Thus for inſtance, in the deſcription of a battle or ſeige, the time ſhould firſt be known, then the cheif perſon or perſons, who conducted it, then the number of forces and other requiſites, afterwards the nature of the place, then the action itſelf, and laſtly the event. But ſometimes it is neceſſary to add the time, in which ſeveral of the other circumſtances happened, eſpecially in actions of any conſiderable

[1] See *A. Gell. Lib.* v. *c.* 18.

LECT. XLV.

siderable length. Where the order of these circumstances is confused, it perplexes the account, and renders it both less entertaining to the reader, and more difficult to remember.

In a *general history*, the order of time cannot always be preserved. Tho, where the actions of different communities have a respect to one as the principal, they should all, as far as possible, be refered to the transactions of that state. But even here the several affairs of those different states ought to be related separately, which will necessarily occasion the anticipating some things, and postponing others, so that they cannot all stand in the order of time, in which they were performed. However, Velleius Paterculus says very justly with regard to this subject, that, *Every intire action, placed together in one view, is much better apprehended, than if divided by different times* [1]. In this case therefore, for better preserving the chronology, it is usual with historians, when they have finished any particular narrative, in passing to the next, to express the time by some short and plain transition; and sometimes to apologize for themselves, by assigning the reasons of their conduct. So Polybius, whose

[1] *Lib.* i. c. 14.

whoſe hiſtory is of this kind, ſais concerning himſelf: *As in writing the actions of each year, in the order of time, I endeavour to repreſent the affairs of the ſame nation together in one ſummary view; it is plain that inconvenience muſt of courſe attend this way of writing*[1]. Curtius profeſſes only to write the actions of Alexander king of Macedon, but his hiſtory contains in it the principal affairs of the greateſt ſtates in the world during that period. Now altho in the courſe of thoſe tranſactions, the war between Archelaus governor of Macedonia, and Agis king of Sparta, happened before the battle of Alexander at Arbela; yet the hiſtorian not only relates that battle firſt, but carries on the account of Alexander's affairs in Aſia, to the death of Darius, without interruption; for which he gives this reaſon: *If I ſhould relate, ſais he, the affairs of Alexander, which happened in the mean time, either in Greece, or Illyrium and Thrace, each in their proper order and time, I muſt interrupt the affairs of Aſia; which it is much better to repreſent together in one continued ſeries, as they fell out, to the flight and death of Darius*[2]. Such anachroniſms therefore are nothing more, than what neceſſarily ariſe ſometimes from the nature of

LECT. XLV.

[1] *Excerpt. Leg.* 80.

[2] *Lib.* v. *init.*

LECT. XLV.

of the ſubject. As every thing, the more complex it is, and contains under it a greater number of parts, is more difficult to be digeſted in a regular order. But in an hiſtory compoſed of ſeveral ſtates, whoſe affairs are independent of one another, the actions of each nation muſt neceſſarily be ſeparated, in order to repreſent them in a juſt view, and prevent confuſion. This is the method, which Herodotus has taken, as likewiſe Diodorus Siculus, and Juſtin. Now both the pleaſure and benefit, which ſuch hiſtories afford, ariſe from obſerving the conduct of each ſtate ſeparately in the courſe of their affairs, and then comparing one with the other. And as the order of time muſt frequently be interrupted, it is not unuſual to continue the chronology at proper diſtances, in relating the affairs of each nation; which preſerves an unity in the whole, and connects it in one conſiſtent body.

THE diviſion of hiſtories into books, was deſigned only for the better diſtinction of the ſubject, and eaſe of the reader. And the dividing theſe books again into chapters, is rather a practice of later editors, (founded as they have thought on the ſame

reaſons) than countenanced by the example of antient writers. LECT. XLV.

I COME now to the third and laſt thing to be conſidered in hiſtory, and that is the *ſtile*, which at firſt led me to treat upon this ſubject, and gives it a relation to oratory. And in general, an hiſtorical ſtile is ſaid to be of a middle nature, between that of a poet and an orator, differing from both not only in the ornamental parts, but likewiſe in the common idioms and forms of expreſſion. This has been remarked by ſome critics with reſpect to the Greek and Latin hiſtorians, who have taken notice of the peculiar words and phraſes frequently made uſe of by theſe different ſorts of writers, to expreſs the ſame things [1]. But inſtances of that kind would be foreign to an Engliſh diſcourſe, and therefore I ſhall procede to the conſideration of ſuch properties of ſtile, as are common to all languages.

[1] See *Voſſ. Ars Hiſt. c. 26.*

AND firſt, Cicero obſerves, that, *nothing is more agreable in hiſtory, than brevity of expreſſion, joined with purity and perſpicuity* [2]. Purity indeed is not peculiar to hiſtory, but yet is abſolutely neceſſary. For no one will ever think him fit to write an hiſtory, who is not maſter of the language, in which

[2] *De Clar. Orat. c. 75.*

LECT. XLV.

he writes. And therefore, when Albinus had writen an hiſtory of the Roman affairs in Greek, and apologized for any ſlips or improprieties, that might be found in the language, upon the account of his being a Roman; Cato called him a trifler for chooſing to do that, which after he had done, he was obliged to aſk pardon for doing it *. Nor is perſpicuity leſs requiſite in an hiſtorical ſtile. The nature of the ſubject plainly directs to this. For as hiſtory conſiſts principally in narration, clearneſs and perſpicuity is no where more neceſſary, than in a relation of facts. But theſe two properties are to be accompanied with brevity, ſince nothing is more diſagreable, than a long and tedious narrative. And in this reſpect an hiſtorical ſtile differs both from that of poetry and oratory. For the poet frequently hightens and enlarges his deſcriptions of facts, by dwelling upon every circumſtance, placing it in different views, and embelliſhing it with the fineſt ornaments of wit and language, to render his images more agreable. And the orator often does the like, with a deſign to ſtrike the paſſions. But ſuch coloring is not the buſineſs of an hiſtorian, who aims at nothing more than a juſt and faithful

* *Gell. Lib. xi. c. 8.*

faithful repreſentation of what he relates, in a way beſt ſuited to its nature, and in ſuch language, as is moſt proper to ſet it in a plain and eaſy light. LECT. XLV.

AGAIN, Cicero treating of an hiſtorical ſtile, ſais: *It ought to be fluent, ſmooth, and even, free from that harſhneſs and poignancy, which is uſual at the bar* [1]. The properties here mentioned, diſtinguiſh this ſtile from that of judicial diſcourſes, in which the orator often finds it neceſſary to vary his manner of ſpeaking, in order to anſwer different views, either of purſuing an argument, preſſing an adverſary, addreſſing a judge, or recommending the merits of his cauſe. This occaſions an inequality in his ſtile, while he ſpeaks ſometimes directly, at other times by way of queſtion, and intermixes ſhort and conciſe expreſſions with round and flowing periods. But the hiſtorian has no neceſſity for ſuch variations in his ſtile. It is his province to eſpouſe no party, to have neither freind nor foe, but to appear wholly diſintereſted, and indifferent to all; and therefore his language ſhould be ſmooth and equal in his relations of perſons, and their actions.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. c. 15. *Orat.* c. 20.

BUT further, Dionyſius makes *decency a principal virtue in an hiſtorian*, which he

LECT. XLV.

explains by saying, that, *he ought to preserve the characters of the persons, and dignity of the actions, of which he treats* [1]. And to do this it seems necessary, that an historical stile should be animated with a good degree of life and vigor; without which, neither the characters of eminent persons, nor their remarkable actions, which make up the main business of history, can be duly represented. For even things in themselves great and excellent, if related in a cold and lifeless manner, often do not affect us in a degree suitable to their dignity and importance. And this seems particularly necessary in speeches, in order to represent what every one says according to his different country, age, temper, and station of life, in the same manner we may suppose he either really did, or would have spoken himself, on that occasion. Besides, there are some scenes of action, which require very pathetic and moving language, to represent them agreably to their nature. And in descriptions, the most beautiful tropes, and lively figures, are often necessary to set the ideas of things in a proper light. From whence it appears, that painting and imagery make up no small part of the historian's province, tho his colours

[1] *Epist. ad Cn. Pompeium.*

are not ſo ſtrong and glittering, as thoſe either of the poet, or orator. He ought therefore to be well acquainted with the manners of men, and the nature of the paſſions, ſince he is often obliged to deſcribe both; in the former of which Herodotus excels, and Thucydides in the latter, as Dionyſius has obſerved [1]. LECT. XLV.

[1] *Ubi ſupra.*

Now from theſe ſeveral properties laid down by antient writers, as requiſite for an hiſtorical ſtile, it ſeems upon the whole to agree beſt with the middle character. And this will further appear, by what they ſay relating to the ornamental parts of ſtile; namely, compoſition and dignity. As to the former of theſe, which reſpects the ſtructure of ſentences, and the ſeveral parts of them, Demetrius remarks, that, *An hiſtorical period ought neither to riſe very high, nor ſink very low, but to preſerve a medium* [2]. This ſimplicity, he ſais, *becomes the gravity and credit of hiſtory, and diſtinguiſhes it from oratory on the one hand, and dialogue on the other.* His meaning is, that hiſtorical periods ſhould neither be ſo full and ſonorous, as are frequent in oratory; nor yet ſo ſhort and flat, as in dialogue; the former of which, as he ſais, require a ſtrong voice to pronounce them; and the latter

[2] *De Interpretat.*

LECT. XLV.

have ſcarce the appearance of periods. So that according to this judicious writer, the periods beſt ſuited for hiſtory are thoſe, which being of a moderate length, will admit of a juſt riſe and cadency, and may be pronounced with eaſe. And Dionyſius tells us, that, *Hiſtory ſhould flow ſmooth and even, every where conſiſtent with itſelf, without roughneſs or chaſms in the ſound*[1]. This relates to the harmony of periods, which ariſes from ſuch a poſition of the words, as renders the ſound pleaſant and agreeable, and, as he thinks, ought to be attended to in hiſtory. And as to dignity, which reſpects the uſe of tropes and figures, the ſame author ſais, that *Hiſtory ſhould be embelliſhed with ſuch figures, as are neither vehement, nor carry in them the appearance of art*[2]. This is agreable to what Cicero obſerves, in comparing Xenophon and Caliſthenes, two Greek hiſtorians. *Xenophon the Socratic*, ſais he, *was the firſt philoſopher, and after him Caliſthenes, the ſcholar of Ariſtotle, who wrote an hiſtory, the latter almoſt like a rhetorician; but the ſtile of the former is more moderate, and has not the force of an orator, leſs vehement perhaps, but in my opinion more ſweet and pleaſant*[3]. The difference between theſe two writers, with regard

[1] *Ubi ſupra.*

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 14.

regard to their ſtile, conſiſted chiefly in the choice of their figures, which in Xenophon were more gentle and moderate, and therefore in the judgement of Cicero more agreable to hiſtory. Now theſe ſeveral properties relating to the ornaments of language, as well as thoſe before mentioned, which by antient writers have been thought requiſite for hiſtory, are all ſuited to the middle ſtile, as I have formerly ſhewn at large, in treating upon that character. SECT. XLV.

But notwithſtanding this general account of the ſeveral properties, which conſtitute an hiſtorical ſtile, it admits of conſiderable varieties from the different nature and dignity of the ſubject. The lives of particular perſons do not requiſe that ſtrength and majeſty of expreſſion, nor all thoſe ornaments of language, as an hiſtory of the Roman empire. And accordingly we find the ſtile of Nepos and Suetonius very different from that of Livy. The former is ſmooth and eaſy, ſcarce riſing above the low character; but the latter often approaches near to the ſublime. And other hiſtorians again have kept a medium between theſe. Upon the whole therefore we may conclude, that

LECT. XLV.

the middle ſtile is the proper character for hiſtory; tho hiſtorians may ſometimes ſink into the low character, and at other times riſe to the grandeur and magnificence of the ſublime, from the different nature of their ſubject, or ſome particular parts of it. For that is to be eſteemed the proper character of any writing, which in the general beſt ſuits it. And this diſtinction may help us in ſome meaſure to reconcile the ſentiments of writers upon this head, who ſeem to attribute different characters to an hiſtorical ſtile; or at leaſt to judge, where the truth lies: ſince a variety of ſtile is not only requiſite in different ſubjects, but likewiſe in different parts of the ſame work.

AND now if we look back upon the whole compaſs of this argument, we cannot but we ſee, it is no eaſy matter to write a good hiſtory, ſince it requires ſo many conſiderable qualifications to perform it. And therefore antiently, among the eaſtern nations, this province was aſſigned to a particular order of men [1]. And both among the Greeks and Romans, it was generally undertaken by perſons of figure, and ſuch, who were eminent for learning, knowledge of the world, and other great abilities.

[1] See *Voſſ. Ars Hiſt. c.* 32.

abilities. And as it is of ſo great ſervice to mankind, to have the records of paſt ages well and faithfully tranſmitted to poſterity; it is to be wiſhed, that perſons of the like characters would in all countries ingage in it.

LECT. XLV.

LEC-

LECTURE XLVI.

Of the Stile of an Orator.

LECT. XLVI.

THERE are few things, which ſeem more generally to be miſtaken, than the ſubject, on which I now propoſe to treat. If a perſon in ſpeaking or writing makes uſe of ſwelling expreſſions, bold and glaring figures, and long periods; nothing is more common, than to ſay, he talks, or writes, like an orator. But this is a great miſtake, and very frequently theſe things are moſt affected by thoſe, who are leaſt acquainted with the art or ſtile of an orator. For this reaſon therefore it may be more neceſſary to ſet this matter in a juſt light. And, as I have already ſhewn the uſe of the low, middle, and ſublime ſtile in treating of the language proper for *epiſtles*, *dialogues*, and other diſcourſes; it ſeems very requiſite, I ſhould now conſider the ſtile of an orator, which contains them all, as they are applied by him in the different parts of his province. For that the language muſt be ſuited to the nature of the ſubject, I have had occaſion often

to

to obſerve already; and the different view of the ſpeaker or writer, neceſſarily occaſions a variety in the manner of expreſſion. Now an orator has three things in his view; to prove what he aſſerts, to repreſent it in an agreable light, and to move the paſſions. Theſe are all neceſſary, I do not mean in the order, wherein I have now mentioned them, but that the diſcourſe may upon the whole have its deſired effect upon the audience. For unleſs the mind be convinced of the truth of what is offered by ſolid and cogent arguments, neither will the moſt eloquent diſcourſe afford a laſting pleaſure, nor the moſt pathetic long influence the affections. Tho on the other hand the hearers expect to be entertained, at the ſame time they are informed; and therefore, unleſs the language be agreable to their taſte, they will ſoon call off their attention, and think but meanly of the ſpeaker. And unleſs both theſe are warmed and animated by a becoming pathos, the ſpeaker may very probably miſs of his end, in bringing his audience over to his ſentiments. For bare conviction is not ſufficient with many perſons, to excite them to action. They will acquieſce in the truth of a thing, which they cannot

LECT. XLVI.

LECT. XLVI.

contradict, or will not give themſelves the trouble to examine; and at the ſame time remain unconcerned to proſecute it. And the pleaſure of a florid diſcourſe will of itſelf ſoon vaniſh, like the harmony of muſic, or the charms of a fine poem. And therefore to captivate his audience, ſecure them in his intereſt, and puſh them upon action, it is neceſſary for the orator to engage their affections. Theſe are, as it were, the ſprings of the ſoul, which managed by a ſkilful hand, move and direct it at pleaſure. Now each of theſe parts of an orator's province require a different ſtile. The low ſtile is moſt proper for proof and information. Becauſe he has no other view here, but to repreſent things to the mind in the plaineſt light, as they really are in themſelves, without coloring or ornament. The middle ſtile is moſt ſuited for pleaſure and entertainment, becauſe it conſiſts of ſmooth and well turned periods, harmonious numbers, with florid and bright figures. But the ſublime is neceſſary, in order to ſway and influence the paſſions. Here the orator calls in all the aſſiſtance both of nature and art; the moſt raiſed and lofty thoughts, cloathed with the brighteſt

and

and ſtrongeſt coloring, enter into this character. LECT. XLVI.

BUT as an orator has frequently each of theſe views in the ſame diſcourſe, I ſhall firſt give a ſummary deſcription of the ſeveral characters of ſtile, which I have formerly diſcourſed on more at large; that by placing them together in one view, the difference between them may be more plain and obvious. And then I ſhall procede to ſhew, to what particular parts of a diſcourſe each of them is more eſpecially to be applied.

FIRST then, as ſhorter periods are proper in the low ſtile, ſo leſs care is neceſſary in their turn and cadency. If a ſentence now and then drop unexpectedly, and diſappoint the ear, or has ſomething rough and harſh in its compoſition, it is no blemiſh in this character. For as it is ſuited to the manner of common diſcourſe, an appearance of regard to the ſubject, rather than the form of expreſſion, is more becoming, than any beauties of art. But the words ſhould be well choſen and proper, ſuited to the ideas they are deſigned to convey; the expreſſions plain and clear; and the artificial ornaments few and modeſt. By artificial ornaments are here meant

LECT. XLVI.

meant tropes and figures. And they are called artificial, becauſe they vary from the natural dreſs of language, either in the words, or manner of expreſſion. Tho they are often uſed by thoſe, who are wholly unacquainted with the rules of art. And particularly metaphors, which perſons, who have the leaſt command of language, frequently run into thro mere neceſſity, for want of a ſufficient ſtock of proper words to convey their ideas. The low ſtile therefore admits of theſe. But care ſhould be taken to chooſe ſuch, which have been rendered familiar by uſe, or at leaſt where the ſimilitude is very plain and evident. Bold or lofty metaphors, or where the alluſion is dark and remote, ought to be avoided. Nor is the moderate uſe of the other tropes wholly diſagreable to this ſtile. And the ſame thing is to be ſaid with reſpect to verbal figures, or ſuch as conſiſt in the particular diſpoſition of the ſentence, ſo that if the form of it be changed, the figure is loſt. Of theſe, ſuch as come neareſt to the natural way of expreſſion, are moſt proper for this ſtile. And therefore thoſe, which conſiſt in a jingle of words, ariſing from the ſame, or a like ſound, are to be avoided, as carrying in them too much

much the appearance of art. Thoſe like- LECT. XLVI.
wiſe which conſiſt in a repetition of the ſame word, have often too great a force and vehemence for this mild and gentle character. And as to figures of ſentences, which do not depend on the conſtruction of words, but lie in the ſenſe, many of them are too gay and ſprightly, and others too rapid and impetuous, for the ſimplicity of the low ſtile; ſo that only the more moderate, and ſedate ones, are to be allowed a place here. It is therefore no wonder, if perſons are often miſtaken in their notion of this character; the beauty of which, conſiſting in a certain plainneſs and ſimplicity, without any thing in it, but what ſeems natural and common; every one is apt to imagine he can readily be maſter of it, till by experience he finds the contrary. For the caſe is much the ſame here, as in perſons of faſhion and good breeding, whoſe behaviour and addreſs is attended with that agreable freedom, and ſeeming negligence, which in appearance is very eaſy to expreſs, but in reality is ſcarce imitable by others.

As the middle ſtile is more adapted for pleaſure and delight, it admits of all thoſe beauties and ornaments, which ſooth and

enter-

LECT. XLVI.

entertain the mind. It has more force and energy than the low ſtile, but leſs than the ſublime. Smooth and harmonious numbers, well turned periods, of a juſt length, delightful cadency, and accurate diſpoſition of the words, are ſuited to this ſtile. The moſt beautiful and ſhining tropes, which ſtrike the fancy; and all thoſe verbal figures, which by a repetition, ſimilitude, or proportion of ſounds pleaſe and gratify the ear, help to form this character. The like is to be ſaid as to figures of ſentences, the moſt florid and beautiful, ſuch as enumeration, deſcription, ſimilitude, and the like, are here the moſt proper.

But it is the ſublime ſtile which perfects the orator. This requires the moſt forceable and emphatical words, the boldeſt metaphors, and ſtrongeſt figures. In verbal figures, repetitions, ſynonyms, gradations, contraries, with others of a like force, and energy, are cheifly employed here. But figures of ſentences are the moſt conſiderable, and principally contribute to make up this character. Among theſe are ſimiles taken from lofty ſubjects, proſopopeia, apoſtrophe, exclamation, epiphonema, apoſiopeſis, and others of a like nature. But due care muſt likewiſe be taken of the form,

form, conſtruction, and harmony of the periods. Which ſeem beſt diſpoſed, when long and ſhort ones are intermixed. For tho round and ſwelling periods carry in them ſomething grand and majeſtic, yet many times they move too ſlow to ſtrike the paſſions. Whereas ſhort ones are more acute and pungent, and by returning quick awaken the mind, and raiſe the paſſions. But to render it complete, it muſt be ſupported with ſtrong reaſon, grandeur of thought, and ſentiments every way equal to the expreſſion; without which it will be very liable to ſwell into bombaſt, and end barely in amuſement. LECT. XLVI.

HAVING given a ſhort ſketch of this part of the orator's furniture, I ſhall now go on to ſhew, where, and in what manner, he is to make uſe of it. This will beſt appear, by conſidering his principal view in each part of his diſcourſe. Now the parts of a juſt oration, as I have formerly ſhewn, are ſix; *introduction, narration, propoſition, confirmation, confutation,* and *concluſion*. I do not ſay, that all theſe are neceſſary in every diſcourſe. But it is proper they ſhould all be mentioned, that we may conſider, what ſtile is fitteſt for them, when they are neceſſary.

LECT. XLVI.

In the *introduction*, the orator has three things before him; to gain the eſteem of his hearers, to ſecure their attention, and to give them ſome general notion of his ſubject. To ſet out modeſtly, is undoubtedly the moſt likely way to recommend himſelf. For to attempt to inflame an audience, before they are prepared for it, or ſee the reaſon of much warmth, is highly improper. A prudent ſpeaker will, like Demoſthenes[1], begin with temper, and riſe gradually, till he has inſenſibly warmed his hearers, and in ſome good degree ingaged their affections in his favor. So that this part ſcarce riſes above the middle ſtile. And if it carry in it an air of pleaſantry, and good humour, it is generally the more apt to ingage the attention.

[1] Cic. *orat.* c. 8.

The introduction is uſually followed by the *narration*, or a recital of ſuch things, as either preceded, accompanied, or followed upon the ſubject under conſideration. Now as the qualities, that recommend a narration, are clearneſs, brevity, and probability; theſe ſufficiently point out the ſtile. Perſpicuity ariſes from the choice of proper words, and ſuch tropes, as have been rendered moſt familiar by uſe; brevity requires moderate periods, whoſe parts are

but little tranſpoſed; and a plain and ſim- LECT. XLVI.
ple dreſs, without ornament or coloring, is beſt ſuited to repreſent things probable: all which are the properties of the low ſtile. And therefore Cicero ſais, narrations come pretty near to our ordinary diſcourſe [1]. Indeed, ſometimes it is neceſſary not only to relate the facts themſelves, but likewiſe to deſcribe the manner, in which they were performed. And then a further degree of art may be requiſite to repreſent them with all their circumſtances, and paint them to the mind in their proper colors.

[1] *Orat.* c. 36.

THE next part in order is the *propoſition*, or ſubject of the diſcourſe, in which there can be no room for ornament. But as it is the baſis and foundation of the orator's whole deſign, it ought to be laid down in the plaineſt and cleareſt terms, ſo as to leave no room for doubt or uncertainty, what it is, which he intends to diſcourſe upon.

THE next thing is *confirmation*, wherein the orator endeavours to maintain and defend his own cauſe, and to convince his hearers of the truth of it by reaſon and argument. Now the low ſtile is certainly fitteſt for cool reaſoning and debate. But the orator's method of reaſoning often very much

LECT. XLVI.

much differs from that of the philoſopher. The latter contents himſelf with the moſt plain and familiar manner of repreſenting the truth, and thinks it ſufficient, if what he ſays be clearly underſtood. But the former, at the ſame time that he convinces the judgement, endeavours likewiſe to affect the paſſions, and that in a great variety of ways. So that in this part of the diſcourſe the ſtile is very different, according to the nature and circumſtances of the cauſe. Sometimes, while he is dwelling upon the proof of a thing, he talks coolly, and reaſons with the ſedateneſs of a philoſopher; and where any part of his argument appears doubtful or obſcure, he endeavours with the ſame even temper to explain and clear it up. But frequently he intermixes with his proofs all the arts of perſuaſion, and embelliſhes his reaſons with the greateſt ornaments and beauties of eloquence.

CONFIRMATION is uſually followed by *confutation*, in which the orator endeavours to enervate, and overthrow all that has been advanced in favor of the oppoſite ſide of the queſtion. But as the ſtile is much the ſame here, as in the former part; what has been

been ſaid upon that, may be ſufficient for this likewiſe. LECT. XLVI.

THE laſt part above mentioned is the *concluſion*. This conſiſts of two branches, *recapitulation*, and *addreſs*. Recapitulation is a ſhort recital of the ſeveral arguments, or at leaſt the cheif of them, which were before advanced in ſupport of the cauſe; that being brought together into a narrow compaſs, they may appear in a ſtronger light. Wherefore the language here ought rather to be forceable and ſtrong, than florid; becauſe brevity and conciſeneſs is a neceſſary quality. The other branch of the concluſion conſiſts in an addreſs to the paſſions, and is wholly perſuaſive; for which the ſpeaker is now intirely at leiſure. Indeed, this is often done occaſionally in other parts of the diſcourſe, particularly in the introduction and confirmation; but as in the former of theſe, his view is principally to ſecure the good opinion of the hearers, and excite their attention; and in the latter to defend his own ſide of the queſtion by reaſon and argument; when theſe two points are gained, he has nothing left, but to prevail with them to fall in with his deſign, and declare for him. And the beſt way to attain

LECT. XLVI.

tain this is, by ingaging their paſſions in his intereſt. Here then, to uſe Quintilian's words, *all the ſprings of eloquence are to be opened. Now we are paſt the rocks and ſhallows, all the ſails may be hoiſted. And as the greateſt part of the concluſion conſiſts in illuſtration, the moſt pompous language, and ſtrongeſt figures, have place here* [1].

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 1.

THUS I have given a ſhort account of the ſtile of an orator, and how it is to be applied; which contains in it all the ſeveral characters, and the whole compaſs and furniture of language. But tho I have deſcribed the particular ſort of ſtile, that is moſt proper for each part of a diſcourſe; yet this is not ſo to be underſtood, as if that variety was always neceſſary. Regard muſt be had to the nature of the ſubject, the time, place, perſons, and other circumſtances, by all which the ſtile is to be regulated. To diſcourſe in a lofty and grand way upon a common topic, or in a low and flat manner upon a ſublime argument, are both equally injudicious. Cicero refers us to ſome diſcourſes of his own, as inſtances of each kind. His oration for Caecina, he ſais, is writen in the low ſtile, that for the Manilian law in the

middle

middle ſtile, and that for Rabirius in the ſublime; and his Actions againſt Verres, with ſome others, are paterns of the variety here mentioned. And he gives us a very comprehenſive deſcription of a perfect orator in very few words, when he ſais: *He is one, who can ſpeak upon a low ſubject acutely, upon a lofty ſubject with ſublimity, and upon a moderate ſubject temperately* [1]. By which he means no more, than one who is maſter of the three characters of ſtile here deſcribed, and knows when and how to uſe them. But altho he mentions ſeveral among the Greeks, and ſome few among the Romans, who excelled in one or other of theſe different kinds; yet one who excelled in them all he ſuppoſes never to have exiſted, except in the imagination. The reaſon perhaps may be, becauſe each of them ſeems to require a very different genius, ſo that it is ſcarce poſſible for the ſame perſon to ſuccede in them all. Since therefore it is ſo rare and difficult a matter to gain the command of each in any good degree, it is better perhaps for every one to purſue that, which nature ſeems moſt inclined to, and to excel in it, than to ſtrive againſt their genius. For every kind has its perfection, and it is more commen-

LECT. XLVI.

[1] *Orat. c.* 29.

LECT. XLVI.

dable to be maſter of one thing, than do ſeveral but indifferently. However, in treating upon the ſtile proper for an orator, I thought it convenient to deſcribe it in ſuch a manner, as in the judgement of the beſt writers makes it moſt complete and perfect.

LECTURE XLVII.

Of Pronunciation in general.

I HAVE formerly obſerved the ſimili- LECT. XLVII.
tude there is between the arts of oratory and architecture; that in both of them the artiſt firſt collects his materials; then puts them together in their proper order; and afterwards gives them ſuch ornaments and decorations, as ſuit the nature of his deſign. And thus far the parallel holds, as it reſpects the three firſt parts of oratory: *invention*, which furniſhes matter for a diſcourſe; *diſpoſition*, which directs the placing it in a regular order; and *elocution*, which gives it a ſuitable dreſs and proper ornaments. Upon each of theſe I have already treated at large in many diſcourſes. But there is a fourth part of this art, not inferior at leaſt to any of the former, which I now propoſe to conſider, and that is *pronunciation*, or *action*, as it is alſo called by ſome of the antients [1]. Tho if we attend to the proper ſignification of each of theſe words, the former reſpects the voice, and the latter the geſtures and motions of the body. But if we conſider them

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xi. *c.* 3.

LECT. XLVII.

them as ſynonymous terms, in this large ſenſe pronunciation or action may be ſaid to be, *a ſuitable conformity of the voice, and the ſeveral motions of the body in ſpeaking, to the ſubject matter of the diſcourſe* [1].

[1] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 8.

THE beſt judges among the antients have repreſented this as the principal part of an orator's province, from whence he is cheifly to expect ſucceſs in the art of perſuaſion. When Cicero, in the perſon of Craſſus, has largely and elegantly diſcourſed upon all the other parts of oratory, coming at laſt to ſpeak of this, he ſais: *All the former have their effect as they are pronounced. It is action alone that governs in ſpeaking; without which the beſt orator is of no value, and is often defeated by one in other reſpects much his inferior* [2]. And he lets us know, that Demoſthenes was of the ſame opinion, who, *when he was aſked, what was the principal thing in oratory, replied, action; and being aſked again a ſecond and a third time, what was next conſiderable, he ſtill made the ſame anſwer* [3]. By which he ſeemed to intimate, that he thought the whole art did in a manner conſiſt in it. And indeed, if he had not judged this highly neceſſary for an orator, he would ſcarce have taken ſo much pains him-

[2] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 56.

[3] *Ib.* Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xi. *c.* 3.

himſelf in correcting thoſe natural defects, under which he labored at firſt, in order to acquire it. For he had both a weak voice, and likewiſe an impediment in his ſpeech, ſo that he could not pronounce diſtinctly ſome particular letters. The former of which defects he conquered, partly by ſpeaking as loud as he could upon the ſhore, when the ſea roared and was boiſterous; and partly by pronouncing long periods, as he walked up hill: both which methods contributed to the ſtrengthening of his voice. And he found means to render his pronunciation more clear and articulate, by the help of ſome little ſtones put under his tongue. Nor was he leſs careful in endeavouring to gain the habit of a becoming and decent geſture; for which purpoſe he uſed to pronounce his diſcourſes alone before a large glaſs. And becauſe he had got an ill cuſtom of drawing up his ſhoulders, when he ſpoke; to amend that, he uſed to place them under a ſword, which hung over him with the point downward [1]. Such pains did this prince of the Grecian orators take to remove thoſe difficulties, which would have been ſufficient to diſcourage an inferior and leſs aſpiring genius. And to how great a perfection he arrived in

LECT. XLVII.

[1] *Creſoll.* p. 91.

LECT. XLVII.

in his pronunciation, under all these disadvantages, by his indefatigable diligence and application, is evident from the confession of his great adversary, and rival in oratory, Eschines. *Who, when he could not bear the disgrace of being worsted by Demosthenes in the cause of Ctesiphon, retired to Rhodes. And being desired by the inhabitants to recite to them his own oration upon that occasion, which accordingly he did; the next day they requested of him to let them hear that of Demosthenes, which having pronounced in a most graceful manner, to the admiration of all who were present, How much more, says he, would you have wondred, if you had heard him speak it himself*[1]. By which he plainly gave Demosthenes the preference in that respect. I might add to these authorities the judgement of Quintilian, who says, that, *it is not of so much moment what our compositions are, as how they are pronounced; since it is the manner of the delivery, by which the audience is moved.* And therefore he ventures to assert, that, *an indifferent discourse, assisted by a lively and graceful action, will have greater efficacy than the finest harangue, which wants that advantage*[2].

[1] Cic. *De Orat. Lib.* iii. c. 56.

[2] *Inst. orat. Lib.* xi. 3.

THE truth of this sentiment of the antients, concerning the power and efficacy of

LECT. XLVII.

of pronunciation, might be proved from many inſtances; but I ſhall content myſelf with one or two only. Hortenſius, a cotemporary with Cicero, and while living next to him in reputation as an orator, was highly applauded for his action. But his orations after his death, as Quintilian tells us (for we have none of them now remaining) did not appear anſwerable to his character; from whence he juſtly concludes, there muſt have been ſomething pleaſing when he ſpoke, by which he gained his character, which was loſt in reading them [1]. But perhaps there is ſcarce a more conſiderable inſtance of this, than in Cicero himſelf. After the death of Pompey, when Caeſar had got the government into his own hands, many of his acquaintance interceded with him in behalf of their relations and freinds, who had been of the contrary party in the late wars. Among others Cicero ſolicited for his freind Ligarius, which Tubero underſtanding, who owed Ligarius a grudge, he oppoſed it, and undertook to repreſent him to Caeſar as unworthy of his mercy. Caeſar himſelf was prejudiced againſt Ligarius, and therefore, when the cauſe was to come before him, he ſaid: *We may venture to hear Cicero*

[1] *Ibid.*

LECT. XLVII.

cero display his eloquence, for I know the person he pleads for to be an ill man, and my enemy. But however, in the courſe of his oration, Cicero ſo worked upon his paſſions, that by the frequent alteration of his countenance, the emotions of his mind were very conſpicuous. And when he came to touch upon the battle of Pharſalia, which had given Caeſar the empire of the world, he repreſented it in that moving and lively manner, that Caeſar could no longer contain himſelf, but was thrown into ſuch a fit of ſhivering, that he dropt the papers, which he held in his hand [1]. This was the more remarkable, becauſe Caeſar was himſelf one of the greateſt orators of that age, knew all the arts of addreſs, and avenues to the paſſions, and conſequently was better prepared to guard againſt them. But neither his ſkill, nor reſolution of mind, was of ſufficient force againſt the power of oratory; but the conqueror of the world became a conqueſt to the charms of Cicero's eloquence; ſo that contrary to his intention he gave in to his plea, and pardoned Ligarius. Now that oration is ſtill extant, and appears excedingly well calculated to touch the ſoft and tender paſſions, and ſprings of the ſoul; but I beleive it can

[1] Plut. *in Cicer.*

can ſcarce be diſcernible to any in reading it, how it ſhould have had ſo ſurprizing an effect; which muſt therefore have been chiefly owing to the wonderful addreſs and conduct of the ſpeaker. LECT. XLVII.

THE more natural the pronunciation is, it will of conſequence be the more moving, ſince the perfection of art conſiſts in its neareſt reſemblance to nature. And therefore it is not without good reaſon, that the antients make it one qualification of an orator, that he be a good man; becauſe a perſon of this character will make the cauſe he eſpouſes his own, and the more ſenſibly he is touched with it himſelf, his action will be the more natural, and by that means the more eaſily affect others in the ſame manner. Cicero, ſpeaking upon this ſubject, ſais: *It is certain that truth*, (by which he means nature) *in every thing excels imitation, but if that was ſufficient of itſelf in action, we ſhould have no occaſion for art* [1]. In his opinion therefore (and who was ever a better judge?) art in this caſe, as well as in many others, if well managed, will aſſiſt and improve nature. But that is not all, for ſometimes we find the force of it ſo great and powerful, that where it is wholly counterfeit, it will for the

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 57.

LECT. XLVII.

the time work the ſame effect, as if it was founded in truth. This is well known to thoſe, who have been converſant with the repreſentations of the theatre. In tragedies, tho we are ſenſible, that every thing we ſee and hear is feigned and counterfeit; yet ſuch is the power of action, that we are oftentimes affected by it in the ſame manner, as if they were all realities. Anger and reſentment at the appearance of cruelty, concern and ſolicitude for diſtreſt virtue, riſe in our breaſts; and tears are extorted from us for oppreſt innocence: tho at the ſame time perhaps we are ready to laugh at ourſelves for being thus decoyed. If art then has ſo great an influence upon us, when ſupported only by fancy and imagination; how powerful muſt be the effect of a juſt and lively repreſentation of what we know to be true and real?

How agreable it is both to nature and reaſon, that a warmth of expreſſion, and vehemency of motion, ſhould riſe in proportion to the importance of the ſubject, and concern of the ſpeaker, will further appear, by looking back a little into the more early and ſimple ages of the world. For the higher we go, the more we ſhall find

find of both. I ſhall give you the obſervation of a very great man upon this head, in his own words. *The Romans*, ſais he, *had a very great talent this way, and the Greeks a greater. The eaſtern nations excelled in it, and particularly the Hebrews. Nothing can equal the ſtrength and vivacity of the figures they imployed in their diſcourſe; and the very actions they uſed to expreſs their ſentiments; ſuch as putting aſhes on their heads, and tearing their garments, and covering themſelves with ſackcloth, under any deep diſtreſs and ſorrow of mind. I do not ſpeak of what the prophets did to give a more lively repreſentation of the things they foretold, becauſe ſuch figurative actions were the effect of divine inſpiration. But even in other caſes we find thoſe people underſtood much better than we do, how to expreſs their greif, and fear, and other paſſions. And hence, no doubt, aroſe thoſe ſurprizing effects of eloquence, which we never experience now* [1]. Thus far this excellent writer. And what he ſais here with reſpect to the actions of the eaſtern nations, was in a good meaſure cuſtomary among the Greeks and Romans; if not intirely of the ſame kind, yet perhaps as vehement and expreſſive. They did not think language

LECT. XLVII.

[1] *Dial. of Eloqu. p* 92.

LECT. XLVII.

of itſelf ſufficient to expreſs the height of their paſſions, unleſs enforced by uncommon motions and geſtures. Thus, when Achilles had driven the Trojans into their city with the greateſt precipitation and terror, and only Hector ventured to tarry without the gates to ingage him; Homer repreſents both king Priam, and his queen, under the higheſt conſternation for the danger of their ſon. And therefore in order to prevail with him to come into the city, and not fight with Achilles, they not only intreat him from the walls in the moſt tender and moving language imaginable: but he tears off his grey locks with his hands; and ſhe in a flood of tears expoſes her breaſts, and adjures him by thoſe paps, which ſuckled him, to comply with their requeſt [1]. The poet knew very well, that no words could of themſelves repreſent thoſe agonies of mind, he endeavoured to convey, unleſs hightened by the idea of ſuch actions, as were expreſſive of the deepeſt ſorrow. And indeed this was antiently eſteemed ſo requiſite in an orator, that in matters of importance he was ſcarce thought to be in earneſt, who wanted it. In one of Cicero's orations, he does not ſtick to argue in that manner with

[1] *Iliad.* χ. *v.* 77.

with his adverſary. *Would you talk thus,* ſais he, *if you was ſerious? Would you, who are wont to diſplay your eloquence ſo warmly in the danger of others, act ſo coldly in your own? Where is that concern? that ardor, which uſed to extort pity even from children? Here is no emotion either of mind or body; neither the forehead ſtruck, nor the thigh, nor ſo much as a ſtamp of the foot. Therefore you have been ſo far from inflaming our minds, that you have ſcarce kept us awake*[1]. LECT. XLVII.

[1] *De Clar. orat. c.* 80.

As action therefore was judged ſo neceſſary a qualification in an orator, among the antients, ſo they made uſe of ſeveral methods and expedients for the better attaining it. The principal of which I ſhall breifly mention.

DECENCY of pronunciation is an habit. And as all habits are gained by time, ſo the ſooner they are learned, they are generally acquired with greater eaſe. For while perſons are young, they are not only more flexible, and capable of any particular bent; but they are likewiſe free from the trouble of encountring and ſubduing contrary habits, which doubles the labor, and increaſes the difficulty of attaining any laudable quality. Quintilian was very

LECT. XLVII.

ſenſible of this, in the caſe before us, and therefore in order to have perſons trained up to it, he begins with them in their childhood, and deſcends ſo low as even to give directions, how they ſhould be taught to pronounce, when they firſt learn to read. And he adviſes, that they ſhould then be inſtructed where to ſuſpend their voice, and make the proper pauſes, both in diſtinguiſhing the ſeveral parts of the ſame ſentence, and in ſeparating one ſentence from another: likewiſe when to raiſe, or ſink their voice, or give it a proper inflexion: to be ſlower or faſter, more vehement or ſedate, as the nature of the things may require: and that the tone of their voice be always manly and grave, but at the ſame time mixed with an agreable ſweetneſs [1]. Theſe things may perhaps appear in themſelves ſmall, but if duly attended to, they will be found of conſiderable ſervice to bring us to a juſt and proper pronunciation. For in every thing that is to be attained by practice, it is a great advantage to ſet out right at firſt.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 7.

THE antients likewiſe had perſons, whom they called *phonaſci*, whoſe proper buſineſs it was to teach them, how to regulate and manage their voice [2]. And others, who in-

[2] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 10. §. 2.

LECT. XLVII.

inſtructed them in the whole art of pronunciation, both as to their voice and geſtures. Theſe latter were generally taken from the theatre, being ſome eminent and experienced actors. So Quintilian, treating of the province of theſe perſons, ſais: *The comedian ought to teach them how to relate facts, with what authority to adviſe, with what vehemence to expreſs anger, and with what ſoftneſs compaſſion.* And ſpeaking of geſtures, he ſais: *He ſhould admoniſh them to raiſe their countenance, not diſtort their lips, or ſtretch their mouths* [1]. With ſeveral other directions of the like kind. And we are told concerning the emperor M. Antoninus, uſually called the philoſopher, that, *His firſt maſters were Euphorio the grammarian, and Geminus the comedian* [2].

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* i. c. 11.

[2] *Creſoll. in praelus.*

BUT tho they made uſe of actors to inſtruct their youth, in forming their ſpeech and geſtures, yet the action of an orator was much different from that of the theatre. Cicero very plainly repreſents this diſtinction, in the words of Craſſus, when ſpeaking of orators, he ſais: *The motions of the body ought to be ſuited to the expreſſions, not in a theatrical way, mimicking the words by particular geſticulations; but in a manner expreſſive of the general ſenſe; with*

LECT. XLVII.

a ſedate and manly inflection of the ſides; not taken from the ſtage and actors, but from the exerciſe of arms and the paleſtra [1]. And Quintilian ſais to the ſame purpoſe: *Every geſture and motion of the comedians is not to be imitated, nor to the ſame degree* [2]. They thought the action of the theatre too light and extravagant for the imitation of an orator; and therefore, tho they imployed actors to inform young perſons in the firſt rudiments; yet they were afterwards ſent to the *paleſtra*, or ſchools deſigned on purpoſe to teach them a decent and graceful management of their bodies. And ſuch ſchools, as Quintilian informs us, were in uſe both among the Greeks and Romans [3], Juſt as of later ages children learn to dance, in ſome meaſure with the ſame intention.

[1] *De orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 59.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 11.

[3] *Ibid.*

BEING thus far prepared, they were afterwards ſent to the ſchools of the rhetoricians. And here, as their buſineſs was to cultivate their ſtile, and gain the whole art of eloquence; ſo particularly to acquire a juſt and accurate pronunciation by thoſe exerciſes, in which for that end they were conſtantly employed. And as the Greeks were moſt celebrated for their ſkill in all the polite arts, and eſpecially oratory;

tory; the Roman gentry and nobility ge- LECT. XLVII.
nerally ſent their ſons abroad, and placed them under the tuition of ſome eminent Grecian maſter, to inſtruct them in the art of ſpeaking, and by that means to fit them for the ſervice of their country, either in the courts of judicature or the ſenate. Thus Cicero was ſent to Rhodes, to ſtudy under the famous Molo, and Brutus under Pammenes; Caeſar was going to the ſame place, when taken by pyrates; and Auguſtus afterwards ſtudied there under Apollodorus [1].

[1] *Creſoll. praef.*

NOR, after all this pains and induſtry, did they yet think themſelves ſufficiently qualified to take upon them the character of orators. But it was their conſtant cuſtom to get together ſome of their freinds and acquaintance, who were proper judges of ſuch performances, and declaim before them in private. The buſineſs of theſe perſons was to make obſervations, both on their language and pronunciation. And they were allowed the greateſt freedom to take notice of any thing, they thought amis, either as to inaccuracy of method, impropriety of ſtile, or indecency of their voice or actions. This gave them an opportunity to correct any ſuch defects at firſt,

LECT. XLVII.

before they became habitual. What effects might not juſtly be expected from ſuch an inſtitution? Perſons trained up in this manner, with all thoſe advantages, joined to a good natural genius, could not fail of making very complete orators. Tho even after they came to appear in public, they did not lay aſide the cuſtom of declaiming. For Quintilian tells us, that, *C. Carbo uſed to practiſe it daily in his tent* [1]. And Auguſtus is reported to have continued it during the war of Mutina [2], againſt M. Antony. Nor is it to be ſuppoſed, that ſo conſtant an attendance to this practice was only ſerviceable to them in their public performances; but it muſt neceſſarily affect their whole conduct, give them a freedom of ſpeech, eaſineſs of addreſs and behaviour, and render them in all reſpects fine gentlemen, as well as excellent orators. And from hence perhaps we may ſee leſs reaſon to wonder at the ſurprizing effects of ſome of their diſcourſes, when we conſider, what pains they took to arrive at thoſe abilities.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 7.

[2] Suet. *Rhet. c.* 1.

LEC-

LECTURE XLVIII.

Of the Voice.

LECT. XLVIII.

HAVING in my laſt diſcourſe treated on the nature of pronunciation in general, its great uſe to an orator, and the methods taken by the antients in order to attain it; I now procede to conſider the parts of it ſeparately, which are *voice* and *geſture*, and ſhall begin with the former.

VOICE is one kind of ſounds. Now the influence of ſounds, either to raiſe or allay our paſſions, is evident from muſic. And certainly the harmony of a fine diſcourſe, well and gracefully pronounced, is as capable to move us, if not in a way ſo violent and extatic, yet no leſs powerful, and more agreable to our rational faculties. As my preſent buſineſs will be to offer ſome conſiderations, for the juſt and decent management of the voice, it may not be improper in the firſt place to obſerve in general, what nature does, when free and unconſtrained. As perſons are differently affected, when they ſpeak; ſo they naturally alter the tone of their voice, tho they do not attend to it. It riſes, ſinks, and has

LECT. XLVIII.

has various inflections given it, according to the preſent ſtate and diſpoſition of the mind. When the mind is calm and ſedate, the voice is moderate and even; when the former is dejected with ſorrow, the latter is languid; and when that is inflamed by paſſion, this is raiſed and elevated. It is the orator's buſineſs therefore to follow nature, and to endeavour, that the tone of his voice appear natural and unaffected. And for this end, he muſt take care to ſuit it to the nature of the ſubject; but ſtill ſo as to be always grave and decent. Some perſons continue a diſcourſe in ſuch a low and drawling manner, that they can ſcarce be heard by their audience. Others again hurry on in ſo loud and boiſterous a manner, as if they imagined their hearers were deaf. But all the muſic and harmony of ſpeech lies in the proper temperament of the voice, between theſe extremes. In order to ſet this matter in a juſt light, it will be neceſſary to conſider the principal affections, or properties of the voice, and how they are to be regulated by an orator. Now theſe may all be refered either to *quantity* or *quality*.

THE *quantity* of the voice conſiſts in its *highneſs* or *lowneſs*, *ſwiftneſs* or *ſlowneſs*,

neſs, and the intermediate degrees between them. LECT. XLVIII.

EVERY perſon who ſpeaks in public, ſhould endeavour, if he can, to fill the place, where he ſpeaks. But ſtill he ought to be careful not to excede the natural key of his voice. If he does, it will neither be ſoft, nor agreable; but either harſh and rough, or too ſhrill and ſqueeking. Beſides, he will not be able to give every ſyllable its full and diſtinct ſound, which will render what he ſais obſcure, and difficult to be underſtood. He ſhould therefore take care to keep his voice within reach, ſo as to have it under management, that he may raiſe, or ſink it, or give it any inflection he thinks proper. Which will not be in his power to do, if he put a force upon it, and ſtrain it beyond its natural tone.

THE like caution is to be uſed againſt the contrary extreme, that the voice be not dropt, and ſuffered to ſink too low. This will give the ſpeaker pain in raiſing it again to its proper pitch, and be no leſs offenſive to the hearers. For tho the muſic of ſpeech conſiſt in the variations of the voice, yet they muſt be gradual to render them pleaſant. Such ſudden and great changes

LECT. XLVIII.

changes at once, are rather to be eſteemed chaſms in ſpeaking, than variations. Beſides, as they often prevent the hearers from taking in the ſenſe of what is ſaid, it gives them no ſmall uneaſineſs, that they are obliged to ſtretch their attention. Many perſons are too apt to be guilty of this, eſpecially at the end of a ſentence, by droping the laſt word; which ought in a particular manner to be expreſſed diſtinctly, becauſe the meaning of the whole ſentence often depends upon it.

THE medium between theſe two is a moderate and even voice. But this is not the ſame in all; that which is moderate in one, would be high in another. Every perſon therefore muſt regulate it by the natural key of his own voice. A calm and ſedate voice is generally beſt; as a moderate ſound is moſt pleaſing to the ear, if it be clear and diſtinct. But this equality of the voice muſt alſo be accompanied with a variety, otherwiſe there can be no harmony: ſince all harmony conſiſts in variety. Nothing is leſs pleaſing, than a diſcourſe pronounced throughout in one continued tone of the voice, without any change or alteration. Beſides, a variation of the voice is an eaſe to the ſpeaker; as

the body is releived by ſhifting its poſture [1]. The equality therefore we are here ſpeaking of, admits a variety of inflections and changes within the ſame pitch. And when that is altered, the gradations, whether higher or lower, ſhould be ſo gentle and regular, as to preſerve a due proportion of the parts, and harmony of the whole; which cannot be done, when the voice is ſuddenly varied with too great a diſtinction. And therefore it ſhould move from one key to another, ſo as rather to glide like a gentle ſtream, than pour down like a rapid torrent, as an ingenious writer has well expreſt it [2]. An even voice is beſt fitted to keep the mind to cloſe attention. And therefore in ſubjects deſigned only for inſtruction, without any addreſs to the paſſions, there is little room for a variety of voice. For the voice ought to agree with the ſtile, and as upon ſuch ſubjects this ſhould be equal, moderate, and ſmooth, ſo ſhould the other. Every thing, as we ſay, is beautiful in its ſeaſon, and there is a certain propriety in things, that is always to be regarded. And therefore an affected variety, ill placed, is as diſagreable to a judicious audience, as the want of it, where the ſubject requires it. We may find ſome perſons

LECT. XLVIII.

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xi. *c.* 3.

[2] *Rules for ſpeaking, &c. p.* 23.

LECT. XLVIII.

perſons in pronouncing a grave and plain diſcourſe, affect as many different tones, changes, and variations of their voice, as if they were acting a comedy; which is doubtleſs a very great impropriety. But the orator's province is not barely to apply to the mind, but likewiſe to the paſſions, which require a great variety of the voice, high or low, vehement or languid, according to the nature of the paſſion he deſigns to affect. So that for an orator always to uſe the ſame tone or degree of his voice, and expect to anſwer all his views by it; would be much the ſame thing, as if a phyſician ſhould propoſe to cure all diſtempers by one medicine. From hence it is evident, that altho various inflections, and tones of the voice, are requiſite to make it harmonious and pleaſing to the ear; yet the degree of it ſhould differ according to the nature of the ſubject, and deſign of the ſpeaker. And, as a perfect monotony is always unpleaſant, ſo it can never be neceſſary in any diſcourſe.

THE next property of the voice above mentioned was ſwiftneſs. That ſome expreſſions ought to be pronounced faſter and ſwifter than others, is very manifeſt. Gay and ſprightly ideas ſhould not only be expreſſed

preſſed louder, but alſo faſter, than ſuch as are ſad and melancholy. And when we preſs an adverſary, the voice ſhould be briſk and quick. But to hurry on in a precipitant manner without pauſing, till ſtopt for want of breath, is certainly a very great fault. This deſtroys not only the neceſſary diſtinction between ſentence and ſentence, but likewiſe between the ſeveral words of the ſame ſentence; nay, and often occaſions us to expreſs our words by halves, while one is thrown ſo faſt upon another, that we are not able to give each its full and juſt ſound. By this means all the grace of ſpeaking is loſt, and in a great meaſure the advantage of hearing. For when the ears of the hearers cannot keep pace with the volubility of the ſpeaker's tongue, they will be little the better for what he ſais. Beſides, by not commanding his voice, and eaſing his breath, at the proper pauſes and points of diſtinction, he is often obliged to ſtop in the middle of a ſentence; and ſo divides what ſhould be continued, and joins what ſhould be ſeparated; which muſt neceſſarily deſtroy the ſenſe, and confound his diſcourſe. Young perſons are very liable to this, eſpecially at firſt ſetting out. And it often

LECT. XLVIII.

LECT. XLVIII.

ariſes from diffidence. They are jealous of their performances, and the ſucceſs they may have in ſpeaking, which gives them a pain, till it is over; and this puts them into a hurry of mind, that incapacitates them from governing their voice, and keeping it under that due regulation, which perhaps they propoſed to themſelves, before they began to ſpeak. And the greater degree ſuch perſons have of a native and ingenuous modeſty, accompanied with a laudable ambition to excel, they are commonly more expoſed to this. For while on the one hand they are fired with an ardent deſire to recommend themſelves, and on the other, are fearful of the event; this dubious ſtate of mind is very apt to throw them off their guard, and run them into this exceſs. From which we may ſee the great advantage of having the voice well formed betimes; for when once it is become habitual to ſpeak with juſtneſs and propriety, perſons readily practiſe it without much attention or concern.

AND as a precipitant and haſty pronunciation is culpable, ſo likewiſe on the other hand it is a fault to ſpeak too ſlow. This ſeems to argue a heavineſs in the ſpeaker. And as he appears cool himſelf, he can never

never expect to warm his hearers, and excite their affections. When not only every word, but every ſyllable is drawn out to too great a length, the ideas do not come faſt enough to keep up the attention without much uneaſineſs. For till the ſenſe is completed, the mind is in ſuſpence; and if it be held long in that ſituation, it will of courſe flag and grow tired. Indeed, in ſome caſes, it is requiſite the pronunciation ſhould be ſlower than in others; as in repreſenting things great and difficult; or in expreſſing ſome particular paſſions, as admiration or greif. But the extreme I am now ſpeaking of, is a flowneſs equally continued thro an whole diſcourſe, which muſt neceſſarily render it flat and lifeleſs. LECT. XLVIII.

Now to avoid either of the two extremes laſt mentioned, the voice ought to be ſedate and diſtinct. And in order to render it diſtinct, it is neceſſary, not only that each word and ſyllable ſhould have its juſt and full ſound, both as to time and accent; but likewiſe that every ſentence, and part of a ſentence, ſhould be ſeparated, by its proper pauſe and interval. This is more eaſy to be done in reading, from the aſſiſtance of the points; but it is no

LECT. XLVIII.

leſs to be attended to in ſpeaking, if we would pronounce in a diſtinct and graceful manner. For every one ſhould ſpeak, in the ſame manner as he ought to read, if he could arrive at that exactneſs. Now the common rule given in pauſing is, that we ſtop our voice at a comma till we can tell one, at a ſemicolon two, at a colon three, and at a full period four. And as theſe points are either accommodated to the ſeveral parts of the ſame ſentence, as the firſt three; or different ſentences, as the laſt: this occaſions the different length of the pauſe, by which either the dependance of what precedes upon that which follows, or its diſtinction from it, is repreſented. And therefore, in the firſt three ſtops, the voice is rather to be ſuſpended in different degrees and meaſures of time, than entirely dropt, to ſhew that the ſenſe is not yet completed. But between ſentence and ſentence we reſpire, and begin a new. So that in long periods, the voice ſhould be favored by beginning low and ſedately, that it may hold to the end without reſpiration; or if it will not, the breath ought to be recovered without ſinking the voice. For if once the voice drop for want of breath, before the period be finiſhed;

LECT. XLVIII.

not only the beauty, but likewiſe the ſenſe of it will be loſt. Quintilian has a great ſtreſs upon a due attendance to theſe pauſes, and ſais: *Tho it may appear not ſo conſiderable in itſelf; yet all the other virtues of a good pronunciation are deficient without it* [1].

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xi. *c.* 3.

HITHERTO I have conſidered ſuch properties of the voice, as reſpect *quantity*, I come now to ſpeak of its *qualities*. And the cheif of theſe are *ſtrength* or *weakneſs*, *clearneſs* or *obſcureneſs*, *fulneſs* or *ſmallneſs*, *ſmoothneſs* or *roughneſs*. Now one half of theſe is what every one would willingly chooſe, as he would wiſh to be free from the others. But it is not in our power to give ourſelves what qualities of the voice we pleaſe; but only to make the beſt uſe we can, of what nature has beſtowed upon us. However, ſeveral defects of the voice are capable of being helped by care and proper means; as on the other hand, the beſt voice may be greatly hurt by ill management and indiſcretion. Temperance is a great preſervative of the voice, and all exceſs is highly prejudicial to it. The voice muſt neceſſarily ſuffer, if the organs of ſpeech have not their proper tone. And in order to their having this, they muſt

LECT. XLVIII.

be kept in a due temperature, that is, they muſt neither be too moiſt, nor too dry. If they abound with fluids, theſe will obſtruct the clearneſs of the voice, and render it obſcure and confuſed; and if they are parched with drought, the voice will be harſh and rough. Now all exceſſes, as well as ſome bodily indiſpoſitions, are apt to affect the organs one or other of theſe ways.

A STRONG voice is very ſerviceable to an orator, becauſe, if it want ſome other advantages, he is however capable to make himſelf heard. And if at any time he is forced to ſtrain it, he is in leſs danger of its failing him, before he has finiſhed his diſcourſe. But he who has a weak voice, ſhould be very careful not to ſtrain it, eſpecially at firſt. He ought to begin low, and riſe gradually to ſuch a pitch, as the key of his voice will well carry him, without being obliged to ſink again afterwards. Frequent inflections of the voice will likewiſe be ſome aſſiſtance to him. But eſpecially he ſhould take care to ſpeak deliberately, and eaſe his voice, by allowing due time for reſpiration at all the proper pauſes. It is an extreme much leſs inconvenient for ſuch a perſon rather to ſpeak too ſlow, than

than too fast. But this defect of a weak voice is sometimes capable of being helped, by the use of proper methods; as is evident from the instance of Demosthenes, mentioned in my last discourse. LECT. XLVIII.

A VOICE is said to be clear, when the organs of speech are suited to give every single letter, and all the combinations of them in syllables and words, their proper and distinct sound. Such a voice is very pleasing and agreable to the hearers; and no less an happiness to the speaker, as it saves him a great expence of spirits. For a moderate voice, if clear, will be as distinctly heard, as one much louder, if thick and obscure. Which is a great advantage to the speaker, because he can better keep his voice under command, and modulate it at pleasure, as the several parts and circumstances of his discourse may require. On the contrary, an obscure and confused voice is not always occasioned from a deficiency in the organ; but many times is the effect of custom, and a bad habit. Some persons, either from want of due care in their education at first, or from inadvertency and negligence afterwards, run into a very irregular and confused manner of expressing their words; either by misplacing

LECT. XLVIII.

ging the accent, confounding the ſound of the letters, or huddling the ſyllables one upon another, ſo as to render what they ſay often unintelligible. Indeed, ſometimes this ariſes from a natural defect, as in the caſe of Demoſthenes; who found a method to rectify that, as well as the weakneſs of his voice. But in faults of this kind, which proceede from habit, doubtleſs the moſt likely way to mend them is to ſpeak deliberately.

A FULL voice is not the ſame, as a ſtrong, nor a loud voice. It fills the ear, but it is often not pleaſant. And therefore to render it ſo, as well as audible, it ſhould be frequently varied. However, this ſeems better ſuited to the character of an orator, than a ſmall and ſhrill voice; becauſe it has ſomething in it more grave and manly. And thoſe, who have the misfortune of a very ſmall voice, ſhould be cautious of raiſing it to too high a pitch, eſpecially at once; becauſe the ſudden compreſſure of the organ, is apt to occaſion a ſqueeking and very diſagreable ſound.

A SOFT and *ſmooth* voice is of all the moſt muſical, eſpecially if it be flexible. And on the contrary, nothing is leſs harmonious, than a voice that is harſh and rough.

rough. For the one grates as disagreably upon the ear, as the other gives it pleasure and delight. LECT. XLVIII.

FROM the consideration of these several properties of the voice, we may conclude that to be the best, and fittest for an orator, which is moderate, distinct, firm, clear, and smooth, and withal easily flexible to the several degrees and variations of sound, which every part of the discourse may require.

THE other part of pronunciation, which is *gesture*, will be the subject of my next discourse.

LECTURE XLIX.

Of Geſture.

LECT. XLIX.

AS one part of a juſt and graceful pronunciation conſiſts in the *voice*, I conſidered the ſeveral properties of it, and how to render them moſt ſerviceable to an orator, in my laſt diſcourſe. And I ſhall now procede to the other part of pronunciation, which relates to geſture; by which is meant, *A ſuitable conformity of the motions of the countenance, and ſeveral parts of the body in ſpeaking, to the ſubject matter of the diſcourſe.* The word *geſture* is here uſed in a larger ſenſe, than is ordinarily done in common language. For we rarely make uſe of that word to denote the motions of the countenance, or any parts of it; but as theſe make a conſiderable part of my preſent ſubject, they muſt here be comprehended under this term. And I thought it neceſſary to lay in this caution, to prevent being miſunderſtood.

IT is not agreed among the learned, whether voice or geſture has the greater influence upon us [1]. But as the latter affects us by the eye, as the former does by the

[1] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 10. § 1.

the ear; geſture in the nature of it ſeems to have this advantage, that it conveys the impreſſion more ſpeedily to the mind: for ſight is the quickeſt of all our ſenſes. Nor is its influence leſs upon our paſſions: nay, in ſome inſtances it appears to act more powerfully. A caſt of the eye ſhall expreſs deſire in as moving a manner, as the ſofteſt language; and a different motion of it reſentment. To wring the hands, tear the hair, or ſtrike the breaſt, are all ſtrong indications of ſorrow. And he, who claps his hand to his ſword, throws us into a greater panic, than one, who only threatens to kill us. Nor is it in ſome reſpects leſs various and extenſive than language. Cicero tells us, he often diverted himſelf, by trying this with Roſcius the comedian; who could expreſs a ſentence as many ways by his geſtures, as he himſelf by words. And ſome dramas have been carried on wholly by mutes, who have performed every part by geſtures only, without words, in a way very intelligent, as well as entertaining to the ſpectators. Well therefore might Cicero call *action* (or geſture) *the language of the body*[1], ſince it is capable in ſo lively a manner to convey both our ideas and paſſions. But with reſpect

LECT. XLIX.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 59.

LECT. XLIX.

respect to oratory, gesture may very properly be called the second part of pronunciation; in which, as the voice should be suited to the impressions it receives from the mind, so the several motions of the body ought to be accommodated to the various tones, and inflections of the voice. When the voice is even and moderate, little gesture is required; and nothing is more unnatural, than violent motion, in discoursing upon ordinary and familiar subjects. The motions of the body should rise therefore in proportion to the vehemence, and energy of the expression, as the natural and genuine effect of it.

But as gesture is very different and various, as to the manner of it, which depends upon the decent conduct of several parts of the body; it will not be amis to consider more particularly, the proper management of each of those parts. Now all gesture is either *natural*, or from *imitation*. By natural gesture I mean such actions and motions of the body, as naturally accompany our words, as these do the impressions of our minds. And these either respect the whole body, or some particular part of it. But before I enter upon this, give me leave just to observe, that it has

has been cuſtomary in all ages and countries, in making a ſet diſcourſe before an aſſembly, to do it ſtanding. Thus we read, that, *Abraham ſtood up, and ſpake unto the children of Heth* [1]. And it ſeems as if he ſat down, when he had ended his ſpeech; becauſe, immediately after the account of their anſwer, it is ſaid again, that, *Abraham ſtood up and bowed himſelf to the people of the land, the children of Heth* [2]. In like manner Homer repreſents the Grecian princes, as ſtanding up, when they made a ſpeech, either to the army, or in their councils. So when Achilles has aſſembled the army, to inquire into the reaſon of the great plague, which at that time raged among them, he riſes up before he begins to ſpeak, and ſits down again, when he has done. After him the prophet Calchas riſes, and charges it upon Agamemnon; who riſing up in a paſſion, does not refuſe to comply with what Calchas propoſed, but expreſſes his reſentment at him for ſaying it [3]. And upon another occaſion, both Agamemnon and Neſtor do the ſame in council [4]. And Cicero acquaints us, that when Lentulus had been charged in the ſenate, as an aſſociate with Catiline, he ſtood up to make his defence [5]. Nor does

LECT. XLIX.

[1] *Gen.* xxiii. *v.* 3.

[2] *V.* 7.

[3] *Iliad. a. v.* 58.

[4] *Iliad. c. v.* 76.

[5] *In Catil. iii. c.* 5.

LECT. XLIX.

does the advantage of being better heard, ſeem to have been the only reaſon for ſo general an agreement in this poſture; but it appears likewiſe to have been choſen, as the moſt decent and reſpectful. Sitting carries in it an air of authority, and is therefore a poſture ſcarce uſed upon ſuch occaſions, unleſs perhaps where that is deſigned to be expreſſed by it. Wherefore it was a thing very much reſented, that when Caeſar, after he had got the power into his hands, being once addreſſed to by the ſenate, either refuſed to riſe, as ſome ſay, or as others, one of his freinds held him down by his gown [1].

[1] Suet. *in Vit.* 78.

But tho ſtanding appears to be the moſt proper poſture for ſpeaking in public, yet it is very unbecoming for the body to be intirely without any motion like a ſtatue. It ſhould not long continue in the ſame poſition, but be conſtantly changing, tho the motion be very moderate. There ought to be no appearance of ſtiffneſs, but a certain eaſe and pliableneſs, naturally ſuiting itſelf to every expreſſion; by which means, when a greater degree of motion is neceſſary, it will appear leſs ſudden and vehement. For as the raiſing, ſinking, and various inflections of the voice muſt

must be gradual; ſo likewiſe ſhould the motions of the body. It is only on ſome particular occaſions, that an haſty vehemence and impetuoſity is proper in either caſe. LECT. XLIX.

As to the ſeveral parts of the body, the head is the moſt conſiderable. To lift it up too high has the air of arrogance and pride, to ſtretch it out too far, or throw it back, looks clowniſh and unmannerly; to hang it downwards on the breaſt, ſhews an unmanly baſhfulneſs, and want of ſpirit; and to ſuffer it to lean on either ſhoulder, argues ſloth and indolence. Wherefore in calm and ſedate diſcourſes it ought to keep its natural ſtate, and upright poſture. However, it ſhould not be long without motion, nor yet always moving; but gently turn ſometimes on one ſide, and ſometimes on the other, as occaſion requires, that the voice may be heard by all, who are preſent; and then return again to its natural poſition. It ſhould always accompany the other actions of the body, and turn on the ſame ſide with them; except when averſion to any thing is expreſt, which is done by ſtretching out the right hand, and turning the head to the left. The antients erected a ſtatue of Venus in this poſture,

LECT. XLIX.

who was called by the Greeks ἀποτροπιάς, and by the Latins *Verticordia*, and in English may be termed the *forbiding Venus*[1]. But nothing is more indecent, than violent motions and agitations of the head. And therefore, when a witty writer, who is well known among us, would convey the most ridiculous idea of a pretender to knowledge, he expresses it thus:

[1] *Kemp. Monum. p.* 71.

For having three times shook his head
To stir his wit up, thus he said[2].

[2] *Hudibr. p.* 369.

But it is the countenance, that chiefly represents both the passions, and disposition of the mind. By this we express love, hatred; joy, sorrow; modesty, and confidence: by this we supplicate, threaten, sooth, invite, forbid, consent, or refuse: and all this without speaking. Nay, from hence we form a judgement not only of a person's present temper, but of his capacity and natural disposition. And therefore it is common to say, *such an one has a promising countenance, or that he promises little by his countenance.* It is true, this is no certain rule of judging; nor is it in the power of any one to alter the natural make of his countenance; however, it may put us upon endeavouring to gain the most pleasing aspect we can; since it is so natu-

ral for mankind to draw ſuch concluſions from it; and ſome perſons are ſo unhappy, as to render their countenance more diſagreable, than otherwiſe it would be, by ill habits. LECT. XLIX.

BUT the ſeveral parts of the face bear their part, and contribute to the proper and decent motion of the whole. In a calm and ſedate diſcourſe all the features retain their natural ſtate and ſituation. In ſorrow the forehead and eyebrows lour, and the cheeks hang down. But in expreſſions of joy and chearfulneſs, the forehead and eyebrows are expanded, the cheeks contracted, and the corners of the mouth drawn upwards. Anger and reſentment contract the forehead, draw the brows together, and thruſt out the lips. And terror elevates both the brows and forehead. As theſe are the natural ſigns of ſuch paſſions, the orator ſhould endeavour to conform to them.

BUT as the eyes are moſt active and ſignificant, it is the advice of Cicero, that the greateſt care ſhould be taken in their management. And he gives this reaſon for it: *Becauſe other parts of the countenance have but few motions; whereas all the paſſions of the ſoul are expreſſed in the eyes, by*

LECT. XLIX.

by ſo many different actions, which cannot poſſibly be repreſented by any geſtures of the body, if the eyes are kept in a fixed poſture [1].

[1] De Orat. Lib. iii. c. 59.

Common experience does in a great meaſure confirm the truth of this obſervation. We readily gueſs at a perſon's intention, or how he is affected to us, by his eyes. And any ſudden change or emotion of the mind, is preſently followed by an alteration in the look. In ſpeaking therefore upon pleaſant and delightful ſubjects, the eyes are briſk and chearful; as, on the contrary, they ſink, and are languid in delivering any thing melancholy and ſorrowful. This is ſo agreable to nature, that before a perſon ſpeaks, we are prepared with the expectation of one or the other from his different aſpect. So likewiſe in anger, a certain vehemence and intenſeneſs appears in the eyes, which for want of proper words to expreſs it by, we endeavour to repreſent by metaphors taken from fire, the moſt violent and rapid element, and ſay in ſuch caſes, the *eyes burn, ſparkle,* or are *inflamed*. In expreſſions of hatred or deteſtation, it is natural to alter the look, either by turning the eyes aſide, or downwards. Virgil has very juſtly obſerved this. For when he deſcribes Aeneas meeting with Dido in the Elyſian

Elyſian ſhades, and addreſſing to her, he represents her diſregard of him, by ſaying: LECT. XLIX.

Diſdainfully ſhe look'd, then turning round,
Still fix'd her eyes unmov'd upon the ground [1]. [1] *Aen. Lib.* vi. *verſ.* 469.

She ſhewed her reſentment for his former treatment of her, by not vouchſafing to look on him. Indeed, the eyes are ſometimes turned downwards upon other occaſions, as to expreſs modeſty. And if at any time a particular object be addreſſed to, whatever it be, the eyes ſhould be turned that way. And therefore Philoſtratus very deſervedly ridicules a certain rhetorician, as guilty of a ſoleciſm in geſture, who upon ſaying, *O Jupiter!* turned his eyes downward; and when he ſaid, *O earth!* looked upward [2]. A ſtaring look has the appearance of giddineſs, and want of thought, and to contract the eyes gives ſuſpicion of craft and deſign. A fixed look may be occaſioned from intenſeneſs of thought, but at the ſame time ſhews a diſregard to the audience; and a too quick and wandering motion of the eyes denotes levity and wantonneſs. A gentle and moderate motion of the eyes is therefore in common moſt ſuitable, always directed to ſome of the audience, and gradually turning

[2] Voſſ. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* vi. *c.* 11. §. 3.

LECT. XLIX.

ning from ſide to ſide, with an air of reſpect and modeſty, and looking them decently in the face, as in common diſcourſe. Such a behaviour will of courſe draw an attention. As in converſation, when a perſon addreſſes us in an handſom and becoming manner, we preſently put ourſelves in a poſture to give what he ſais a proper reception. But, as all the paſſions are in the moſt lively manner expreſſed in the eyes, their motions ought to vary, according to the different nature of thoſe paſſions, they are ſuited both to diſcover in the ſpeaker, and convey to his hearers. Since as the quickeſt acceſs to the mind is by the ſight, a proper well timed look will ſometimes ſooner effect this, than it can be done by words; as in diſcharging a cannon, we are ſtruck with the light, before we hear the ſound.

As to the other parts of the body, diſtinct from the head: the ſhoulders ought not to be elevated. For this is not only in itſelf indecent, but it likewiſe contracts the neck, and hinders the proper motions of the head. Nor, on the other hand, ſhould they be drawn down, and depreſſed; becauſe this occaſions a ſtiffneſs both to the neck, and the whole body. Their

natural

natural poſture therefore is beſt, as being moſt eaſy and graceful. To ſhrug the ſhoulders has an abject and ſervile air, and frequently to heave them upwards and downwards is a very diſagreable ſight. LECT. XLIX.

A CONTINUED motion of the arms any way, is by all means to be avoided. Their action ſhould generally be very moderate, and follow that of the hands, unleſs in very pathetic expreſſions, where it may be proper to give them a more lively ſpring.

THE hands need never be idle. Quintilian ſeems to think them as neceſſary and powerful in action, as Cicero does the eyes. *The hands*, ſais he, *without which all geſture is lame and weak, have a greater variety of motions, than can well be expreſſed; for they are almoſt equal to our words. Do not we deſire with them, promiſe, call, diſmiſs, threaten, beſeech, deteſt, fear, inquire, deny? Do not they expreſs joy, ſorrow, doubt, confeſſion, penitence, meaſure, plenty, number, and time? Do not they excite, reſtrain, prove, admire, and ſhame? That in ſo great a variety of ſpeech among all nations and countries, this ſeems to me the common language of all mankind*[1]. Thus far Quintilian. Now all bodily motion is either upward or downward, to the right or left,

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xi. *c.* 3.

LECT. XLIX.

forward or backward, or elſe circular. The hands are imployed by the orator in all theſe, except the laſt. And as they ought to correſpond with our expreſſions, ſo they ought to begin and end with them. In admiration, and addreſſes to heaven, they muſt be elevated, but never raiſed above the eyes; and in ſpeaking of things below us, they are directed downwards. Side motion ſhould generally begin from the left, and terminate gently on the right. In demonſtrating, addreſſing, and on ſeveral other occaſions, they are moved forward; and in threatning ſometimes thrown back. But when the orator ſpeaks of himſelf, his right hand ſhould be gently laid on his breaſt. When no other motion is neceſſary, the hands ſhould be kept about as high as the breaſt, ſo as to make near a right angle with the arm. This is not only graceful, but likewiſe the moſt eaſy poſture, and gives the leaſt ſtrain to the muſcles. They ſhould never be ſuffered to hang down, nor to loll upon the cuſhion, or bar. The left hand ſhould never move alone, but accommodate itſelf to the motions of the right. In motions to the left ſide, the right hand ſhould not be carried beyond the left ſhoulder. In promiſes,

and

and expreſſions of compliment, the motion of the hands ſhould be gentle and ſlow; but in exhortations and applauſe more ſwift. The hands ſhould generally be open; but in expreſſions of compunction and anger they may be cloſed. All finical and trifling actions of the fingers ought to be avoided, nor ſhould they be ſtretched out and expanded in a ſtiff and rigid poſture, but kept eaſy and pliable. LECT. XLIX.

NEITHER the breaſt, nor the belly ſhould be thruſt out, which in itſelf looks ungain, and hinders the free motion of the trunk; which ought not to be kept too ſtiff and upright, but eaſy and flexible, always ſuiting itſelf to the motions of the head and hands. The feet ſhould continue ſteady, and not give the body a wavering and giddy motion by frequently ſhifting; tho ſome perſons fall into that habit without moving their feet. Curio, a Roman orator, as Cicero tells us, was addicted to this, which occaſioned a freind of his once to paſs a joke upon him, by aſking: *Who that was talking out of a boat* [t]. The jeſt is too plain to need explication, for every one knows the waving of a boat will give the body ſuch a motion.

[t] *De Clar. orat. c.* 60.

LECT. XLIX.

THE geſtures I have hitherto diſcourſed of, are ſuch as naturally accompany our expreſſions. And I beleive thoſe I have mentioned, if duly attended to, will be found ſufficient to anſwer all the purpoſes of our modern pronunciation. The antients indeed uſed ſeveral more vehement actions and geſtures, than we are accuſtomed to, as was ſhewn in a former diſcourſe. Philip the Roman orator, as Cicero informs us, did not uſe to prepare his diſcourſes, but ſpoke, as we ſay, off hand. And he was wont to tell his freinds, he was never fit to talk, till he had warmed his arm. He doubtleſs therefore uſed a more violent motion with his arms and hands, than is common with us. And Cicero calls *the arm projected, the orator's weapon* [1]. Indeed, to extend or brandiſh the arm carries in it an air of command and authority, which was not unbecoming the character of Philip, who was a perſon of the higheſt rank and quality. And therefore young orators, both among the Greeks and Romans, for a time uſed no motion of the arm, but kept it confined in their garment, as an argument of modeſty, till age and experience allowed them to uſe greater freedom [2]. Nor was it uncommon for the antient

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 59.

[2] *Creſoll. De Perfect. orat. act. p.* 319.

antient orators to expreſs the exceſs of their passions by tears. They thought nothing unbecoming, that was natural; and judged it agreable to the characters even of the braveſt men, to be touched with a ſenſe of humanity in great calamities. And therefore we find both Homer and Virgil make their greateſt heroes ſhed tears on ſome occaſions. LECT. XLIX.

THE other ſort of geſtures above mentioned, are ſuch as ariſe from imitation. As where the orator deſcribes ſome action, or perſonates another ſpeaking. But here great care is to be taken not to over act his part, by runing into any ludicrous, or theatrical mimicry. It is ſufficient for him ſo to repreſent things of this nature, as may beſt convey the image of them in a lively manner to the minds of the hearers; without any ſuch change either of his actions or voice, as are not ſuitable to his own character.

LECTURE L.

Some particules rules for the Voice, and Geſture.

LECT. L. THE ſubject of pronunciation is of ſo great importance to an orator, that it can neither be too clearly laid down, nor too ſtrongly inculcated. If we inquire into the cauſes of that ſurprizing power it has over us, and by what means it ſo ſtrongly affects us; this, I think, may in ſome meaſure appear, by reflecting on the frame and conſtitution of human nature. For our infinitely great and wiſe maker has ſo formed us, that not only the actions of the body are ſubject to the direction of the mind; but we are likewiſe indued with various paſſions and affections, that excite us to purſue thoſe things, which make for our happineſs, and avoid others, which are hurtful to us. And as we are made for ſociety, we are alſo furniſhed with ſpeech, which enables us to converſe one with another. And ſuch is the contrivance of our make, and influence of our minds, upon the mechaniſm of our bodies; that we cannot only communicate our thoughts to each other,

other, but likewiſe our paſſions. For, as Cicero well obſerves, *Every motion of the mind has naturally its peculiar countenance, voice, and geſture; and the whole body, every poſition of the face, and ſound of the voice, like the ſtrings of an inſtrument, act agreably to the impreſſion they receive from the mind*[1]. Nor is, this all: but as every one is differently affected himſelf, he is capable to make the like impreſſions upon others, and excite them to the ſame motions, which he feels in himſelf. As when two inſtruments are ſet to the ſame pitch, the ſtrings of the one being touched, produce in the other the like ſound. This common ſympathy in the human frame ſhews how neceſſary it is, that an orator ſhould not only in general be well acquainted with the rules of pronunciation, but likewiſe know how to uſe them, as occaſion requires. For a general knowledge of the rules of art is not of itſelf ſufficient to perfect an artiſt, without a further acquaintance with the particular application of them to their ſeveral caſes, and circumſtances. Thus for inſtance, it is not enough for an orator to underſtand all the beauties and ornaments of language, and which of them are ſuited to form the ſeveral kinds of ſtile; unleſs he

LECT. L.

[1] *De orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 57.

LECT. L. he can likewiſe accommodate each of thoſe characters to their proper ſubject. And ſo likewiſe in pronunciation, he ought not only to know the ſeveral qualities of the voice, and proper geſtures of the body; but alſo when and where to make uſe of them. For not only different ſubjects, but alſo different parts of the ſame diſcourſe, and even particular expreſſions, often require a difference in the manner of pronunciation, both as to the voice and geſture. Having therefore in my two laſt diſcourſes treated on both theſe parts of pronunciation in general; it may not be amiſs now to conſider, how they are to be applied in each of the two reſpects laſt mentioned.

I SHALL begin with the parts of a diſcourſe, and treat of them in their natural order. And here the view and deſign of the ſpeaker in each of them, will eaſily help us to ſee the proper manner of pronunciation. And if I am obliged to repeat ſome things, which I have formerly mentioned, in order to render what I ſhall offer more clear and intelligible; it will, I hope, for that reaſon be the more excuſable.

LET us ſuppoſe then a perſon preſenting himſelf before an aſſembly, in order to make a diſcourſe to them. It cannot be decent immediately to begin to ſpeak, ſo ſoon as ever he makes his appearance. He will firſt ſettle himſelf, compoſe his countenance, and take a reſpectful view of his audience. This prepares them for ſilence and attention. To begin preſently, and hurry on, without firſt allowing either himſelf, or his hearers time to compoſe themſelves, looks as if he was rather performing a taſk, than had any deſign to pleaſe them; which will be very apt to make them as uneaſy till he has done, as he ſeems to be himſelf. Perſons commonly form ſome opinion of a ſpeaker from their firſt view of him, which prejudices them either in his favor, or otherwiſe, as to what he ſais afterwards. A grave and ſedate aſpect inclines them to think him ſerious, that he has conſidered his ſubject, and may have ſomething to offer worth their attention. A haughty and forbiding air occaſions diſtaſte, as it looks like diſreſpect. A wandering giddy countenance argues levity. A dejected drooping appearance is apt to raiſe contempt, unleſs where the ſubject is melancholy. And a chearful aſpect is a proper

LECT. L

LECT. L. per prelude to a pleaſant and agreable argument.

To ſpeak low at firſt has the appearance of modeſty; and is beſt for the voice, which by riſing gradually will with more eaſe be carried to any pitch, that may be afterwards neceſſary, without ſtraining it. However, ſome variation of the voice is always proper to give it an harmony. Nay, and ſometimes it is not improper for an orator to ſet out with a conſiderable degree of warmth, expreſſed by ſuch an elevation of the voice, and geſtures of the body, as are ſuited to repreſent the emotions of his mind. But this is not ordinarily the caſe. We have ſome few inſtances of this in Cicero, as in his oration for Roſcius Amerinus, where the heinouſneſs of the charge could not but excite his indignation againſt the accuſers. And ſo likewiſe in that againſt Piſo, and the two firſt againſt Catiline, which begin in the ſame manner, from the reſentment he had conceived againſt their perſons, and conduct.

In the narration, the voice ought to be raiſed to ſomewhat an higher pitch. Matters of fact ſhould be related in a very plain and diſtinct manner, with a proper ſtreſs and emphaſis laid upon each circumſtance,

ſtance, accompanied with a ſuitable ad- LECT. L.
dreſs and motions of the body, to engage the attention of the hearers. For there is a certain grace in telling a ſtory, which thoſe who are maſters of ſeldom fail to recommend themſelves in converſation. The beauty of it conſiſts in an eaſy and familiar manner of expreſſion, attended with ſuch actions and geſtures, as are ſuited to the nature of the things related, and help to enliven each particular circumſtance, and part of the diſcourſe.

THE propoſition, or ſubject of the diſcourſe, ſhould be delivered with a very clear and audible voice. For if this be not plainly heard, all that follows in proof of it cannot well be underſtood. And for the ſame reaſon, if it be divided into ſeveral parts or branches, they ſhould each be expreſſed very deliberately and diſtinctly. But as the deſign here is only information, there can be little room for geſture.

THE confirmation admits of great variety, both of the voice and geſtures. In reaſoning the voice is quick and pungent, and ſhould be enforced with ſuitable actions. And as deſcriptions likewiſe have often a place here, in painting out the images of things, the orator ſhould ſo en-

LECT. L. deavour to adapt both his voice, and the motions of his body, particularly the turn of his eyes, and action of his hands, as may beſt help the imagination of his hearers. Where he introduces another perſon ſpeaking, or addreſſes to an abſent perſon, it ſhould be with ſome degree of imitation. And in dialogue the voice ſhould alter with the parts. When he diverts from his ſubject by any digreſſion, his voice ſhould be lively and chearful; ſince that is rather deſigned for entertainment, than inſtruction.

In confutation, the arguments of the adverſe party ought firſt to be repeated in a plain and diſtinct manner, that the ſpeaker may not ſeem to conceal, or avoid the force of them. Unleſs they appear trifling and unworthy of a ſerious anſwer; and then a facetious manner, both of expreſſion and geſture, may be the propereſt way to confute them. For to attempt to anſwer in a grave and ſerious manner, what is in itſelf empty and ludicrous, is apt to create a ſuſpicion of its having more in it, than it really has. So when Tubero, in his accuſation of Ligarius before Caeſar, had made it part of his charge, that Ligarius was in Africa during ſome part of the civil war between

between Caeſar and Pompey; Cicero in his anſwer, not thinking it deſerved a ſerious reply, contents himſelf with barely mentioning it ironically. For thus he begins his defence of Ligarius: *Caeſar, my kinſman Tubero has laid before you a new crime, and till this day unheard of, that Q. Ligarius was in Africa.* Every one muſt eaſily perceive, by the manner, in which theſe words were pronounced, that the deſign of them was to make the charge appear ridiculous. But caution ſhould be uſed not to repreſent any argument of weight in a ludicrous way, leſt by ſo doing the ſpeaker ſhould more expoſe himſelf, than his adverſary. LECT. L.

IN the concluſion, both the voice and geſture ſhould be briſk and ſprightly, which may ſeem to ariſe from a ſenſe of the ſpeaker's opinion of the goodneſs of his cauſe, and that he has offered nothing but what is agreable to reaſon, and truth; as likewiſe from his aſſurance, that the audience agree with him in the ſame ſentiments. In every undertaking that requires care and thought, perſons are apt at firſt to be ſedate and moderate; but when it draws to an end, and is near finiſhed, it is very natural to appear more blith and gay. If

LECT. L. an enumeration of the principal arguments of the diſcourſe be convenient, as it ſometimes is, where they are pretty numerous, or the diſcourſe is long; they ought to be expreſſed in the moſt clear and forceable manner. And if there be an addreſs to the paſſions, both the voice and geſture muſt be ſuited to the nature of them, of which more will be ſaid preſently.

I PROCEED now to the conſideration of particular expreſſions. And what I ſhall offer here, will be firſt in relation to ſingle words, then ſentences, and laſtly the paſſions.

As to the firſt, even in thoſe ſentences, which are expreſſed in the moſt even and ſedate manner, there is often one or more words, which require an emphaſis and diſtinction of the voice. Pronouns are often of this kind. As: *This is the man.* And ſuch are many words, that denote the circumſtances and qualities of things. Such as highten or magnify the idea of the thing, to which they are joined, elevate the voice. As *noble, admirable, majeſtic, greatly*, and the like. On the contrary, thoſe which leſſen the idea, or debaſe it, depreſs the voice, or at leaſt protract the tone. Of this ſort are the words *little, mean, poorly, contemptible,* with

with many others. Some tropes likewiſe, as metaphors; and verbal figures, which conſiſt in the repetition of a ſingle word, ſhould have a particular emphaſis. As when Virgil ſais of the river Araxes, *It diſdained a bridge* [1]. And Niſus of himſelf in the ſame poet, *I*, I *am the man* [2]; where the repeated word is loudeſt. This diſtinction of words, and giving them their proper emphaſis, does not only render the expreſſion more clear and intelligible; but very much contributes to the variation of the voice, and the preventing a monotony. And the different pronunciation of theſe words will alſo require a peculiar geſture.

LECT. L.

[1] *Aen.* viii. 728.

[2] *Ibid.* ix. 427.

In ſentences, regard ſhould be had to their length, and the number of their parts, in order to diſtinguiſh them by proper pauſes. The frame and ſtructure of the period ought likewiſe to be conſidered, that the voice may be ſo managed, as to give it the moſt muſical accent. Unleſs there be ſome ſpecial reaſon for the contrary, it ſhould end louder than it begins. And this difference of tone between the end of the former ſentence, and the begining of the next, not only helps to diſtinguiſh the ſenſe, but adds to the harmony of the voice. And that the laſt ſyl-

LECT. L. lables of a ſentence might become more audible and diſtinct, was doubtleſs one reaſon, why the antient rhetoricians diſlike ſhort feet at the end of a period. In an antitheſis, or a ſentence conſiſting of oppoſite parts, one contrary muſt be louder than the other. As: *He is gone, but by a gainful remove, from* painful labor, *to* quiet reſt; *from* unquiet deſires, *to* happy contentment; *from* ſorrow, *to* joy; *and from* tranſitory time, *to* immortality. In a climax, or gradation, the voice ſhould riſe with it. So: *There is no enjoyment of* property *without* government; *no* government *without a* magiſtrate; *no* magiſtrate *without* obedience; *no* obedience *where every one acts as he* pleaſes. And ſo in other gradations, of a different form. As: *Since* concord *was loſt,* freindſhip *was loſt,* fidelity *was loſt,* liberty *was loſt,* all *was loſt.* And again: *You would pardon him, whom the* ſenate *hath condemned, whom the* people of Rome *have condemned, whom* all mankind *have condemned.* I might mention ſeveral other figurative expreſſions, which require a particular conformation and management of the voice; but theſe, I preſume, with ſome others, I ſhall have occaſion to name preſently, when I come to the

the paſſions, may be ſufficient to guide us in the reſt. But that it may appear more evidently, how neceſſary a different inflection and variation of the voice is in moſt ſentences, give me leave to ſhew you how Quintilian illuſtrates it, by a paſſage, which he takes from Cicero. The place is in the begining of Cicero's defence for Milo, and the words are theſe: *Altho I am apprehenſive, it may ſeem baſe to diſcover fear, when I enter upon the defence of* a moſt courageous man; *and it may appear very indecent,* when Milo diſcovers more concern for the public ſafety, than for his own, *not to ſhew a greatneſs of mind equal to his cauſe: yet this new form of the court terrifies my eyes,* which cannot diſcern the antient manner of the forum, and former cuſtom of trials, *whatever way they look:* your bench is not ſurrounded with its uſual attendants. This ſentence conſiſts of four members. And Quintilian ſuppoſes, that tho theſe words are the begining of a ſpeech, and were accordingly expreſſed in a calm and ſubmiſſive manner; yet that the orator uſed a great deal of variety in the pronunciation of their ſeveral parts. In the firſt member (as he imagines his voice was more elevated in expreſſing the

LECT. L.

LECT. L.

words, *a moſt courageous man*, than in thoſe other parts of it, *I am apprehenſive, it may ſeem baſe*, and, *to diſcover fear*. In the ſecond member he roſe higher in ſaying, *when Milo diſcovers more concern for the public ſafety, than for his own*; and then again as it were checked himſelf in what follows, *not to ſhew a greatneſs of mind equal to his cauſe*. The begining of the third member, carrying a reflection in it, was ſpoke with a different tone of the voice, *this new form of the court terrifies my eyes*; and the other part of it more loud and diſtinctly, *which cannot diſcern the antient manner of the forum, and former cuſtom of trials*. And the laſt member was ſtill more raiſed and audible, *your bench is not ſurrounded with its uſual attendants*. And it muſt be ſuppoſed, that while he was ſaying this, he caſt his eyes round the aſſembly, and viewed the ſoldiers, whom Pompey had placed there; which renders the expreſſion ſtill more grave and ſolemn. If this was the manner of the antient orators, and they were ſo exact and accurate in expreſſing their periods, and the ſeveral parts of them, as we have reaſon to beleive they were; it muſt have given a very great force,

force, as well as beauty, to their pronunciation. LECT. L.

BUT I come to the paſſions. And that they have each of them both a different voice and action, is evident from hence; that we know, in what manner a perſon is affected by the tone of his voice, tho we do not underſtand the ſenſe of what he ſais, or many times ſo much as ſee him; and we can often make the ſame judgement from his countenance, and geſtures. Love and eſteem are expreſſed in a ſmooth and chearful tone: but anger and reſentment with a rough, harſh, and interrupted voice; for when the ſpirits are diſturbed and ruffled, the organs are moved unequally. Joy raiſes and dilates the voice: as ſorrow ſinks and contracts it. Cicero takes notice of a paſſage in an oration of Gracchus, wherein he bewails the death of his brother, who was killed by Scipio; which in his time was thought very moving: *Unhappy man*, ſais he, *whither ſhall I betake myſelf? where ſhall I go?* Into the capitol? *that flows with my brother's blood.* Shall I go home? *and behold my unhappy mother all in tears and deſpair* [1]? Tho Gracchus had a very ill deſign in that ſpeech, and his view was to excite the populace againſt

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* iii. *c.* 56.

LECT. L. their governors; yet (as Cicero tells us) when he came to this paſſage, he expreſſed himſelf in ſuch moving accents, and geſtures, that he extorted tears even from his enemies. Fear occaſions a tremor and heſitation of the voice: and aſſurance gives it ſtrength and firmneſs. Admiration elevates the voice, and ſhould be expreſſed with pomp and magnificence: *O ſurpriſing clemency, worthy of the higheſt praiſe, and greateſt encomiums, and fit to be perpetuated in laſting monuments* [1]! This is Cicero's compliment to Caeſar, when he thought it for his purpoſe. And oftentimes this paſſion is accompanied with an elevation, both of the eyes and hands. On the contrary, contempt ſinks and protracts the voice. In the diſpute between Cicero and Cecilius, which of them ſhould accuſe Verres, Cicero puts this contemptuous queſtion to him: *How are you qualified, Cecilius, for ſuch an undertaking? I will not aſk, when you ever gave a proof of it; but when you ſo much as attempted it? Do you conſider the difficulty of managing a public cauſe* [2]? With much more to the ſame purpoſe. Tho ſuch kind of expreſſions require little geſture; yet ſometimes a motion of the hand may not be improper, to ſignify

[1] *Pro Lig. c. 2.*

[2] *Cap. 8.*

LECT. L.

ſignify diſdain or averſion. We may ſuppoſe Cicero to have acted thus in his defence of Rabirius. For to ſhow his aſſurance of his client's cauſe, having uſed this expreſſion in a very audible manner: *I wiſh I had it to ſay, that Rabirius had with his own hand killed Saturninus, who was an enemy to the Roman ſtate:* ſome perſons in the croud began to raiſe a clamor, juſt as of later times hiſſing has been practiſed on the like occaſions. Upon which Cicero immediately replies: *This noiſe does not diſturb me, but pleaſe me; ſince it ſhows, tho there are ſome weak perſons, yet they are but few.* Then preſently after follows the expreſſion I refer to: *Why do not you ceaſe your clamor, ſince it only diſcovers your folly, and the ſmallneſs of your number* [1]. All exclamations ſhould be violent. When we addreſs to inanimate things, the voice ſhould be higher, than when to animated beings; and appeals to heaven muſt be made in a loftier tone, than thoſe to men [2].

[1] *Cap.* 6.

[2] *Rules for ſpeaking, &c. p.* 24.

THESE few hints for expreſſing the principal paſſions, may, if duly attended to, ſuffice to direct our practice in others. Tho after all, it is impoſſible to gain a juſt and decent pronunciation of voice and

LECT. L. geſture merely from rules, without practice, and an imitation of the beſt examples. Which ſhews the wiſdom of the antients, in training up their youth to it, by the aſſiſtance of maſters, to form both their ſpeech and actions.

BUT there is one thing, which ought always to be attended to; namely, that perſons ſhould well conſider their own make and genius, eſpecially with reſpect to the paſſions. We ſeldom find, that any actor can excel in all characters; but if he performs one well, he is deficient in another. And therefore they are commonly ſo prudent, as to confine themſelves to ſuch as beſt ſuit them. The caſe is the ſame in an orator; who ſhould therefore keep within thoſe bounds, which nature ſeems to have preſcribed for him. Some are better fitted for action than others; and moſt for ſome particular actions rather than others; and what fits well upon one, would appear very awkward in another. Every one therefore ſhould firſt endeavour to know himſelf, and manage accordingly. Tho in moſt caſes, nature may be much aſſiſted and improved by art, and exerciſe.

LECT. L.

BUT, as neither of theſe parts of pronunciation can be performed to ſo good advantage, and ſome things in both of them are impracticable, where a diſcourſe is read, and not ſpoken *memoriter*; I ſhall in my next lecture treat upon the ſubject of *memory*.

LEC-

LECTURE LI.

Of Memory.

LECT. LI. WHEN I formerly treated of the diviſion of oratory, I ſaid it conſiſted of four parts, *invention*, *diſpoſition*, *elocution*, and *pronunciation*. Tho I obſerved at the ſame time, that ſeveral of the antients added a fifth part, which is *memory*. But ſome of the beſt writers upon this art among the moderns, differ from them in this reſpect. And ſeveral of the Greek rhetoricians appear to have been of the ſame mind; for neither Ariſtotle, Hermogenes, nor ſome others, have ſaid any thing about it in their inſtitutions.

MEMORY, as conſidered by philoſophers, is a faculty of the mind, which receives, retains, and exhibits again, as occaſion requires, all ſorts of ideas preſented to the underſtanding. Its perfection conſiſts in two things: readily to admit the impreſſions or images of things; and to preſerve them from oblivion, that the underſtanding may have recourſe to them, and imploy them for ſuch purpoſes, as reaſon ſhall direct. It contains likewiſe two different

acts;

acts; one which we properly call *memory*, or the actual retenſion of the ideas conceived by the mind; and the other *remembrance*, that is, a reviewing or calling forth thoſe ideas, which have been there treaſured up. Some have divided this latter act into two: and when ſuch ideas, as have once been loſt, or the traces of them in a manner obliterated, are again revived, they call it *reminiſcence* [1]. But to treat of the nature of memory, belongs not to my purpoſe at preſent. It is the uſe and benefit of this faculty, the methods proper to aſſiſt and improve it, with a ſhort account of artificial memory, of which I now propoſe to ſpeak.

LECT. LI.

[1] *A. of M. c.* 11. *p.* 17.

THE great advantages of a good memory are very evident in all circumſtances, and conditions of life. All other abilities of the mind receive from hence their beauty, ornaments, and perfection, as from a common treaſury. Knowledge conſiſts in the conception of ideas, comparing them with each other, and diſcerning their agrement or difference. From hence we judge of truth or falſehood, what is proper to be done, and what to be avoided. He is therefore eſteemed a wiſe man in matters of ſcience, whoſe mind is furniſhed

LECT. LI. with a ſufficient number of ſpeculative truths, to enable him to diſcourſe handſomely upon ſuch ſubjects. And in matters of practice he is called a prudent man, who by long experience and obſervation is capable to judge of the certainty, or at leaſt the probability of events, from former occurrences of the like nature, in the common affairs of life; and governs himſelf accordingly. But neither wiſdom, nor prudence can be gained without the aſſiſtance of memory. If the ideas conceived by the the mind are not laſting, nor capable of being recalled, as occaſion requires; but immediately vaniſh, like impreſſions made upon a fluid; no improvement of the mind, no art, ſcience, or any part of knowledge, can poſſibly be acquired. For in reality we know no more, than what we remember. So that it is memory alone, that inriches the mind, and preſerves what we collect by ſtudy and obſervation.

IT is plain from hence, that the advantages of a good memory are not peculiar to oratory, or indeed to any one art; but common to all. And therefore ſo far as the gaining, or improving it may be promoted by rules and precepts, this may rather ſeem to conſtitute a particular art of itſelf.

itſelf. Indeed no one wants it more, or can receive greater aſſiſtance from it, than the orator; but ſtill this does not make it to be a part of his art, any more than grammar or logic ought to be ſo eſteemed; both which are abſolutely neceſſary in oratory, the one as the foundation of language, and the other to reaſon juſtly. However, its uſefulneſs to an orator has made it cuſtomary with moſt rhetoricians to treat of it in their inſtitutes. And ſo far it ſeems reaſonable, till it comes to be treated as a ſeparate art. Tho was it ſtrictly a branch of oratory, it would not properly make one of its principal parts, but ought rather to be refered to pronunciation; ſince the uſe of it, as conſidered by an orator, is in order to enable him to pronounce his diſcourſes in the moſt graceful, and advantageous manner. And it is for this reaſon I have choſen to ſpeak of it in this place. LECT. LI.

EVERY diſcourſe pronounced in public, muſt either be ſpoken by memory, or read. In this latter way there can be little room for action. Some indeed read with a much better grace than others; but ſtill the body is confined to a very few motions, and the declivity of the head breaks the ſound of the voice, and very much abates its harmony.

LECT. LI.

mony. If what I obſerved from Cicero in a former diſcourſe be true, that all the paſſions of the ſoul are expreſſed in the eyes; when the eyes are kept in a fixed poſture, how is it poſſible thoſe paſſions ſhould be expreſſed in reading? Decency of geſture requires, that all the parts of the body ſhould conſpire, and accompany each other, in their proper motion; and how can that be done, while the head, which is the principal, is ſo confined to one poſture? Beſides, it can ſcarce ſeem natural to expreſs any conſiderable warmth and vehemence in reading; but it will rather appear to be the effect of art, than to ariſe from any real paſſion, that affects the mind. And as the ſpeaker muſt immediately return again to his book, or be ſilent, this muſt neceſſarily render it leſs graceful. If therefore the life and beauty of pronunciation conſiſts in a proper tone and modulation of the voice, accompanied with ſuch motions of the body, as are ſuited to the nature of the expreſſions; this is certainly much better done by ſpeaking *memoriter*, than reading: which ſhows the advantage of a good memory to an orator. Beſides, it is ſometimes neceſſary to ſpeak on ſudden occaſions, without preparation; or to reply to what others have ſaid: which muſt

LECT. LI.

muſt be muſt more difficult for thoſe, who have been always uſed to read their deliberate compoſitions. And therefore it is the opinion of ſome good judges, that orators ſhould not accuſtom themſelves to commit to memory every word, or ſentence of their diſcourſes; but only conſider well the ſubject, on which they are to ſpeak, range all the parts of it in a proper order in their mind, and prepare the figures, and cheif expreſſions they deſign to uſe; and leave room to add what may occaſionally be ſuggeſted from preſent circumſtances, when they come to ſpeak [1]. For it often happens in the ſeries of a diſcourſe, when the ſpirits are raiſed, and the imagination warmed, that many things occur to the mind more to the purpoſe, than were before thought of upon cool deliberation; eſpecially where perſons have preſence of mind, free from any anxious concern. Thoſe, who have this command of themſelves, certainly ſpeak in a more natural way, and with greater freedom; than where the memory is all the while labouring, for fear of any miſtake, which muſt neceſſarily confine the thoughts, check the voice, and occaſion a ſtiffneſs of behaviour. This cannot indeed be well done at firſt; but,

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* xi. *c.* 2.

as

LECT. LI. as Quintilian ſais, it is very hard, if long practice will not gain a facility, and if perſons muſt always labour under the ſame difficulties, as at firſt ſetting out [1]. The antient orators ſeem to have taken this method. If they had not writ down their orations, we could not have had them now; but there are many paſſages in Cicero, which from the occaſion of them appear plainly to have been ſpoken off hand; and ſome whole orations, particularly the firſt againſt Catiline. So that in ſuch caſes they muſt have been penned after they were pronounced, or elſe taken down by ſome other perſon, while they were delivered.

[1] *Ubi ſupra.*

BUT I procede to ſuggeſt ſome things, which may be of ſervice to aſſiſt and improve this faculty. Memory depends very much upon the temper and conſtitution of the body. When this is too hot and dry, it is not ſo ſuſceptive of impreſſions; and when too cold and moiſt, it is not ſufficiently retentive. A due temperament therefore of heat and moiſture is beſt on this account. And as the ſeat of the memory is in the brain; whatever is hurtful to this latter, muſt prejudice the former. Too much ſleep clouds the brain, and too little over heats it; therefore either of theſe

theſe extremes muſt of courſe hurt the memory. All intemperance likewiſe, and exceſs of paſſion, have the ſame ill effect. LECT. LI.

WHEN we would commit any thing to memory, our firſt concern ſhould be to underſtand it throughly. For we can never retain thoſe things long, of which we have but an imperfect knowledge. Likewiſe order and method in the diſcourſe itſelf is a great help to the memory. Where things have a mutual dependance upon each other, and go on in a ſeries, the thoughts paſs more readily from one to another; than where they lie confuſed, and without any connection. The mind ſhould alſo be free at ſuch times, and have nothing elſe to take off its attention. Nothing is a greater hindrance to the memory, than a croud of ideas, and thoſe of different kinds, flowing in upon the mind at the ſame time. They juſtle out one another, ſo that few of them ſettle; and if they do, it is in ſuch a confuſed and diſorderly manner, that when they come to be ſurveyed by reflection, little can be made of them.

To write down any thing is likewiſe a great advantage towards remembering it. For the very action of writing helps very much to imprint it upon the mind; by in-

LECT. LI.

gaging it to a closer attention, and causing it to dwell longer upon every part, than otherwise it would do only in reading. And therefore the Jewish doctors tell us, it was for this reason, that the kings of Israel were injoined always to write out a copy of the law with their own hand [1]. And the fairer a thing is writen, it is with greater ease committed to memory. This may possibly at first seem to have little in it; but if we consult experience, we shall generally find, that those things make the deepest impression upon the mind, which affect the senses in the most lively and agreable manner. As we receive most of our ideas thro them, the stronger impulse is made upon the organ, the greater attention it excites in the mind; and what we most attend to, we retain longest.

[1] *Deut.* xvii. 18.

A LITTLE experience and observation will help a person to discover the strength of his memory. And care should be taken not to over burden it. A long discourse therefore should be committed to memory by parts, so much at once, as the memory can well receive and retain. These parts should not be too many, for fear of confusion. And as it is most likely we may be at a loss in passing from one part to another,

other, it will not be amiss in a more particular manner to impress upon the mind the beginnings of them. One letter often helps us to recover a word, that word a sentence, and the first sentence an whole argument. As when a person is turning out of the way, it is but seting him right, and he will then go on of himself. Some have therefore advised, for the assistance of weaker memories, to write each part of the discourse in a separate paragraph, and the first word in larger characters, which may strike the fancy like a picture, when we come to those places. For every one is sensible of the powerful effect of imagery to excite and recal our ideas. And therefore it has been thought a further advantage, if the first letter of each word, writen in larger characters, could be joined together in one artificial word. For then the remembrance of that word would give us the first letter of each of those initial words, which letters would help us to recollect the whole words, which was the thing designed by writing them in different characters. We find this method of bringing several ideas together into one artificial word, of use in other cases. So the figures of syllogisms being distinguished by technical words, are bet- LECT. LI.

LECT. LI.

ter known, and more eaſily remembered, as every one perceives, who is converſant in logic. And in many other things, great effects are often produced from ſmall cauſes.

As the mind is not at all times equally diſpoſed for the exerciſe of this faculty; ſuch ſeaſons ſhould be made choice of, as are moſt proper for it. The mind is ſeldom fit for attention preſently after meals; and to call off the ſpirits at ſuch times from their proper imployment in digeſtion, is apt to cloud the brain, and prejudice the health. Both the mind and body ſhould be eaſy and undiſturbed, when we ingage in this exerciſe; and therefore retirement is moſt fit for it. And the evening, juſt before we go to reſt, is generally recommended as a very convenient ſeaſon, both for the ſtilneſs of the night; and becauſe the impreſſions will then have a longer time to ſettle, before they come to be diſturbed by the acceſſion of others, proceding from external objects. And to call over in the morning, what has been committed to the memory over night, muſt for the ſame reaſon be very ſerviceable. For to review thoſe ideas, while they continue freſh upon the mind, and unmixed with

with any others, muſt neceſſarily imprint them more deeply. LECT. LI.

SOME antient writers ſpeak of an artificial memory, and lay down rules for attaining it [1]. Simonides the poet is ſaid firſt to have diſcovered this, or at leaſt to have given the occaſion for it. The ſtory they tell of him is this: Being once at a feaſt, he recited a poem, which he had made in honor of the perſon, who gave the entertainment. But having (as is uſual in poetry) made a large digreſſion in praiſe of Caſtor and Pollux, when he had repeated the whole poem, his patron would give him but half the ſum he had promiſed, telling him he muſt get the other part from thoſe deities, who had an equal ſhare in the honor of his performance. Immediately after Simonides was told, that two young men were without, and muſt needs ſpeak with him. He had ſcarce got out of the houſe, when the room, where the company was, fell down, killed all the perſons in it, and ſo maſhed their bodies, that when the rubbiſh was thrown off, they could not be known one from another. Upon which Simonides recollecting the place where every one had ſat, by that means diſtinguiſhed them. Hence it

[1] Cic. *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 86, *&c.* Auctor ad *Herenn. Lib.* iii. *c.* 16.

LECT. LI. came to be obſerved, that to fix a number of places in the mind, in a certain order, was a help to the memory. As we find by experience, that upon returning to places once familiar to us, we not only remember them, but likewiſe many things we both ſaid and did in them. This action therefore of Simonides was afterwards improved into an art. And the nature of it is this: They bid you form in your mind the idea of ſome large place or building, which you may divide into a great number of diſtinct parts, ranged and diſpoſed in a certain order. Theſe you are frequently to revolve in your thoughts, till you are able to run them over one after another without heſitation, begining at any part. Then you are to impreſs upon your mind as many images of living creatures, or any other ſenſible objects, which are moſt like to affect you, and be ſooneſt revived in your memory. Theſe, like characters in ſhort hand or hieroglyphies, muſt ſtand to denote an equal number of other words, which cannot ſo eaſily be remembered. When therefore you have a number of things to commit to memory in a certain order, all that you have to do, is to place theſe images regularly in the ſeveral parts of

of your building. And thus they tell you, that by going over the ſeveral parts of the building, the images placed in them will be revived in the mind, which of courſe will give you the things or words themſelves, in the order you deſire to remember them. The advantage of the images ſeems to be this; that, as they are more like to affect the imagination, than the words, for which they ſtand, they will for that reaſon be more eaſily remembered. Thus for inſtance, if the image of a *lion* be made to ſignify *ſtrength*, and this word *ſtrength* be one of thoſe I am to remember, and is placed in the porch; when in going over the ſeveral parts of the building I come to the porch, I ſhall ſooner be reminded of that image, than of the word ſtrength. Some antient [1], as well as modern writers, relate wonderful effects of this artifice. But they all agree it much more aſſiſts us to remember any number of ſeparate and unconnected words, than a continued diſcourſe; unleſs ſo far as the remembrance of one word may inable us to recollect more. And in this reſpect it does not much differ from ſome of thoſe methods above mentioned, as helps to the memory. Quintilian therefore, tho he does not

LECT. LI.

[1] Auctor ad *Herenn.* *Ubi ſupra.*

LECT. LI. wholly paſs it over, yet ſeems to lay no great ſtreſs upon it [1].

[1] *Ubi ſupra.*

AND doubtleſs, the moſt effectual way to gain a good memory, is its conſtant and moderate exerciſe. As its goodneſs conſiſts in the facility, wherewith the prints of thoſe objects, which lie as it were wraped up in the cells of the brain, are reviewed; theſe cells by continued exerciſe become more pliable, and open themſelves with greater readineſs. Juſt as we find things fold and unfold with more eaſe, the oftener they are uſed. In a word, the memory, like other habits, is ſtrengthened and improved by daily uſe and practice. Wherefore thoſe, who have moſt occaſion for it, as orators, ſhould not ſuffer it to lie idle; but conſtantly imploy it in treaſuring up, and frequently reviewing ſuch things, as may be of moſt importance to them. For by this means it will be more at their command, and they may put greater confidence in it upon any emergent occaſion.

LECTURE LII.

Of other helps to Oratory: particularly, Hearing, Reading, and Writing.

THERE are three things neceſſary to form a good orator; *nature*, *art*, and *practice*. Nature begins the work, art conducts it, and practice completes it. LECT. LII.

By nature I mean the happineſs of a good and towardly genius. For where this is wanting, as a foundation, there can be little hopes of raiſing any conſiderable ſuperſtructure. And therefore Apollonius, the rhetorician, has been very much commended by ſeveral antient writers, for his prudence, and juſtice to his ſcholars. For it is reported of him, that as he greatly encouraged thoſe in the purſuit of their ſtudies, who appeared to be of a promiſing diſpoſition; ſo where he diſcovered in any an incapacity and want of genius, he would adviſe them not to loſe their time and pains; and direct them to ſuch other employments, as were more ſuited to their capacities. But every natural defect ought not to be eſteemed ſufficient to deter us from any laudable deſign, we are inclined

LECT. LII. to profecute. Labor and induſtry have often effected wonders. Demoſthenes's imperfection of ſpeech, and both his and Cicero's weak voice at firſt, might have diſcouraged leſs generous minds from any hopes of ever making a figure in oratory. But had they not ſurmounted thoſe difficulties by a continued labor, and inflexible reſolution, the world had been deprived of two of the greateſt orators, who ever appeared in it.

BUT where nature has been moſt kind and bountiful, the aſſiſtance of art is yet neceſſary. For as art is nothing elſe, but a ſyſtem of precepts, conſiſting of what has been thought by experience, and the opinion of the beſt judges, moſt proper and neceſſary to acquire any part of knowledge; in the preſent ſtate of things, nature is ſcarce ever found ſo indulgent to any, as to furniſh them with what is moſt perfect in its kind in all its parts, without calling in the aſſiſtance and direction of art. Thus particularly in oratory; if a perſon has the happineſs of a ready and copious invention, he may want judgement to digeſt and compoſe his thoughts in a proper and regular order; which will render his diſcourſes confuſed, and leſs agreable. Or if he has this

latter

latter faculty, he may want ſome aſſiſtance to help his invention. Again, if he has naturally a flow of words, and readineſs of expreſſion, he may ſtill be at a loſs how to manage it to the beſt advantage. Art will be very neceſſary to direct him in the choice of his words and phraſes, and how to accommodate them beſt to every particular ſubject and occaſion: when brevity and plainneſs of expreſſion is moſt proper, and when a more gay and florid dreſs; what parts of his diſcourſe require an even and ſmooth ſtile, and what more raiſed and ſonorous periods; and particularly what figures are beſt ſuited to ſtrike the imagination, or move the paſſions, and when and how to uſe them. And ſhould he be either ſo fortunate, or induſtrious, as in a good degree to acquire this ſkill himſelf, he may however want aſſiſtance to form his pronunciation and action; which is the more likely, becauſe in this perſons are leaſt able to make a judgement of themſelves, or to diſcover their own faults, and conſequently to correct them. Now in all thoſe particulars, and others that might be mentioned, it is ſcarce to be expected, that any one ſhould of himſelf fall into that way, which is beſt; and therefore art muſt be

LECT. LII.

LECT. LII.

ſerviceable to all. I am ſenſible, that many have gained the character of good ſpeakers, and very deſervedly, merely from the force of a happy genius, without much art or ſtudy; but yet they are only ſo comparatively, and the beſt judges admire them with that allowance: and all will own, they would have greatly excelled themſelves, had they been furniſhed with the aſſiſtance of art and learning. It ſeems plain therefore, that nature and art muſt both concur, in order to form an orator.

BUT there are other helps conducive to this end, beſides a ſyſtem of rules. Theſe indeed may in ſome meaſure enable a perſon, as a critic, to judge of the performances of others; but they are not ſufficient alone to make him a good ſpeaker himſelf. And therefore, as I have already imployed many diſcourſes in laying down the rules of art; I ſhall now go on to treat of ſuch other things, as ſeem neceſſary to gain the character of an orator. And theſe are *hearing*, *reading*, *writing*, and *imitation*; the three firſt of which I ſhall conſider breifly in my preſent diſcourſe.

IT is a maxim no leſs true, than common, that examples influence more than precepts. Nothing excites us ſo much to the

the purſuit of any thing we are inclined to, as to ſee or hear the ſame thing done by others. Barely to be told how any thing is performed, or to have rules given for the doing it, may indeed make it ſeem practicable; but when it is done before us, this ſets it in the ſtrongeſt light, and comes neareſt to the doing it ourſelves. Thus to hear a fine diſcourſe pronounced in a juſt and graceful manner, naturally excites an emulation in thoſe, who have any view themſelves ever to ſpeak in public. And while they obſerve the juſtneſs of the thoughts, and ſeveral ways of reaſoning; the order and connexion of the parts; the propriety and beauty of the language; and the various methods of addreſſing to, and moving the paſſions, by a ſuitable voice and geſture: this muſt not only animate, but alſo very much aſſiſt them to perform the like themſelves. LECT. LII.

But tho hearing the beſt and moſt celebrated orators is attended with theſe advantages; yet there are others no leſs conſiderable, which are principally to be gained by reading. In hearing a perſon ſpeak, the neceſſity of keeping pace with him, many times prevents the weighing duly all that he ſays. Some things perhaps are but

ſlightly

LECT. LII.

slightly attended to; and others wholly escape, that cannot be recalled; so that many imperfections may pass unobserved. Nor is it easy to bring together all the distant parts of the discourse, so as to view the just connexion and consistency of the whole. Besides, the harmony of the voice, or agreeableness of the gestures, may so far captivate the mind, and bribe the passions in favor of the speaker, as by that means to bias the judgement. And it is often found, that those discourses, which were very entertaining when heard, are far from affording an equal pleasure upon a review, when divested of those allurements. It is by reading therefore, that persons are best capable of passing a just sentiment upon any performance, and discovering all its real beauties, or defects. The mind is then at leisure to examine in the most exact, and critical manner, every thing relating either to the thought, language, method, or whatever else may appear worthy of observation, both as to the whole, or any particular part; and by reviewing it as often as is necessary, so to digest it, as to make it its own. And indeed, if we consider the extent of an orator's province, we shall easily perceive much reading necessary for him.

He,

LECT. LII.

He, who ſets out wholly upon his own ſtock, either with what his natural invention, or particular experience can furniſh him, will often find himſelf very much ſtraitened. Craſſus ſais, an orator ſhould not be altogether a ſtranger to any of the polite arts, becauſe he muſt expect to have occaſion ſome time or other to make uſe of them all [1]. But there are ſome kinds of writers, beſides thoſe of his own character, which the antients more eſpecially recommend as uſeful to an orator, which I ſhall breifly mention.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* i. c. 16.

AND firſt they think it very ſerviceable to read the beſt poets, becauſe they abound in fine thoughts, beautiful turns of expreſſion, ſtrong images, and lively deſcriptions, with other ornaments, which contribute very much to excite the fancy, and enliven the ſtile. Tho care muſt be taken not to follow them in all the liberties of poetical diction. For as the orator's view is different from that of the poet, ſo the means he makes uſe of muſt be ſuited to his deſign. The poet often propoſes nothing more than to amuſe and entertain his reader, and therefore takes greater liberty in the choice of his words, boldneſs of his figures, and hightening his images beyond the

LECT. LII.

the life. But as the orator's aim is to perſuade, he is obliged to be more modeſt in all theſe reſpects, that nothing, which he ſais, may appear improbable. If we may judge of the uſe of poetry to an orator, from Quintilian's character of Homer, we muſt acknowledge it to be very great. *Homer*, ſais he, *has given an example and pattern for all the parts of eloquence. No one has excelled him in ſublimity upon lofty ſubjects, or in propriety upon low ones. For to ſay nothing of his laudatory, exhortatory, or conſolatory diſcourſes; does not either his ninth book, which contains the meſſage ſent to Achilles; or the diſpute between the generals in the firſt, or their debates in the ſecond, repreſent all the arts of ſuch conteſts and deliberations? And as to the affections, either thoſe which are more mild, or vehement, he has deſcribed them ſo naturally, that the moſt unſkilful perſon cannot but be impreſſed by them. And in both his poems at the entrance he has briefly, I do not ſay obſerved the method of introductions, but rather preſcribed one. For he not only conciliates his reader, by invoking the deities, who are ſuppoſed to preſide over poets; but ingages his attention, by repreſenting the grandeur of the ſubject; and likewiſe prepares him to under-*

underſtand it, by a ſummary account of his deſign. Who can be more conciſe in his narrations, than when he relates the death of Patroclus? or more expreſſive, than when he recites the battle of the Curetes and Etolians? His ſimilitudes, illuſtrations, examples, digreſſions, circumſtances, and other arguments of proof and refutation, are ſo numerous; that even rhetoricians themſelves have taken many of their examples from him upon theſe heads. And for an epilogue, what inſtance is there to be found, equal to that of Priam's addreſs to Achilles? In ſhort, in the choice of his words, expreſſions, and figures, does not he excede the bounds of an human genius? So that it requires no ſmall abilities not to equal (which is impoſſible) but even to obſerve all his beauties [1]. Thus far Quintilian. Now as theſe are the things proper to be remarked by an orator, this inſtance ſufficiently ſhews, what good uſe may be made of reading the poets.

LECT. LII.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 1.

ANOTHER ſet of writers, no leſs ſerviceable to an orator, are hiſtorians. By hiſtory we are not only informed of matters of fact, but likewiſe of the ſprings of human actions, the manner, in which they were conducted, and likewiſe their events. From whence we are inabled to perceive,

LECT. LII.

what are the natural effects of different cauſes; the tendency, which virtue has to ſocial happineſs, and the contrary effect of vice; and if things have at any time fallen out otherwiſe, than might be expected, what has commonly been the occaſion of ſuch accidents. This knowledge furniſhes an orator with many uſeful and profitable maxims, and enables him to reaſon with greater ſtrength and certainty, from examples and facts, than he could otherwiſe do from bare ſpeculation and opinion. Beſides, the ſmooth, and ſedate ſtile of an hiſtorian, is very ſuitable to ſome parts of an orator's diſcourſe, as I have formerly obſerved.

A THIRD kind of writers recommended by the antients, as very uſeful in oratory, are philoſophers. The acuteneſs of their invention, ſubtilty of their reaſoning, and juſt manner of treating an argument, are in many reſpects ſerviceable to an orator. They inſtruct him likewiſe in the knowledge of human nature, and its various paſſions, by what means they are excited, and how to allay them. From theſe writers alſo he learns the nature, different kinds, and degrees of virtue and vice, with all the offices and duties both of private and ſocial life.

life. And in this reſpect we have an unſpeakable advantage of the antients from revelation. LECT. LII.

BUT it is not only neceſſary to know, what kinds of writers are more eſpecially ſerviceable; but likewiſe, in what manner to make the beſt uſe of them. Many perſons run into a looſe and deſultory way of reading, which turns to little, or no account. They rove from one thing to another, and get only a few ſuperficial notices of many things, without acquainting themſelves with any thing throughly. To prevent this inconvenience, order and method are very requiſite. The mind cannot attend to many things at once. And therefore it is beſt for perſons to maſter one thing, before they paſs to another; and when they begin a writer, to go through with him, and not preſently lay him aſide, if they meet with any thing, which diſpleaſes them, or at firſt ſight appears difficult. It is ſcarce poſſible, that any writer ſhould always expreſs himſelf exactly to every ones taſte. And if ſome difficulties come in the reader's way, he ſhould rather ſuppoſe, like the perſon in reading Democritus, that ſince thoſe things he does underſtand are ſo good, the reſt would appear ſo too, if

LECT. LII.

he knew them [x]. Such a method of reasoning would animate him to conquer difficulties, or at leaſt to endeavour it. But where things prove inſuperable after due pains, it is better to leave them for the preſent; ſince the mind is not always equally diſpoſed to cloſe attention. That will at one time readily open itſelf, and appear very eaſy, which at another ſeemed not intelligible. Beſides, what appears difficult in one part of a writer, is often explained in another. So that patience is a very neceſſary virtue in theſe caſes. Great care and attention ſhould likewiſe be uſed, in order to make the beſt improvement of reading. For any one to hurry over what he reads, without underſtanding it, is but loſs of time; and not to retain it, when he does apprehend it, affords only a preſent pleaſure: and therefore to avoid both theſe diſadvantages, it is neceſſary to read with due attention; and afterwards to conſider the ſubject well in his mind, till he has throughly digeſted it, and made it his own. The want of this conduct has deprived ſome perſons of great reading, in a good meaſure of the benefit of their labor; while retaining only ſome general, and confuſed notions of what they have read, they have not been

[x] Scheff. *De ſtyl.* 55.

been able either to diſcourſe, or write with clearneſs and accuracy upon any ſubject. LECT. LII.

But as the conſtant method of hearing and reading are thus neceſſary for an orator, ſo they ought likewiſe to be accompanied with writing. Cicero calls this *the beſt maſter of eloquence* [1]. And Quintilian ſais, that *eloquence can never arrive to its full ſtrength and maturity, unleſs it derive its nouriſhment from hence* [2]. By this we find our ſtrength and proficiency; and convert to our own uſe, what we have obſerved, and treaſured up from others. And what we have heard or read, will ſoon die and be loſt, unleſs it be kept alive by this exercise. Nor is it ſcarce poſſible to gain both a readineſs, and accuracy without it. For oratory, like all other habits, muſt be acquired by practice. Indeed, a perſon may have a natural faculty of talking with eaſe and fluency; but unleſs he firſt correct and adjuſt his ſtile by writing, it will ſcarce deſerve the name of oratory. There is a wide difference between a looſe and immethodical harangue, and a correct and regular diſcourſe, compoſed with ſkill and judgement. This muſt be the effect of cloſe ſtudy, diligent reading, and much writing. But when a perſon firſt begins

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* i. *c.* 33.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 1.

LECT. LII.

to exercise his stile, it is Quintilian's advice, that he write slowly and with care, examining his thoughts, as they occur to his mind, before he writes them down, and attending both to the choice of his words, and proper turns of expression [1]. It is also very convenient, first to form a general scheme of the discourse in his mind, with the order of its parts, before he begins to compose. And if at any time his thoughts are at a stand, a review of what he wrote last will help to give them a new motion. As it is proper to be thus careful in avoiding a negligence of stile; so, on the other hand, to be over nice and solicitous cools the fancy, and checks the invention. And therefore Quintilian is at a loss to say, who are the most culpable, *such who are pleased with every thing they do, or with nothing* [2]. But it ought to be remembered by every candidate for oratory, that words should always give way to things. A good thought must not be dropt, tho he is not able to dress it up just to his mind. And on the contrary, he should say nothing, that is improper, for the sake of bringing in a particular word or expression, that pleases him. He, who pursues this method at first, will find his labor daily lessen, till time and

[1] *Inst. orat. Lib.* x. c. 3.

[2] *Ibid.*

expe-

experience bring him to an habit of expreſſing himſelf, in the beſt manner with readineſs. Tho in order to this it will be further neceſſary, when the heat of imagination is over in compoſing, and the mind leſs prejudiced in its own favor, to review his diſcourſe at leiſure; and to add, take out, or alter, as he finds convenient, till he has wrought it up, as near as he can, to an imitation of the beſt patterns. LECT. LII.

But of this I ſhall ſpeak more directly in my next lecture.

LECTURE LIII.

Of Imitation, and who are to be imitated.

LECT. LIII.

THAT a ſyſtem of rules is not of itſelf ſufficient to form an orator, but that ſeveral other helps are alſo requiſite to gain this character, was ſhewn in my laſt diſcourſe. I mentioned four of theſe, *hearing*, *reading*, *writing*, and *imitation*; the three firſt of which, and the advantages, which ariſe from them, were then conſidered; and I ſhall now procede to treat of the laſt of them, which is *imitation*.

Now to imitate another, is to endeavour carefully to be like him in that, wherein we propoſe him to ourſelves as a pattern [1]. So in imitating a writer, our view is to gain his ſtile, way of thinking, and method of treating his ſubject. Whatever we obſerve in any, or all of theſe, peculiar to him, and worthy to be copied after, we endeavour to follow. Men ſeem to diſcover as great a diverſity in their minds, as in their faces. And therefore, with the greateſt ſimilitude there is ſtill ſo much difference in both, as that, in either reſpect, one perſon may with

[1] See *Ad Herenn. Lib* i. *c.* 2.

with due attention be diſtinguiſhed from another. Every one has ſomething proper to himſelf in his way of thinking, and acting. And as all are ambitious ſome way or other to recommend themſelves; hence we are naturally led to imitate, what we are pleaſed with in others. This diſcovers itſelf very early, even in children, who readily fall into what they ſee done by their companions with applauſe; tho, for want of diſcretion, it often leads them wrong. However, this natural ambition to excel, if well conducted, is very ſerviceable to mankind; ſince without it ſcarce any part of knowledge, or other laudable deſigns, could be carried to a conſiderable pitch. If we look back to the origin of arts and ſciences, we ſhall find their firſt rudiments generally very lame and imperfect, and that they improved gradually, by firſt imitating, and then improving upon the inventions of former ages. Cicero tells us, that the firſt hiſtorians among the Romans were very dry and jejune, contenting themſelves with a capacity of conveying their ſenſe in an intelligible manner; and that the improvements made upon them by their ſucceſſors were but ſmall, till they came to fall into an imitation of the Greeks; and then they

LECT. LIII.

ſoon

LECT. LIII.

ſoon became their rivals [1]. And if imitation be neceſſary, while arts are in a progreſſive ſtate, and advancing towards maturity; it ſhould ſeem no leſs ſo, when they are arrived at perfection. For as we muſt either be like thoſe, who have performed beſt, or unlike them: no one ſurely would chooſe the latter; and it can ſcarce be expected, that nature alone ſhould enable us to do the former, tho imitation poſſibly may [2].

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 12.

[2] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 2.

AND as nature and reaſon thus direct us to imitation, ſo we find it has been the conſtant practice of the beſt artiſts of all kinds. And ſome critics have ſhewn, that even Homer himſelf, who has been long eſteemed the fountain and origin of all the liberal arts, had the aſſiſtance of other writers, which are now loſt [3]. And it is well known, how cloſely Virgil has imitated him in his *Aeneid*, as he has done Heſiod in his *Georgics*, and Theocritus in his *Eclogues*. Terence principally copied after Menander, and Plautus after Epicarmus, as we learn from Horace [4]; who himſelf owes many of his beauties to the Grecian liric poets [5]. And to come nearer to our preſent purpoſe, M. Antony the Roman orator commends Sulpicius, a young gentleman

[3] J. G. Voſſius, *De poet. Graec. l.* 1.

[4] *Lib.* ii. *ep. ad Auguſt.*

[5] Scal. *De poet. v.* 7.

tleman of a very promiſing genius, for his imitation of Craſſus, the moſt celebrated orator of that age; and repreſents the incredible proficiency of Sulpicius by that means in one year, which it would not have been poſſible for him to have gained any other way [1]. And that Cicero himſelf imitated the Greek orators, appears from many paſſages in his writings; ſome of which I ſhall have occaſion to mention afterwards, and therefore at preſent ſhall content myſelf with the teſtimony of Quintilian, who in comparing him with Demoſthenes, ſais thus: *Moſt of their virtues ſeem alike to me. But in this Demoſthenes has the advantage, that he was firſt; and in a great meaſure made Cicero what he is. For as Cicero appears to me to have wholly given himſelf to the imitation of the Greeks, he has expreſſed the ſtrength and ſublimity of Demoſthenes, the copiouſneſs of Plato, and the delicacy of Iſocrates. Nor has he only acquired what was beſt in each of them, but rather by the force of his own happy, and immortal genius, fetched every virtue from himſelf* [2]. Thus we ſee the moſt celebrated writers among the antients copied after thoſe, who went before them, and in a great meaſure acquired that reputation, which they

LECT. LIII.

[1] *De orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 21.

[2] *Inſt orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 1.

LECT. LIII.

they have ſo juſtly gained in their ſeveral ways, by their examples. And the like might be ſhewn, if neceſſary, in ſome of the beſt of our modern authors. But notwithſtanding the conſtant practice of the greateſt men in all ages, in favor of imitation, this, like moſt other things, has had its oppoſers.

For it is objected: That only to attend to what has been ſaid, or done by others, is to baulk nature, and check the force of our own genius: that if this ſhould be always the caſe, there could be no room for improvement in arts and ſciences, where nothing more is aimed at, but what has been done before [1].

[1] Politian. *Lib.* viii. *ep.* 16. Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. 2.

THIS might be true in a good meaſure, if what is here repreſented, was all that is deſigned by imitation. But no further reſtriction is intended by it, than a careful endeavour to expreſs the principal and peculiar excellencies of thoſe, we propoſe for our patterns; and that too in ſuch a manner, as to leave room for emulation, either to excel them, in thoſe virtues, or to add others to them, in which they may be thought deficient. So that our own genius is not cramped by this means, but rather excited to gain a ſuperiority in thoſe excel-

excellencies, which perhaps we ſhould never have attended to, or not been able to repreſent to that advantage, if we had not firſt ſeen them expreſſed by others. Let us reflect a little how nature uſually acts in this caſe. Upon ſeeing any thing, that is excellent in its kind, that we ourſelves have been purſuing, or our genius leads us to; do not we preſently find ourſelves fired with an ambition to imitate it? And if we ſet about it, do not we endeavour to expreſs all its beauties, amend its defects, if we obſerve any, and to give our copy all the advantages we can above the original? This is what is meant by imitation, and is very conſiſtent with the free exerciſe, and improvement of our own abilities. And as I obſerved before in nature, that the greateſt ſimilitude is accompanied with ſuch a difference, as plainly diſtinguiſhes one perſon from another; ſo in art, the genius of him, who imitates another, is very diſcernible from his, whom he imitates. Have not Virgil and Cicero their peculiar virtues, different from thoſe in common with Homer and Demoſthenes, whom they followed? And even in theſe latter, which they have in common, there is ſtill a difference. There is nothing ſo like another,

LECT. LIII. as to be intirely the ſame, but may be either better or worſe [1].

[1] Quint. *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 2.

IT is objected again: That to confine ourſelves to an imitation of others, does not barely hinder our excelling them, but even prevents our being equal to them. Juſt as he, who in walking follows another, and endeavours to tread in his ſteps, muſt neceſſarily keep behind him [2].

[2] Ib. *Polit. dict. ep.*

BUT this objection ſtill goes upon the miſtake of not diſtinguiſhing between imitation, and bare copying; the latter of which is indeed almoſt neceſſarily attended with this inconvenience. He, who is imployed only to copy a picture, is not at liberty to correct its defects, improve its beauties, or add any thing to render it more perfect; but is confined to expreſs every thing, as near as poſſibly he can to the original. This reſtriction does of courſe occaſion a ſtiffneſs, and by cramping the imagination of the artiſt, take off from the life and ſpirit of the work. So that we ſeldom find an exact copy, which in all reſpects comes up to the original. And the caſe is the ſame as to language; he, who obliges himſelf to uſe only the ſame words, forms of expreſſion, turn of periods, and other ornaments of ſtile, which another

another perſon has done before him, will find himſelf hampered with the like diſadvantage. For, as Quintilian has well obſerved: *It is generally leſs difficult to do what is better, than exactly the ſame thing* [1]. But now imitation does not tie us down to this ſlaviſh attendance, of following another's ſteps; but permits us, where we find it proper, to leave the tract, come up with him, and if we can, to get before him. LECT. LIII.

[1] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 2.

BUT it is ſtill further objected: That one thing may be like another, that is beautiful and agreable, and yet not be ſo itſelf. And to ſet this matter in the worſt light they can, they ſay: No animal is ſo like a man, as an ape; and yet none more contemptible and ridiculous [2].

[2] Politian. *dict. op.*

THIS may paſs for a peice of pleaſantry, but ſcarce deſerves the name of an argument. Every one knows, there are two kinds of likeneſs, one that is true and genuine, and the other burleſque. The ſimilitude of an ape to a man may ſerve for an inſtance of the latter; as that of a ſon to his father may of the former. And this may further help to illuſtrate what is deſigned by imitation. The ſon's likeneſs to his father, either in body, mind, or behaviour,

LECT. LIII.

viour, leaves him as much at liberty in the exerciſe of all his faculties, as if there was no ſuch ſimilitude. And in any of theſe, where the father has a power to correct or improve them, the ſon has equally the ſame. Beſides, as this natural agrement ſhews itſelf in ſome reſpects, ſo in others it leaves a difference. And what nature does in this caſe, is the deſign of art by imitation, to aim at a ſimilitude in ſome things only, which appear excellent; and this without any reſtraint upon the perſon's genius, but only by directing it into a proper channel, and that principally at firſt, till it be once confirmed by uſe and experience. It is true indeed, that as in nature there is both a good and a bad likeneſs, ſo either may be the effect of imitation. For as there is nothing ſo perfect, but what is attended with ſome defects; it too often falls out, that thoſe, who propoſe others for their examples, more eaſily run into their faults and imperfections, than gain a likeneſs of their virtues. Thus Cicero tells us of a Roman orator, who was remarkable for his flame, and pathetic way of addreſſing his audience; but at the ſame time rendered what he ſaid leſs agreable, by the diſtortion of his countenance, and a broad pro-

pronunciation. However, the reputation he had gained, induced another to make him his pattern; who unhappily fell into his bad qualities, but was never maſter of his good ones [1]. And Quintilian informs us of ſome in his time, who thought they imitated Cicero very notably, if they did but end their ſentences, as he often does, with the words *eſſe videatur* [2]. But theſe, and ſuch like follies, are not the fault of imitation, but ariſe from a want of judgement in thoſe, who attempt it.

LECT. LIII.

[1] *De Orat. Lib.* ii. *c.* 22.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. *c.* 2.

SINCE the objections therefore againſt imitation ſeem not ſufficient to diſſuade from the practice of it, three inquiries here naturally offer themſelves.

WHO are to be imitated.

WHAT we are to imitate. And,

IN what manner.

As to the firſt of theſe: Who the perſons are, proper for our imitation: writers have very much differed in their ſentiments concerning it.

SOME ſay, we ſhould imitate all, who are good and eminent in their way [3].

[3] *Joan. Franc. Pici Epiſt. p.* 232.

BUT this ſeems to deſtroy the notion of imitation. For to endeavour to be like every body, is in reality to be like no body; and yet the deſign of imitation is to be

LECT. LIII. like ſome body. Such a roving, and unſteady conduct will ſuffer nothing to faſten long upon the mind. And therefore he, who purſues this method, can never be uniform and conſiſtent with himſelf; but will always fluctuate and vary, according to the different tincture he receives from thoſe writers, with whom he laſt converſes. Nor will the number of his new acquaintance, conſtantly increaſing upon him, permit him to converſe with any of them intimately enough, to be throughly maſter of their virtues; ſo that what he gains from each, can be but ſuperficial at the moſt.

OTHERS therefore on the contrary think it moſt adviſeable, that we ſhould confine our imitation to one only, the beſt and moſt perfect in his kind. The advantages of this method are beſt repreſented by cardinal Bembus, of any writer I have met with; and as he relates them from his own experience, I ſhall give you the ſubſtance of what he ſais, as breifly as I can. He tells us, that when he firſt ſet out for a candidate in oratory, he determined to fix on no particular pattern for his imitation, but to follow whatever pleaſed him in all. But he was ſoon diſſuaded from this conduct, by finding it attended with ſuch in-

con-

conveniences, as I have before mentioned. This put him upon a reſolution of laying aſide all imitation of others, and wholly to follow the bent of his own genius. But he was diſcouraged again from the purſuit of this method, by obſerving, that either the ſame things had been ſaid by others to better advantage; or, if they had not, that ſtill upon comparing his own writings with thoſe of others, his ſtile, and manner of conveying his thoughts, was very much inferior to theirs; and beſides, he perceived, that this way had proved unſucceſsful to others, who by continuing in it had never arrived to any eminency. This made him think ſome ſort of imitation neceſſary. But being doubtful, leſt, if he ſhould at firſt propoſe to follow the beſt and moſt excellent, the difficulty of the taſk, and his ſlow proficiency, might ſoon diſhearten him from the purſuit; he reſolved to begin with thoſe of an inferior rank, and by that means prepare his way to imitate the others with greater eaſe. Tho in this again he afterwards found his miſtake. For when he had once fallen into the manner of thoſe writers of a low rank, inſtead of their proving any aſſiſtance to him in imitating the beſt, they proved no ſmall hindrance

LECT. LIII.

LECT. LIII.

in the attempt. For what he had got from them being now become familiar, would be apt to ſtart firſt in his mind, and prevent what was better. However, being reſolutely bent upon purſuing his deſign, and making Cicero his pattern, he at laſt ſo far gained his point, that of thoſe many, who have attempted the ſame thing, very few, if any, have arrived at a greater ſimilitude to Cicero in his ſtile. And therefore from his own example, after ſo many fruitleſs trials otherwiſe, he recommends it, as the beſt and moſt certain method, to fix upon one pattern for imitation [1].

[1] Bemb *Epiſt. ad Joan. Franc. Picum, p.* 260.

BUT it muſt ſtill be owned, there are ſome inconveniences, which attend this practice. For ſo ſtrict a confinement, in adhering only to one example, will almoſt neceſſarily occaſion a ſtiffneſs, notwithſtanding the greateſt care to avoid it; as often appears not only in the writings of all others, who affect to call themſelves Ciceronians, but even of thoſe of Bembus himſelf. Beſides, tho one writer may upon the whole be much preferable to any, or all others in the ſame way, and have more excellencies than all of them in the ſame degree; yet another may excede him in ſome particular beauties. And why ſhould

we

we deny ourſelves the liberty of endeavouring to gain thoſe, out of a peculiar fondneſs to him? This is to gratify fancy at the expence of our judgement. Nay, and it is poſſible, that he, who purſues this method, may at length, by dwelling conſtantly upon one, without comparing him with others (as there is none perfect in all reſpects) render his defects ſo familiar to him, as wholly to overlook them, if not to admire them. SECT. LIII.

OTHERS therefore recommend a middle way between theſe extremes, and adviſe at firſt to make choice of one only for ſome time, the beſt in his kind; and then to join with him one or more of the moſt conſiderable, and ſuch as come neareſt him in their manner; and when by obſervation and practice we have gained ſome good degree of ſimilitude to theſe, ſo that it is become eaſy and habitual; after this to proceede to any others, who may be thought worth reading, not with ſo direct a view of cloſe imitation, but only to borrow from them occaſionally, whatever may be of ſervice to us, and add to the furniture of our minds, either as to thought or language. But in conjunction with all the others, we ſhould ſtill continue to be moſt converſant

LECT. LIII.

with the firſt and beſt, to endeavour to retain a clear idea of him in our minds, and cheifly to expreſs him in our practice. And the reaſons for joining others with him, are partly to avoid the inconveniences of too minute and ſlaviſh an imitation, which thoſe ſo generally run into, who always confine themſelves to one only; and partly not to loſe the advantage of acquiring any particular excellencies, which may be greater and more conſpicuous in others.

THIS is the way, which Voſſius propoſes, and I think with very good reaſon [1]. And Quintilian ſeems to be much of the ſame opinion, when he ſais: *Only the beſt, and he, whom we may truſt moſt ſafely, is to be read long* [2]. But we have ſtill a greater authority to recommend it, than either of theſe, and that is of Cicero himſelf; who ſeems to have followed this method. For by Quintilian's account above mentioned, tho he cheifly imitated Demoſthenes, yet to his ſtrength and ſublimity (which were the cheif excellencies of Demoſthenes) he likewiſe added the copiouſneſs of Plato, and delicacy of Iſocrates. But as the minds of all perſons are no more of one ſize, than their bodies, and authors of the ſame kind differ very much in their manner, and there

[1] *De imit.* c. 11. §. 5, 6.

[2] *Inſt. orat. Lib.* x. c. 1.

are ſome, who excel in each; every one ſhould conſult his own genius, and chooſe that way, in which he is moſt likely to ſucceed. The cool, and ſedate temper of Iſocrates, would never have raiſed him to the grandeur and ſublimity of Demoſthenes, tho he had aimed at it; nor perhaps was the other's natural heat and flame conſiſtent with that cloſe attendance and labor, which would have been neceſſary to gain that delicacy in the choice of words, and correctneſs of expreſſion, with thoſe ſmooth and flowing numbers, which are the diſtinguiſhing beauties of Iſocrates. A genius like Cicero might unite all theſe, and other perfections; but that is a ſingular happineſs. In common caſes it is not always what is abſolutely beſt, but comparatively ſo, in its own kind, and beſt ſuits their own taſte, that ſhould determine perſons in the choice of their patterns for imitation. LECT. LIII.

I SHOULD now procede to the other two inquiries, which reſpect the ſubject, and manner of imitation. But theſe I muſt refer to my next diſcourſe.

LECTURE LIV.

Of the Subject, and Manner of Imitation.

LECT. LIV. IN my laſt diſcourſe having ſhewn the nature of imitation, and vindicated the practice of it from ſuch objections, as have been raiſed againſt it; in order to ſet this ſubject in the fulleſt light, I propoſed to conſider three things:

WHO are to be imitated.

WHAT we are to imitate. And,

IN what manner.

THE firſt of theſe I then treated at large; and now procede to the other two, which reſpect the ſubject, and manner of imitation.

AND with regard to the former, it will be requiſite to conſider both the things themſelves, which are to be imitated, and the conduct neceſſary for doing it with ſucceſs.

Now, as the things to be imitated are the perfections of the beſt maſters in their ſeveral kinds; ſo theſe are different, according to the various ſubjects, in which they excel. And therefore the things more eſpecially to be obſerved in an orator, as

proper for imitation, are thoſe, which conſtitute his art; and they are, *invention*, *diſpoſition*, *elocution*, and *pronunciation*; in each of which the imitator ought carefully to attend to the following particulars. LECT. LIV.

As to invention, it is fit he obſerve in his pattern the juſtneſs of his ſcheme, the force of his arguments, and the topics, from whence they are fetched; his caution in guarding againſt objections, and ſkill in removing them; his ſmooth and becoming addreſs; and his artful manner of applying to the paſſions.

IN the diſpoſition, he ought to conſider the order and rangement of the ſeveral parts of his diſcourſe, and his conduct thro each of them. In the exordium, his manner of engaging his hearers, and how naturally he leads them into his ſubject. In the narration, how clear his account is, how conſiſtent with itſelf in all its parts, and how every circumſtance is ſo placed as to give weight to, and highten the credit of the whole. In laying down the propoſition, how clearly and fully he ſtates his ſubject. And if he afterwards divides it, how adequate the partition is to the whole, and how juſt the dependence of each part upon one another. In the confirmation, his

LECT. LIV.

his ſkill in ſo ranging his arguments, as they may throw the cleareſt light upon each other; how he varies their form, and ſets them in different views, both for greater variety and ſtrength. In the concluſion, with what brevity, and order he compriſes the ſubſtance of his preceding diſcourſe, and particularly, with what art he addreſſes to the paſſions Laſtly, how eaſy and natural his tranſitions appear, in paſſing from one thing to another, thro the whole. And if any of theſe parts are wanting, or not in their uſual order (as ſometimes happens) he ſhould conſider, what particular reaſons might occaſion it.

As to elocution, it is neceſſary for him to attend to the choice and variety of his words, and propriety of his expreſſions; as the beauty of his tropes, and ſtrength of his figures; as likewiſe the turn of his periods, and harmony of his numbers: in a word, the whole complexion and character of his ſtile, and how juſtly he adapts it to the nature of his ſubject.

AND laſtly, with regard to pronunciation, it is requiſite to obſerve his conduct in the management both of his voice and geſtures. As to the former, how it riſes, ſinks, or varies, as the nature of each ſentence,

tence, and the ſeveral parts of it require; and how its different changes and inflections are ſuited to anſwer his particular intention, thro the whole diſcourſe. And as to the latter, how the motions of his countenance, every feature of it, and all the other parts of his body, are adapted to the nature of his expreſſions, and the tone of his voice, in a decent and graceful manner. But this part of imitation requires a living pattern; whereas the former may all be gained by ſtudy, and a careful attention to the works of the beſt orators. LECT. LIV.

THESE are the ſeveral things proper to be imitated in an orator. But in order to any one's doing it effectually, he ſhould be careful to gain his ſpirit, and way of thinking, as well as the beauties of his language. And therefore, when he reads him, he ſhould ſtrive to put himſelf in the ſame ſituation of mind, and be affected as he was, when he ſpoke; that he may view things in the ſame light, and then he will beſt diſcern both his excellencies, and defects. For as two perſons cannot have exactly the ſame proſpect, unleſs it be taken from the ſame place, and directed to one point; ſo neither can they conceive alike of the ſame thing, unleſs it appear to them in

SECT. LIV. in the like circumſtances. Wherefore he, who would get the ſame ideas in reading, which another had in ſpeaking, muſt put himſelf, as near as he can, into his ſtate; conſider the time, place, and occaſion of his diſcourſe; the perſons, to whom it is addreſſed, and how he was himſelf affected, with whatever elſe may deſerve remarking. By this means he will be let into a fuller acquaintance with his deſign, receive deeper impreſſions from what he ſais, and be helped to ſee the reaſon of his conduct in each part of his performance; why he diſpoſed it in ſuch order, reaſoned in ſuch a manner; choſe ſuch expreſſions, brightened them with ſuch figures, or warmed them with ſuch affections. For many things are elegant and beautiful in their proper place, which would not appear ſo, if otherwiſe diſpoſed. So that without ſuch a key, he may be often liable to miſtake beauties for defects, and defects for beauties; and even to convert the beauties of a good diſcourſe into blemiſhes, by miſapplying them. I have formerly taken notice of the ſurpriſing effect, which Cicero's oration for Ligarius is ſaid to have had upon J. Caeſar. And doubtleſs very much of this was owing to the action of the orator, and his artful manner

manner of ſpeaking. However, if we conſider the circumſtances both of the ſpeaker, and the perſon, to whom the diſcourſe was made; we ſhall perceive, that nothing could be better calculated to anſwer ſuch an end. After the concluſion of the civil war, when Cæſar had got the ſole power into his hands, he affected nothing more, than to have it thought he held it rightfully, as the conſequence of a juſt victory, and therefore to be applauded for his clemency to thoſe of the contrary party. And indeed, the two characters, of which he was moſt ambitious, were courage and clemency. And Cicero endeavours, in the moſt ſkilful manner, to work upon his paſſions, by applauding both thoſe virtues throughout that oration. In the cloſe of which he pays him this compliment, with regard to each of them. *Your fortune*, ſais he, *has nothing greater, than to enable you; or your nature better, than to incline you, to ſpare very many.* But he begins with his clemency, and to ſooth him the more, owns himſelf as an inſtance of it. For it is with reſpect to his own caſe, that he breaks out into thoſe pathetic expreſſions: *O admirable clemency, worthy of the higheſt praiſe, and to be for ever recorded in the monu-*

LECT. LIV.

LECT. LIV. *monuments of future ages*[1]! Tho, in reality, this was mere grimace; for he always thought him a tyrant, and did not ſtick to call him ſo afterwards, when he could do it with ſafety. However, it anſwered his end at that time, to give Caeſar the moſt pleaſing idea of his preſent felicity, as lord of ſo great a part of the world. But after this, when he comes to ſpeak of his courage, and carries him back to the plains of Pharſalia, which could not but revive in his mind the anxious thoughts he was then under, for the ſucceſs of that important battle, on which no leſs depended than the government of the Roman empire; and theſe thoughts were again preſently ſucceded by a reflection upon the glorious conſequences of that victory: is it to be wondered at in ſuch a ſtate of mind, that thoſe oppoſite paſſions of fear and joy, wrought up to ſuch a pitch by ſo maſterly an hand as Cicero's, ſhould be ſufficient to overſet any mortal? If we conſider the ſpeech in this light, and can in ſome meaſure, by the help of imagery, render thoſe things preſent to our own minds; I doubt not but we ſhall feel ourſelves ſo warmed by them, that Plutarch's account may appear not improbable. But without that view,

[1] *Pro Lig.* c. 2.

view, or entering into the circumſtances of the caſe, this oration may probably be read without our being at all affected by it, or perceiving, how it poſſibly could in ſo wonderful a manner affect another. It is therefore by conſidering the deſign of a ſpeaker, that we are firſt helped perfectly to underſtand him, thence led to admire him, and ſo prepared to imitate him. An imperfect knowledge can carry us only to a partial imitation. And he cannot be ſaid to underſtand him throughly, who does not enter into his thought and ſpirit. Some indeed have imagined, that nothing more is deſigned by imitation, than to uſe another's words and phraſes; but this is only a ſmall part, if it goes no farther. It is the juſtneſs and beauty of his thoughts, we are principally to labour after. This was the judgement of Quintilian upon this matter. *Imitation*, ſais he, *does not conſiſt only in words. We are to regard the decency of an author, both as to things and perſons, what his deſign is, how he forms it, even with reſpect to thoſe things, which are only deſigned for entertainment: how he works up his exordium, and frames his narration, how cloſely he reaſons, with what ſkill he applies to the paſſions, and inſinuates himſelf*

LECT. LIV.

LECT. LIV.

himself into the good opinion of his hearers: which is then most artfully managed, when it appears most easy and natural. When we discern these things, we shall be fit to imitate them. And he who is not only advanced so far, but is able likewise himself to supply what is deficient, or omit what is redundant, is a complete orator [1]. Thus far Quintilian. To labour only at a similitude of stile with the person, we propose to imitate, without entering into his sentiments and way of thinking, is (as we say) to begin at the wrong end; since this latter can scarce be attained, without gaining at the same time a considerable tincture of his stile; whereas we find instances of those, who by great pains, and close attention, have been able to express themselves in the words and phrases of some particular author, but appear wholly destitute of his spirit and genius.

[1] *Inst. orat. Lib. x. c. 2.*

But it is time to procede to the last inquiry, which relates to the manner of imitation. Seneca compares imitation to the action of the stomach, which by digestion converts the several kinds of food it receives into one different substance, which supplies us with fresh recruits of blood and spirits. For so the mind (as he

he ſais) alters what it receives from others in ſuch a manner, as that it no longer appears to be theirs, but its own [1]. And therefore he, who copies only, or tranſlates from another, and endeavours to paſs it off for his own, is not an imitator, but a plagiary. Which is the caſe of Apuleius, who in his *Metamorphoſis of a golden aſs*, copies all in a manner from Lucian, without ever naming him [2]. Indeed, the beſt writers ſometimes take particular paſſages from others, almoſt in the ſame words; but this is not common. They generally either ſo diſguiſe what they borrow, as to make it appear intirely new; or endeavour at leaſt ſo far to alter and improve it, that they may rather ſeem to rival, than copy after their original. There is one very remarkable inſtance of this, among many others, in Virgil, which I ſhall here mention. Homer repreſents Thetis as addreſſing to Vulcan, to make her ſon Achilles a new ſuit of armour, upon the death of Patroclus [3]. And Virgil, borrowing the thought from him, deſcribes Venus ſoliciting him upon the like account for her ſon Aeneas [4]. But they very much differ in deſcribing the circumſtances of this affair; for Virgil no where

SECT. LIV.

[1] *Ep.* 85.

[2] *Cauſſ. p.* 162.

[3] *Iliad. σ.* 428.

[4] *Aen. Lib.* viii. *v.* 416.

LECT. LIV. follows Homer, where he thinks he can improve upon him. Homer places Vulcan's workhouſe among the ſeats of the celeſtial deities; but Virgil ſeems to have thought that not ſo proper a place for a ſmith's forge, and therefore fixes it in a little iſland near Sicily. In Homer, Thetis finds Vulcan imployed in making caldrons; but Virgil aſſigns his workmen a more noble imployment, in forming thunderbolts. The fineſt peice of armour in both is the ſheild. And here Virgil has in a particular manner ſhewn his great judgement, and art in imitation. For tho the ornaments upon the ſheild of Achilles are very beautifully deſcribed by Homer; yet he has embelliſhed it with many things, that have no relation to the character of an hero; ſuch as muſic, dancing, a marriage, a lawſuit, the labors of huſbandmen, and of ſhepherds. But Virgil has repreſented upon his ſheild the great actions of the Romans, as deſcendants of Aeneas, down from Aſcanius, to M. Antony's defeat at Actium by Auguſtus; the moſt proper imagery for a warrior, and fited to inſpire him with courage, as often as he viewed it. In this then conſiſts the true art of imitation, ſo to diverſify what we take from others,

as,

as, if we can, to improve it, or at leaſt not ſuffer it to receive any detriment by our alteration. And this is cheifly done by ſome or other of the following methods, which I ſhall illuſtrate by examples taken from Cicero. LECT. LIV.

ONE way is ſo to enlarge a thought, or expreſſion taken from another, as in a good meaſure to render it our own. It is well known, that Cicero, in his orations againſt Mark Antony, followed the pattern of Demoſthenes, in his invectives againſt king Philip, for which reaſon Cicero has given his the name of *Philippics*. Now Demoſthenes makes uſe of the following argument, to inſpire the Athenians with courage in defence of their country, by carrying on a vigorous war againſt king Philip. *Your anceſtors*, ſais he, *have left you this glory, which they procured for you by many honorable and eminent dangers* [1]. Cicero uſes the ſame argument, when he endeavours to perſuade the Romans to declare Mark Antony a traitor to his country; but has ſo diſguiſed it, by his manner of introducing it, and inlargement upon it, that it is not eaſily obſervable, from whence he took it. *We do not*, ſais he, *conſider now, upon what terms we ſhall live; but,*

[1] *Philip.* iii. *in fin.*

LECT. LIV.

whether we are to live at all, or ſuffer an ignominious death. But tho nature has made death common to all, courage renders us ſuperior both to its pain and diſgrace. This has never been wanting to the Romans. Therefore preſerve this, citizens, which your anceſtors have left you as an inheritance. For when all other things are uncertain, fading, and changeable; true courage is ſo deeply rooted, it can never be ſhook, never be moved. It was by this our anceſtors firſt conquered all Italy, and afterwards demoliſhed Carthage, deſtroyed Numantia, and brought the moſt powerful kings, and warlike nations into a ſubjection to this government [z]. No one can doubt, upon comparing theſe paſſages in the two orations, but that Cicero took from Demoſthenes that thought, when he repreſents courage in defence of their country, as an inheritance left them by their anceſtors; tho he ſo enlarges it by a variety, both of arguments and examples, that it is in a great meaſure concealed.

[z] *Philip.* iv. c. 5.

A SECOND method is, when we either abridge, or take only a part of what another has ſaid before us. After the battle at Chæronea, in which the Athenians had been defeated by king Philip, Demoſthenes,

nes, in a funeral oration, which he made in praiſe of thoſe, who upon that occaſion had loſt their lives in the defence of their country, to alleviate the greif of their freinds, ſais: *How can they be thought otherwiſe than happy, who being placed among the antient worthies in the iſlands of the bleſſed, may be juſtly thought aſſeſſors with the deities below*[1]? Cicero borrows part of this in his xivth *Philippic*, in which he applauds the bravery of thoſe Romans, who were killed in the battle againſt Mark Antony before Mutina. *Thoſe impious wretches*, ſais he, *whom you have ſlain, will ſuffer the puniſhment of their parricide in the infernal regions; but you, who expired in victory, are ſeated among the bleſſed. Nature has granted us a ſhort term of life; but the memory of it, when well employed, is eternal*[2]. He omits the exceſs of compliment, in joining them with the infernal deities: but when Demoſthenes had only ſpoken of them as in a ſtate of happineſs, he addreſſes to them, which gives a ſtronger idea of their exiſtence, and conſequently of their enjoyment of that felicity.

LECT. LIV.

[1] *Orat. funebr. in fin.*

[2] *Cap.* 12.

A THIRD method is to keep the thought, but apply it to a different ſubject. Of this

LECT. LIV.

we have alſo an inſtance in Cicero, whoſe introduction to his oration for Quinctius is taken from that of Demoſthenes, in his defence of Cteſiphon. They both complain of two diſadvantages, they laboured under in their pleading. Thoſe mentioned by Demoſthenes are, firſt, that it would be of much worſe conſequence for him, if he did not ſuccede, than for his adverſary Aeſchines; and ſecondly, that moſt people are better pleaſed to hear another accuſed, than a perſon commend himſelf, tho it be neceſſary for his defence. But Cicero's two things are, that the adverſe party had more intereſt, and greater eloquence; which two things, as he ſais, had then the greateſt influence at Rome.

THE laſt way I ſhall mention is, when the thoughts are preſerved, and applied to the ſame ſubject; but either the order of them is changed, or they are repreſented in a different dreſs. Thus Demoſthenes, in one of his orations againſt Ariſtogiton, very eloquently ſhews the neceſſity, and advantage of the laws to all ſorts of people, by enumerating the ſeveral orders and ranks of perſons in the ſtate. And Cicero, in his defence of Cluentius, does the like in as florid a way,

way, but pretty much different as to the manner, and form of his expreſſions. LECT. LIV.

AND now what has been ſaid may, I hope, be ſufficient to explain the nature of imitation, and direct our conduct in the practice of it.

END *of the* SECOND VOLUME.

ERRATA.

Vol. I. Page 27. Line 26. read *Antony.*
69. in Note 1. after L. 19. inſert *ff. ad ex.*
88. Line 6. read *ſettled.*
139. Line 10. inſert , after arguments; dele , after ſuited.
151. Line 21. read *violently.*
324. Line 10. dele , after manners.

Vol. II. Page 6. Line 27. read *Antony.*
10. Line 21. after whole inſert *of.*
51. Line penult. read *magnanimity.*
83. Line 23. read *not.*
84. in Note 1. read *c.* 7.
86. Line 9. read *honor.*
90. in note, read *Milon.*
292. Line ult. read *colors.*
371. Line penult. inſert) after imagines

In ſeveral places, for defence, offence, exclaim, excell, read *defenſe, offenſe, exclame, excel.*

FEB 7 1936